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CAPACITY BUILDING AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE 




Linda M. Young 
Montana State University 
 
This  edition  of  the  Journal  of  International  Agricultural  Trade  and  Development  is 
devoted to papers prepared and submitted by fellows of a capacity building program for 
researchers in agricultural trade policy in developing countries. The program, funded by the 
Global  Development  Program  of  the  William  and  Flora  Hewlett  Foundation,  has  been 
implemented by the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) and is 
known as the Hewlett/IATRC Capacity Building Program. 
The purpose of the program is to involve researchers in developing countries who are 
working in agricultural trade policy in an international research and networking program. The 
fellows were selected in 2006 through an international competitive process. Each fellow was 
then paired with an IATRC member who has acted as both mentor and partner in a joint 
research program over the duration of the three-year program. As part of the program, fellows 
have also attended workshops on trade policy issues and the semi- annual conferences of the 
IATRC. 
The Hewlett/IATRC fellows have participated  in a challenging research program that 
reflects the diverse and complex policy issues facing developing nations. Developing country 
governments  frequently  have  multiple  goals  for  their  agricultural  sectors.  One  goal  is  to 
reduce  poverty  in  rural  areas  through  increased  agricultural  productivity  and  exports. To 
achieve  this  goal,  governments  have  reformed  policies  that  have  historically  taxed  the 
agricultural sector, as discussed by Salam and Abdel Karim Yousif and Abler. Governments 
may also seek greater integration into world markets through accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This accession process and the requirements of WTO membership have 
consequences both for a country‘s overall economy and the agricultural sector in particular, as 
illustrated in the paper on Sudan. At the same time that  governments have sought greater 
involvement in world markets, they have also continued to pursue their goal of ensuring low 
food prices and food security for poor consumers. Both Weerahewa and Meilke and Salam 
highlight  the  use  of  policies  to  insulate  consumers  from  volatility  in  world  markets,  as 
recently experienced in 2006-2008.  Along with  integration  into world markets comes the 
need for governments to respond to the policy choices of their trading partners. Weerahewa 
and  Meilke  discuss  the  impact  on  small  developing  South  Asian  countries  of  India‘s 
restrictions on food exports, illustrating the vulnerability of small food importers. Miranda 
and Barros investigate the impact of the European Union‘s non-tariff barriers on Brazilian Linda M. Young 
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beef  exports.  In  different ways,  the  papers  by  Weerahewa  and  Meilke  and  Miranda  and 
Barros  demonstrate  the  challenge  of  designing  WTO  trade  regulations  that  balance  the 
concerns  and  needs  of  importers  and  exporters. The  paper  by  Miranda  and  Barros  also 
emphasizes the difficult task of assessing whether the imposition of a particular non-tariff 
measure violates WTO rules. 
Papers authored or co-authored by five of the Hewlett/IATRC fellows are included in this 
issue of the journal. The paper by Abdul Salam investigates the changing nature of domestic 
agricultural policy choices in Pakistan. Salam notes that historically the government has taxed 
the production of several major crops in Pakistan, which has reduced the incentives facing 
farmers in their production decisions. He assesses the nature and extent of government policy 
interventions in the production and marketing of domestic wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane 
crops and estimates nominal protection coefficients for the period 1991 to 2008. The analysis 
indicates that both wheat and basmati rice production have been taxed over this period, while 
production of coarse rice varieties have been protected. The results for cotton and sugarcane 
are  mixed.  Salam  finds  that  overall  government  intervention  in  commodity  markets  and 
taxation of agricultural production has declined. He concludes by highlighting the need for 
active  government  support  for  research  and  development  to  help  increase  the  sector‘s 
productivity. 
Abdel  Karim  Yousif and Abler analyze the consequences of Sudan‘s accession to the 
WTO. Sudan, like several  least developed countries, is not food self-sufficient and faces 
numerous challenges in developing its agricultural sector, including political instability and 
the dominant role of oil in its economy. Over the past 15 years, taxation of the agriculture 
sector has been significantly reduced as the economy has been liberalized. Sudan does not 
currently face high tariffs for its exports and it is a member of several preferential trading 
arrangements. Thus the authors focus their analysis on the impact of accession on imports, 
and they estimate the consequences of Sudan‘s proposal to bind its import tariffs. They find 
that oilseed products would suffer the largest negative  impact of tariff  liberalization and 
conclude  with  a  suggestion  that  Sudan  reorient  its  trade  policies  to  increase  the 
competitiveness of its agricultural exports. 
Motivated by the 2006-08 spike in world food prices, Weerahewa and Meilke examine 
the impact of India‘s possible agricultural trade policy choices on its trading partners. The 
increase  in  global  food  prices  motivated  many  governments  to  restrict  their  agricultural 
exports in an attempt to moderate the impact on their consumers. Weerahewa and Meilke note 
three facts about trade in South Asia: India dominates regional trade; intra-regional trade is 
lower in South Asia than in other regions; countries in South Asia still trade more with each 
other than with other regions. The authors find that while the imposition of export taxes on 
agricultural commodities by India increases Indian welfare, importers usually suffer welfare 
losses. These results inform recommendations for policies to better address the issue of trade 
restrictions and their impacts through regional trade agreements and the WTO.  
Miranda  and  Barros  investigate  the  impacts  of  non-tariff  trade  barriers,  especially 
sanitary measures, on Brazilian exports of fresh and chilled beef. The authors document the 
occurrence of these non-tariff measures and assess their impact on the price and quantity of 
Brazilian  beef exports to the European  Union  between 1992 and 2000 using intervention 
models. The results indicate that a three-month embargo against Brazilian exports by the EU 
in early 1995 affected both the quantity and price of Brazilian exports. However, most of the 
sanitary  measures  did  not  appear  to  have  significant  effects.  The  authors  conclude  by Introduction 
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discussing  reasons  for  the  difficulty  in  capturing  the  impact  of  sanitary  measures  in 
econometric analysis. 
The article by Echeverría, Gopinath, Moreira and Cortés is unique in this issue of the 
journal  due  to  its  focus  on  producers  rather  than  national  policy  choice.  The  authors 
investigate the importance of producers‘ attributes and farms‘ geographical characteristics in 
the decision to produce exportable goods through a case study of blueberry producers in 
Chile. This evaluation from the producer perspective highlights the importance of government 
policy  decisions  in  enhancing  both  human  and  physical  capital.  The  authors  find  that 
education  is strongly correlated with the decision to produce for export markets and that 
access to water and irrigation are the main physical variables affecting the export-production 
decision. The authors also find that the availability of labor has a strong effect on the decision 
to produce exportable goods. 
We would like to thank the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and especially Ann 
Tutwiler, for recognizing the importance of skilled analysis in supporting decision making 
concerning agricultural trade policy. Indeed, the consequences of these policies reverberate 
throughout domestic economies as well as the global economy. The research presented in this 
volume strongly supports the conclusion that the governments of developing countries face 
diverse and difficult decisions. This effort would not have been possible without the support 
of  the  International  Agricultural  Trade  Research  Consortium  and  the  expertise  and 
willingness of its members who have participated as mentors. All papers in this volume 
benefited greatly from skilled editing by Suzanne Leonard. Finally, we want to thank Dragan 
Miljkovic, editor of the  Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development, for 
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CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS  




Linda M. Young 





Recent  efforts  to  develop  and  offer  capacity  building  programs  for  analysts 
concerned with agricultural trade policy have been prompted by the high level of skill 
required to design and implement a package of domestic agricultural and trade policies to 
achieve national goals. In this paper, capacity building is defined as the strengthening of 
the ability of individuals, organizations and governments to determine and achieve their 
development goals. The capacity of analysts to effectively inform all levels of the policy 
choice process, which include the underlying economic ideology, policy framework, and 
policy implementation, is an important requirement for national ownership of economic 
policies.  The  multitude  of  institutions offering  capacity  building  programs  has  caused 
concern about coordination and duplication of efforts. Different types of institutions have 
a comparative advantage in different aspects of policy analysis. However, academia  is 
better suited than other types of institutions to provide capacity building programs for all 
levels of the policy choice and analysis process. 
 
 
Keywords: agricultural trade policy; capacity building. 





Recent efforts to develop and offer capacity building programs for analysts concerned 
with agricultural trade policy have been prompted by the high level of skill required to design 
and implement a package of domestic agricultural and trade policies to achieve national goals. 
In the case of the agricultural sector, the goals may include increasing agricultural production 
and exports, while at the same time, ensuring low food prices and increased food security for 
poor  consumers.  Many  national  governments,  multilateral  organizations  and  aid  agencies 
have  increased  the  priority  given  to  agricultural  sector  investment  and  to  implementing 
policies  to  support  the  agriculture  sector  (World  Bank  2007).  Increasing  the  level  and 
diversity of agricultural production and the productivity of the sector are viewed as critical for Linda M. Young 
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achieving food security, raising income in rural areas, and contributing to export earnings. 
The job facing agricultural trade policy analysts in developing countries is demanding and 
complex as the implementation of agricultural sector policies is often constrained by tight 
government budgets, which limit both direct expenditures and the scope of policy choice. In 
addition to identifying and assessing specific goals for food policy and the agricultural sector, 
analysts in agricultural trade policy may need to consider and balance overarching national 
goals such as active participation in international markets. 
Developing  countries  currently  account  for  three  quarters  of  the  membership  of  the 
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO).  Additionally,  32  least  developed  countries  are  WTO 
members, with another ten least developed countries in accession. Developing countries face 
the challenge of balancing their commitments to the WTO with their national goals for the 
development of their agricultural sectors. In current and past WTO negotiations, developing 
countries  have  had  to  address  difficult  issues concerning  the  goals  for  their  agricultural 
sectors  and  how  to  achieve  them  within  the  framework  of  commitments  required  and 
opportunities presented by the WTO. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement, WTO members 
accepted constraints on their policies for supporting the domestic agricultural sector as well as 
those governing agricultural trade. Additional restrictions will be implemented if the Doha 
Round reaches a successful conclusion. 
Given  the  complexity  of  meeting  their  WTO  obligations,  the  governments  of  many 
developing  countries  have  requested  assistance  programs  from  multilateral  agencies, 
particularly the  WTO, to increase their capacity to both meet their trade obligations and 
benefit more from trade. It is within this context that the term ―trade-related capacity‖ was 
coined. It includes the ability to produce competitive exports, the business environment and 
transportation infrastructure necessary for trade, and the human capital required to analyze, 
negotiate, and  implement trade agreements. The third component of trade-related capacity 
(i.e., human capital) is the focus of the analysis in this paper. 
Recent  efforts  to  build  trade-related  capacity  building  started  with  a  1994  request 
resulting from a meeting of African trade ministers who adopted the ―Framework for Action 
for Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement by African Countries‖ (JITAP 2005). 
This document identified their needs for greater professional capacity to develop and manage 
their trade policy. A wide variety of academics, analysts and negotiators (e.g., Luke 2002; 
Kerr 2008; Shaffer 2005) from both developing and developed countries have argued that 
there is an urgent need for more professionals trained in the analysis of agricultural trade 
policy and the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. 
Programs to increase trade-related capacity are currently offered by a wide variety of 
institutions, including multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
and academia. However, the number of institutions involved has prompted criticism of the 
duplication and lack of coordination of programs (de Sand 1996). Agencies offering these 
programs have responded through efforts to more effectively report and communicate their 
activities, as, for example, through the Doha Development Agenda Trade Capacity Database 
(WTO  and  OECD  2009).  However,  an  efficient  and  productive  distribution  of  efforts  to 
provide  trade-related  assistance  requires  an  assessment  of  institutions‘  strengths  and 
weaknesses in building trade-related capacity. 
This paper reviews past experience with trade-related capacity building programs and 
explores the unique role that academia can play in such programs. The next section defines 
the concept of capacity building. This is followed by discussions of the history and status of Capacity Building Programs in Agricultural Trade Policy 
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trade-related capacity building programs. These discussions provide the basis for a review of 
recent  criticism  of  trade-related  capacity  building  programs  and  an  examination  of  the 
potential role for academia in future programs. 
 
 
DEFINING CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
Capacity  building  has  been  defined  as  ―the  process  through  which  individuals, 
organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve 
their own development objectives‖ (UNDP 2008). This emphasis on capabilities underlies a 
wide range of current development assistance programs and reflects Amartya Sen‘s argument 
that freedom, defined as the ability to exercise agency on behalf of oneself, is both the ends 
and the means of development (Sen 1999). More specifically, Sen argues that capabilities 
enhance freedom, as freedom depends on the free agency of people to make choices, and that 
the effective exercise of choice depends on capabilities. Sen develops his argument in terms 
of individual capability and freedom. However, his argument can be conceptually extended to 
the nation-state and its ability to be effective and to exercise sovereignty over its economic 
policy. 
The  recent  economics  literature  supports  Sen‘s  framework,  arguing  that  national 
ownership of economic policy is an important element in its eventual success. For example, 
Waeyenberge (2006) notes that the recent emphasis on sovereignty in the design of economic 
policies in developing countries is partly a reaction to the history of conditionality in foreign 
assistance  and structural  adjustment  programs, which  have  shortchanged  domestic  policy 
processes in the past. Further criticism has been directed at the uniformity of the policies that 
were imposed under structural adjustment programs, which tended to neglect local conditions 
and  needs  (Jomo  KS  and  Fine  2006).  Rodrik  (2003;  2007)  argues  that  spurring  and 
maintaining economic growth requires that economic policies be carefully adapted to local 
institutions. Rodrik (2002) also emphasizes that the proper yardstick for evaluating trade 
reform is the extent to which it fosters the development of high quality institutions at home. 
Stiglitz  (1998)  maintains  that  government  ownership  of  economic  policies  is  critical  to 
sustaining  policies  over  time.  Finger  and  Schuler  (2002)  provide  a  specific  example  of 
Stiglitz‘s  point,  noting  that  many  developing  countries  were  not  full  participants  in  the 
negotiation of the Uruguay Round Agreement, and that because of this lack of ownership, 
some governments did not place a high priority on implementation. 
National  ownership  of  economic  policies  in  general,  and  agricultural  trade  policy  in 
particular, can occur at different points in the policy choice process. The first and most basic 
choice is the nature of the economic system to which a country aspires. Currently this choice 
is determined mostly by the extent to which a national government embraces the neoliberal 
economic model and is likely to be based on a combination of pragmatic and ideological 
factors. Pragmatically, the dominance of the neoliberal economic model makes it difficult to 
adopt  and  implement  a  radically  different  economic  strategy.  Ideologically,  a  country‘s 
decision makers may believe in the underlying tenets of the neoliberal model. An important 
issue at this point in the policy choice process is the significant variation that exists within 
capitalism itself, particularly with respect to the specific roles of the market and the state 
(Baumol,  Litan  and  Schramm  2007;  Gilpin  2001).  This  underlying  policy  choice  has Linda M. Young 
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implications for agriculture, including the degree to which agriculture is to be insulated from 
the market and how this insulation is to be achieved. 
The next step in the policy choice process involves questions about how to implement the 
desired  economic  system.  With  respect  to  agricultural  trade  reform,  this  includes  issues 
concerning the degree of trade liberalization and the level of commitment undertaken through 
the country‘s trade agreements. These decisions encourage the use of certain policies, such as 
tariffs and subsidies that are less distorting to world markets, and discourage the use of other 
polices that are considered too distorting to the market. 
The third  level of policy choice  involves the actual  implementation of policies. This 
includes choices about the level of tariffs or government subsidies, specific standards and 
regulations,  and  the  functioning  of  institutions  that  support  the  implementation  of  trade 
liberalization. 
For a nation to achieve national ownership of economic policy, it must have the skilled 
capacity to promote dialogue on the relevant questions at all levels of policy choice. The next 
two sections examine the history and recent status of capacity building programs and indicate 
a gradual but incomplete movement towards this goal. 
 
 
EARLY MODELS OF CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
The terms used to describe capacity building programs have changed as the underlying 
philosophy  and  nature  of  the  programs  have  evolved.  There  has  been  a  long-standing 
recognition of the need to increase the technical skills, education and ‗know how‘ of the labor 
force in developing countries. The term ―technical assistance‖ was used in the 1950s and 
1960s and usually referred to foreign, donor-funded personnel providing expert advice to an 
institution  in  a  recipient  country,  often  in  connection  with  the  implementation  of  a 
development project (Berg 1993 p.43). This term was largely replaced in the 1970s with the 
term  ―technical  cooperation‖  because  of  its  positive  connotation  of  partnership  between 
donors and recipients. The term ―capacity building‖ came into use in the 1990s, along with 
the recognition of the need to extend the concept of capacity beyond the individual to include 
the institutions where the individual works. 
Early efforts to increase local capacity were usually a component of more comprehensive 
development  programs  undertaken  by  national  and  multilateral  agencies.  Technical 
assistance, characterized as the transfer of skills and systems, drew on expatriates to ―inject 
knowledge‖  into the recipient country (Shaffer 2005). This characterization applies to the 
early efforts of the World Bank to develop expertise in government agencies and institutions 
concerned with the implementation of Bank  projects (Kapur, Lewis and Webb 1997). The 
expert-counterpart system was extensively used, and the common format was for resident 
expatriate experts to work with a local counterpart to implement a larger aid project. The 
expert-counterpart model has been sharply criticized as being ineffective in transferring skills 
to the local counterpart because the expert was focused on meeting the main criterion for 
success, that is, the completion of the project (Berg 1993; Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and Malik  
2002). Additionally, this system did not address the numerous constraints faced by the local 
counterpart,  including  lack  of  appropriate  training,  incentives,  responsibilities,  and 
institutional support (Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and Malik 2002). Capacity Building Programs in Agricultural Trade Policy 
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In the 1990s there was a decided shift away from the use of expatriate expertise and the 
expert-counterpart model towards other models that included more participation by recipients 
in the design and implementation of programs. This was an attempt by donors to address a 
perception  of  past  failures  by  increasing  effectiveness  through  greater collaboration  with 
recipients (Berg 1993) and emphasis on the development of the skills of both professional and 
non-professional recipient country workers. While it is widely acknowledged that the use of 
foreign experts in developing countries declined during this period and that the training and 
use of local experts increased, there are no systematic data available to analyze this shift. 
Morgan  (2006)  discusses  the  recent  and  growing  emphasis  on  capacity  building, 
highlighting  decisions  and  agreements  resulting  from  international  conferences  under  the 
auspices of the United Nations, and statements from multilateral institutions and international 
aid  agencies. Capacity building has now been labeled ―the missing  link in development‖ 
(Morgan 2006) and has been roundly endorsed by a wide variety of institutions, including the 
World  Bank,  various  agencies  in  the  United  Nations,  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and national aid agencies. Data on the recent status of 




RECENT STATUS OF TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING 
PROGRAMS 
 
The WTO and the OECD have been charged with collecting data  and  improving the 
coordination of trade-related capacity building programs. They have developed three main 
categories  for  tracking  trade-related  capacity  building  activities:  trade  development  (i.e., 
improving the business climate); trade infrastructure (i.e., improving the infrastructure needed 
to support trade); and trade policy and regulations. Total donor commitments for trade-related 
capacity  building  programs  are  currently  around  14  percent  of  Official  Development 
Assistance  (OECD  2009).  The  analysis  here  is  concerned  with  the  ―trade  policy  and 
regulations‖ category, which consists of programs to improve the effectiveness of developing 
countries‘ participation in multilateral trade negotiations, trade policy and technical standards 
analysis, and regional trade agreements (WTO 2006). Table 1 indicates that between 2001 
and 2005, programs to support trade policy and regulations have accounted for a relatively 
small share of total expenditures for trade-related capacity building (i.e., always less than 
seven percent of the total), while infrastructure has consistently accounted for around eighty 
percent of total expenditures. 
Table 2 provides additional detail on trends in donor expenditures on activities under the 
trade policy and regulations category. A large portion of expenditures have been dedicated to 
assisting in the  implementation of current commitments, such as those undertaken in the 
categories  of  technical  standards,  trade  facilitation  and  dispute  settlement,  trade  related 
intellectual  property  rights  and  accession.  Finger  and  Wilson  (2006)  detail  the  types  of 
activities undertaken to facilitate trade, which include projects to improve customs valuation, 
and to strengthen the institutions responsible for sanitary and phytosanitary standards and 
intellectual property rights necessary to meet WTO commitments. 
 Linda M. Young 
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Table 1. Expenditures for Trade-Related Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 
(constant 2004 US$ million) 
 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Trade Policy and Regulations   856  820  1,008  807  906 
Trade Development   1,797  1,663  2,219  2,153  2,173 
Infrastructure   11,397  11,277  10,154  14,808  12,317 
Total   14,050  13,760  13,381  17,768  15,396 
Source: WTO, 2006. 
 
Table 2. Detailed Expenditures for the “Trade Policy and Regulations” Category 
(constant 2004 US$ million) 
 
Category  2001-02  2003-04  2005 
Trade mainstreaming in poverty reduction strategy and 
development plans*  113  129  110 
Total Technical Standards   130  103  103 
 Technical barriers to trade (TBT)   37  55  51 
 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS)   93  48  52 
Total Trade Facilitation   173  335  185 
 Trade facilitation procedures   159  302  167 
 Customs valuation   14  31  5 
 Tariff reforms   0  1  13 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs)   149  139  310 
Total Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Agreements   214  135  138 
 Accession   24  18  17 
 Dispute settlement   4  3  2 
 Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS)   14  13  13 
 Agriculture   9  11  5 
 Services   14  5  5 
 Tariff negotiations - non-agricultural market 
access   5  3  3 
 Rules   9  1  2 
 Training in trade negotiation techniques   7  6  6 
 Trade and environment   73  29  36 
 Trade and competition   40  31  30 
 Trade and investment   13  8  12 
 Transparency and government procurement   2  7  7 
Trade education/training   57  66  60 
TOTAL TRADE POLICY AND REGULATIONS   838  908  906 
Source: WTO, 2006. 
*This  refers  to  research  and  training  to  explore  how  to  use  trade  as  an  effective  component  of 
development and economic growth, to ensure that complimentary institutions and policies exist to 
facilitate growth from trade and to ensure that trade benefits the poor. 
 
An examination of the Trade Capacity Building Database (WTO and OECD 2008) for 
expenditures by by donor indicates that the European Union (EU) is by far the largest donor, Capacity Building Programs in Agricultural Trade Policy 
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accounting for US$509 million of the US$905 million total committed for 2005. The EU 
spent US$159 million on capacity building for regional trade agreements and US$146 million 
on trade facilitation. The US is a smaller donor, spending US$168 million in 2005, of which 
US$74 million was for multilateral trade negotiations and US$30.8 million was for regional 
trade negotiations. An examination of the data by implementing agency indicates that the 
World Bank spent US$62 million in 2005, the highest level of expenditure by any multilateral 
agency (WTO and OECD 2008). Other multilateral agencies had much lower expenditures, 
with the IMF spending US$12.8 million and the WTO spending US$15.9 million on trade-
related capacity building in 2005. 
 In summary, the data available on trade-related capacity building programs indicate that 
in recent years these programs have focused on developing the skills needed to implement 
existing trade policy and to negotiate further regional and multilateral trade agreements. In 
terms of the three levels in the policy choice process, expenditures have largely been directed 
at the third level, that is, the implementation of policies and the rules and regulations needed 
to support them. 
 
 
CRITICISM OF CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS AND THE 
POTENTIAL ROLE FOR ACADEMIA 
 
Current  capacity  building  programs  have  been  criticized  because  the  multiplicity  of 
donors has resulted in a lack of coordination and duplication of efforts. Much remains to be 
done to address these concerns. Critics have focused in particular on the legitimacy of WTO 
capacity building programs (Deere 2005; Shaffer 2005), which are aimed largely at providing 
assistance for the implementation of WTO agreements and the negotiation process. Shaffer 
(2005) argues that the basic structure and objectives of the WTO may not be appropriate for 
developing countries and that the WTO‘s programs for capacity building neglect the broader 
and more basic issue of whether developing countries should initiate negotiations to change 
the WTO‘s structure and the obligations assumed by members. Shaffer further argues that 
donors  and  the  institutions  implementing  capacity  building  programs  are  perpetuating  a 
system that is biased towards donors. 
While Shaffer raises an important issue for WTO capacity building programs, I argue that 
it  is  appropriate  for  the  WTO  to continue  to  offer  programs  congruent with  the  current 
structure and agreements of the WTO, and that it would be difficult for members to support 
capacity building programs that are at odds with the fundamental basis of the organization. 
This practical concern is supported by economic theory that suggests that bureaucracies are 
fundamentally concerned with their own perpetuation, power and enlargement (Allison 1984; 
Niskanen 1971). 
Institutions have different skills, strengths, and weaknesses, and offer varied perspectives 
for  capacity  building  programs.  This  is  important  to  consider  in  the  discussion,  design, 
coordination, and funding of future programs. The WTO is well suited to offer capacity 
building programs concerned with the  implementation of policies required to meet  WTO 
commitments, and the process of negotiating trade agreements. In contrast, given both the 
skills and the mission of academic institutions, they are better suited than the WTO to foster 
the capacity to address the more fundamental questions about overall economic policy (i.e., Linda M. Young 
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the first two levels of the policy choice process). Academics have a long history of both 
supporting  and  challenging  the  status  quo  with  respect  to  key  questions  of  economic 
philosophy and policy choice (Rosak 1968; Freire 1970). Academia also offers a variety of 
perspectives  from  disciplines  beyond  economics  that  offer  additional  insights  into  these 
questions. Thus academic institutions can play a role in capacity building programs that is 





Decision makers  in developing countries are faced with choices for their agricultural 
policies that need to simultaneously consider goals at both the sectoral and national  level 
while being cognizant of their  international obligations. Currently, many institutions offer 
capacity  building  programs  to  improve  the  ability  to  meet  current  commitments  and  to 
negotiate further trade agreements. However, successful implementation of policies requires a 
commitment by the government that reflects ownership of the policies and their adaptation to 
local contexts and institutions. This requires the ability of analysts to articulate the questions 
and consequences of broader economic policy choices. Academia has and should continue to 
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This article describes the main policy interventions in the production and marketing 
of wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane crops in Pakistan and estimates the incentives or 
disincentives faced by farmers in their domestic production during the period of 1991 to 
2008.  Empirical estimates of the protection coefficients suggest continuing taxation of 
wheat production. In the case of rice, production of long grain basmati has been taxed 
while that of coarse varieties somewhat protected. In the case of cotton and sugarcane 
crops,  the  major  cash  crops  and  sources  of  raw  material  for  the  textile  and  sugar 
industries, the picture emerging from the analysis is somewhat mixed. For cotton, which 
was taxed in the 1990s, the incidence of taxation has declined. As cotton imports have 
been  on  the  rise,  protection  coefficients  based  on  import  parity  prices  still  suggest 
implicit  taxation  of  domestic  production.  For  sugarcane,  the  analysis  of  export  parity 
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Agriculture accounts for 21 percent of Pakistan‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is 
the main source of income for 68 percent of the population that lives in the countryside. Crop 
production, which covers an area of 23 million hectares and involves 6.62 million small, 
medium and large farms, accounts for about 50 percent of the agriculture sector‘s share of 
GDP. Most of Pakistan‘s crop production depends on irrigation, as rainfall is both low and 
concentrated  during  the  summer  months.  Pakistan  has  a  long  history  of  government 
interventions in farm input and output markets. These interventions have included monopoly Abdul Salam 
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procurement (inherited at the time of  independence and continuing through the 1950s) of 
commodities such as wheat and rice  Niaz 1995); public sector monopolies of exports and 
imports; establishment of support prices for crops; restrictions  on commodity movements; 
zoning for sugar mills; and subsidized issue price of wheat procured at support prices and 
imported in the public sector.
1 Some of these interventions, such as procurement and import 
monopolies, were aimed at providing cheap food to the urban population, while others, such 
as public sector monopolies of cotton and rice exports, were established to eliminate trade 
malpractices and develop export markets. Support prices were aimed at providing a floor for 
market prices in the post harvest season (Salam 2001). In addition,  input subsidies were 
introduced  to  encourage  the  use  of  modern  inputs  and  technology  in  order  to  promote 
agricultural development. Despite their intentions, however, these policy interventions have 
also  distorted  agricultural  prices  and  producer  incentives  and  lowered  the  real  prices  of 
tradable commodities (Hamid, Nabi and Nasim 1990, Dorosh and Valdes 1990). 
Faced with a growing budget deficit, a rising debt burden, and mounting pressure from 
donors, as well as increasing evidence about the inefficiency of the public sector and the 
failure of public sector institutions to address emerging challenges, in the mid-1980s the 
government  embarked  on  a  series  of  economic  reforms  under  a  Structural  Adjustment 
Program. The major thrust of these reforms was to reduce public sector interventions and 
increase  reliance  on  market  forces.  Under  these  reforms,  explicit  taxes  and  tariffs  were 
reduced (Nabi 1997). As a result, the average rate of applied customs duties declined from 
47.2 percent in 1996-97 to 19.6 percent in 2002-03 for agricultural imports, and from 40.8 
percent to 16.9 percent for industrial products (World Bank 2004). 
This study estimates the distortions faced by farmers in their production of wheat, rice, 
cotton  and sugarcane,  important  food  and cash crops which  are  also  major  imports  and 
exports, during the 1990-91 to 2007-08 period. While most of the period covered  in the 
analysis is in the aftermath of the economic reforms, in some cases the reforms were under 
way but not fully implemented. 
Together, the four crops under study account for about 64 percent of the annual crop area 
and about 90 percent of the value added  by major agricultural crops in Pakistan (Government 
of Pakistan 2008).
2 These crops are also important for their forward and backward linkages in 
the economy and are the key to the performance of the crop sector. While the markets for 
these crops have faced many of the government interventions noted above, these interventions 
have seldom been based on in-depth analysis and their objectives have often conflicted with 
each other. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The methodology used to estimate 
the distortions faced by farmers is explained in section 2. Sections 3 through 6 describe t he 
economic  importance,  discuss  government  policies  and  interventions,  and  estimate  and 
discuss the distortions in producer incentives for each of the four commodities. In section 7, 
the empirical estimates of these distortions in incentives are compared w ith estimates from 
other studies. Limitations of the data and analysis are explained in section 8. The paper 
concludes in section 9 with a discussion of the implications of the distortions in incentives 
and some of the emerging challenges concerning commodity pricing in Pakistan. 
 
                                                 
1
 The issue price is the price at which the government releases wheat from its stocks to flour mills. 
2
 Appendix Table 1 presents data on the area and production of these crops between 1991 and 2008.  Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA USED FOR ESTIMATING DISTORTIONS 
 
International  prices  represent  the  opportunity cost  to  a country  of  producing  various 
commodities domestically (Tsakok 1990). Thus, world commodity prices provide a reference 
and benchmark for domestic prices and indicate whether or not a country is an efficient 
producer of a particular commodity. The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) for a given 
commodity  is  the  ratio  of  its  domestic  price  to  its  international  price.  The  NPC  for  a 
commodity i is defined as: 
 
NPCi =Pdi / Pwi 
 
where  Pdi  is  the  domestic  price  of  commodity  i  and  Pwi  is  the  international  price  of 
commodity i, converted into local currency, at a comparable point in space and time. 
The NPC indicates any divergence between the domestic and international prices of a 
given  commodity,  which  reflects  the  presence  of  market  interventions  such  as  taxes, 
subsidies,  government  controlled  prices,  and  other  policy  instruments.  Thus,  the  NPC 
provides an empirical estimate of any distortions (i.e., protection or taxation) for production 
of  that commodity. It  also  provides  a  measure  of  the  incentives  or  disincentives  for  the 
domestic production of a given commodity (Appleyard 1987). More specifically, if the NPC 
= 1, it  is a neutral situation. That  is, there is neither an  incentive nor  a disincentive for 
domestic production. If NPC > 1, there is positive protection (i.e., a subsidy) for domestic 
production. Conversely, if NPC < 1, there is negative protection (i.e., a tax) for domestic 
production. 
To estimate the distortions affecting the production of wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane, 
for each commodity the producer prices prevailing in the domestic market during the harvest 
/post-harvest period were examined and compared with  their relevant international prices. 
The corresponding international prices are calculated using the actual export or import parity 
prices of these commodities, estimated from the relevant export or import price data, but 
excluding any customs duties and other taxes. These international prices provide a measure of 
the opportunity cost of the resources used in the domestic production of a given commodity. 
Two important points about the domestic and international prices used in the analysis in this 
article are in order. First, concerning domestic prices, the government has followed a policy 
of annually reviewing and announcing support prices for wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane. 
These support prices have been intended to provide price floors during the harvest season, 
when market prices tend to fall, especially in good crop years. This price support policy was 
not meant to replace the market mechanism, but rather to correct market shortcomings and 
failures (Salam 2001). Thus, the analysis of domestic prices here has been confined to market 
prices prevailing during the harvest/post-harvest season (i.e., actual prices received by the 
growers). In addition, the prices used relate to the major producing area markets for each of 
the commodities. Second, regarding international prices, actual import and export prices have 
been  used  to  estimate  the  import  and  export  parity  prices.  Actual  prices  were  preferred 
because quoted international prices may vary from those at which transactions actually occur, 
due to quality, timing, mode of payment and delivery, or other practical considerations. More 
specifically, in calculations of export / import parity prices, international prices were adjusted 
for the relevant domestic marketing, transport, handling, and processing charges in order to Abdul Salam 
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make them comparable in space with the domestic prices. The use of actual export prices also 
helps to address the issue of quality differences and the resulting price differences between 
domestic and international commodities. 
The exchange rate during the period covered in the analysis has been free and floating, 
and a recent estimate of the equilibrium exchange rate (Dorosh and Salam 2007) did not find 
much  difference  between  the  official  and  equilibrium  exchange  rates.  Accordingly,  the 
official  exchange  rate,  as  reported  in  the  Pakistan  Economic  Surveys  (Government  of 
Pakistan, 2006, 2008), has been used to estimate import or export parity prices for the four 
commodities studied in this article. 
The NPCs described above account only for the distortions in output markets; they do not 
consider  interventions  and  any  resulting  distortions  in  input  markets.  This  issue  can  be 
addressed by using effective protection coefficients (EPCs), which show how value added, 
rather than the gross value of production, is affected. Thus, the EPCs account for differences 
across industries in the value added share of output as well as distortions to intermediate input 
prices. However, estimating EPCs is much more demanding than estimating NPCs in terms of 
the  data  requirements,  which  may  not  be  readily  met.  Moreover,  compared  to  output 
distortions, farm input subsidies, on average, have a small overall  impact on value added 
(Anderson et al 2007). During the bulk of the analysis period (1990-91 to 2007-08), most of 
the direct interventions in input markets and subsidies on seed, fertilizers, pesticides, credit, 
etc. had either been totally eliminated already or were in the process of being eliminated. 
However, in the wake of rising fertilizer prices in the world market, fertilizer subsidies were 
reintroduced in 2006. Nevertheless, these subsidies are common to all crops and are not crop 
specific. Thus, the protection coefficients (NPCs) estimated for the current analysis should 
provide useful insights about the levels of protection/assistance in place for the selected crops 
in general and the comparative picture in particular. 
 
 
3. WHEAT: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE, GOVERNMENT POLICIES, AND 
ESTIMATES OF DISTORTIONS 
 
Wheat, which is the most widely grown crop in Pakistan and a staple food, is planted 
over an area of more than 8 million hectares annually and accounts for 66 percent of the total 
area planted for food grains, estimated at around 12 million hectares. The annual production 
of all food grains has averaged 31 million tons, with wheat production hovering around 21 
million in the recent past, or 68 percent of total food grains production. The share of wheat in 
the total cropped area in Pakistan has ranged from 36 to 39 percent and it contributes 39 
percent of the value added from major crops (Government of Pakistan 2008). Wheat is grown 
all over the country, under both irrigated and rain-fed conditions, and about 55 percent of  its 
area is sown on farms operating less than 12.5 acres (Government of Pakistan 2003). 
 
 
3.1. Government Policies and Interventions 
 
Wheat production, milling, and marketing are all in the private sector. However, because 
of the  importance of wheat to both consumers and producers, all governments since the Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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country‘s independence have intervened in the wheat market. The government interventions 
have  been  aimed,  inter  alia,  at  increasing  production,  maintaining  incentives  for  wheat 
farming, keeping wheat prices within reach of consumers, and controlling inflation (Salam 
and Mukhtar 2008). In the wake of the deregulation of the economy and the increasing role of 
the private sector, most of the interventions in the wheat market have either been eliminated 
or are being phased out. Nevertheless, the government continues to announce support prices, 
procures substantial quantities of wheat in order to maintain the support price, holds stocks 
for food security reasons, and manages wheat import levels to achieve its consumer pricing 
goals. The issue price for the provision of domestically-procured and imported wheat from 
government stocks to the flourmills is subsidized to stabilize and exercise some control over 
market prices for wheat flour (Cornelisse and Naqvi (1987), Hamid, Nabi, and Nasim (1990), 
Dorosh and Valdes (1990), and Dorosh and Salam (2008). 
 
 
3.2. Prices and Distortions in the Wheat Market 
 
Data on the domestic market prices of wheat prevailing during the harvest season and the 
corresponding import parity prices are presented in Table 1. As Pakistan has been a regular 
wheat importer, the import parity price is the relevant measure of the opportunity cost of 
domestic wheat production. An examination of these data indicates that throughout the 1990-
91  to  2007-08  period,  producer  prices  of  wheat  in  the  domestic  market  have  been 
substantially below the corresponding import parity prices. 
As shown in Table 1, the NPCs ranged from 0.53 to 0.95, with an overall average value 
of 0.72. These coefficients reflect large transfers of resources from wheat farmers and surplus 
wheat-producing regions, adversely impacting the incomes and well being of wheat farmers. 
Such resource transfers have naturally discouraged investments in wheat farming and have 
had a negative impact on its production. Thus it is no surprise that Pakistan continues to have 
a wheat deficit and to rely on expensive imports to bridge the gap between wheat demand and 
supply. 
Table 1 also presents data on the support prices of wheat along with government wheat 
procurements, which provide some useful insights about the wheat sector and wheat pricing 
policy. The support prices have been revised irregularly, 11 times in 18 years. However, two 
time periods stand out:  1) 1996-97 to 1998-99, when the price was raised from Rs. 173/40 kg 
to 240/40 kg for the 1996-97 crop and retained for the next two crop years; and  2) 1999-00 to 
2002-03, when the price was raised to Rs. 300/40 kg in 1999-00 and maintained at the same 
level for the next three crop years (i.e., until 2002-03). 
In 1992-93, when the NPC was 0.72 and the support price was raised in 1993-94 by 19 
percent, the NPC rose to 0.95 but plunged to 0.53 by 1995-96. The NPC spiked to 0.78 during 
1996-97 when producer prices in the domestic market rose in the wake of a 38 percent rise in 
the support price. For the 1999-00 crop, the NPC was estimated at 0.81, as the wheat support 
price was raised by 25 percent to Rs. 300/ 40 kg, which also pushed up producer prices. In 
1999-00, there was a record procurement of 8.58 million tons, out of total production of over 
21 million tons. As the Government had sufficient stocks of wheat, its support prices were not 
revised for the next three crop years. As a result, the NPCs fell sharply, from 0.81 in 1999-00 
to 0.58 in 2003-04 Abdul Salam 
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Table 1. Domestic and International Prices of Wheat in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
 
Year  Import parity 
price  
Rs/ 40 kg 
Domestic market 
price 
Rs/ 40 kg 
NPC   Support price 
Rs. / 40 kg 
Procurements 
Million tons 
1990-91  144  121  0.84  112  3.16 
1991-92  183  134  0.73  124  3.16 
1992-93  193  139  0.72  130  4.12 
1993-94  178  170  0.95  160  3.64 
1994-95  219  176  0.80  160  3.74 
1995-96  349  185  0.53  173  3.45 
1996-97  350  273  0.78  240  2.72 
1997-98  346  259  0.75  240  3.98 
1998-99  303  261  0.86  240  4.07 
1999-00  365  297  0.81  300  8.58 
2000-01  504  275  0.55  300  4.08 
2001-02  523  292  0.56  300  4.04 
2002-03  522  305  0.58  300  3.51 
2003-04  567  385  0.68  350  3.40 
2004-05  581  432  0.74  400  3.93 
2005-06  458  411  0.90  415  3.88 
2006-07  804  437  0.54  425  4.42 
2007-08  1232  750  0.61  625  3.92 
Average: 91-00      0.78     
Average: 01-08      0.65     
Average: 91-08      0.72     
Note:  Import  parity prices  estimated  from  the  actual  import prices  reported  in  Pakistan  Economic 
Survey (Statistical Supplement) 2007-08. Incidentals and related costs of importing wheat adapted 
from  various  annual Wheat  Price  Policy  reports of  Agricultural  Prices  Commission.  Data  on 
support and domestic market prices and wheat procurements also obtained from the Agricultural 
Prices Commission‘s Wheat Price Policy reports. To represent the average situation in Pakistan, 
both domestic and import parity prices of wheat were estimated for Lahore, the major consumption 
centre located in the wheat producing region. 
 
International prices of wheat have surged in the last couple of years. However, in spite of 
the substantial revisions in support prices, domestic producer prices have lagged far behind. 
The NPCs for the 2006-07 and 2007-08 crops are estimated at 0.54 and 0.61, respectively, 
reflecting the deterioration in incentives to wheat farmers. As the country was in the midst of 
a domestic food crisis and experiencing pressure from rising international wheat prices, the 
government was forced to abandon many of the market oriented policy initiatives in favor of 
administrative  measures  and  interventions  to  insulate  the  domestic  market  from  the Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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4. RICE: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE, GOVERNMENT POLICIES, AND 
ESTIMATES OF DISTORTIONS 
 
Pakistan is famous for producing and exporting long-grain aromatic ―basmati‖ rice. It 
also exports substantial quantities of coarse rice. Pakistan ranks 12
th in the world in terms of 
rice production and is the world‘s 5
th largest rice exporter, accounting for 9 percent of global 
rice exports. Pakistan‘s rice exports, averaging 3.2 million tons in recent years, have earned 
over US$1 billion  in foreign exchange annually (Government of Pakistan 2008). The rice 
crop, annually sown over an area averaging 2.5 million hectares, accounts for 18 percent of 
the area sown for food grains. Annual rice production averages 5.1 million tons and accounts 
for 18 percent of the total output of food grains. 
 
 
4.1. Government Policies and Interventions 
 
Rice production, marketing and trade have been subjected to several policy interventions, 
including monopoly procurements and exports in the public sector; levying of export taxes; 
restrictions on internal movements and the banning of the cultivation of certain varieties; and 
restrictions on rice sowing in certain areas and promotion of cultivation in others to reclaim 
saline lands. Until 2001-02, the government annually reviewed and announced the support 
price of rice (paddy).
3 
The  support  price  was  protected  through  market  intervention  and  government 
procurements of paddy. In the wake of the economic reforms and the expanding role of the 
private sector in the economy, since 2003-04 the government‘s role in the rice sector has been 
limited  to  occasional  and  irregular  announcements  of  indicative  paddy  prices, while  the 
milling, marketing, and trade of rice are all in the private sector.
4 
Currently, there is no export tax on rice, but imports are subject to a 10 percent customs 
duty. Following the very high international and domestic prices experienced in 2007 -08, in 
April 2008 the government fixed minimum export prices (MEP) for various varieties of rice: 
$1500/ton for Super basmati, $1300/ton for basmati, $1000/ton for IRRI -9, and $750/ ton for 
IRRI-6 (The World Trade Review 2008).
5 The MEP restrictions were lifted in August for 
IRRI rice and in October 2008 for other varieties. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Paddy is unhusked rice. 
4
 A lot of confusion remains about the concept of indicative price, which involves limited intervention in the market to 
protect a commodity‘s price. In contrast, with support prices, the government continues to intervene as long as is 
necessary to protect the commodity‘s price. 
5
 Both IRRI-6 and IRRI-9, which were developed at the International Rice Research Institute  IRRI), are coarse varieties 
of rice. Abdul Salam 
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4.2. Prices and Distortions in the Rice Market 
 
To examine the wedge between the domestic and international prices of rice (paddy), export 
parity prices of rice paddy were calculated using the actual export prices for rice and compared 
with the domestic market prices for paddy (see Table 2). Because of the large differences between 
the quality and prices of long grain basmati and coarse varieties of rice, the two types of rice are 
analyzed and discussed separately below. 
 






























1990-91  167  143  0.86  72  78  1.08 
1991-92  167  158  0.95  173  98  0.57 
1992-93  184  190  1.03  108  112  1.03 
1993-94  201  194  0.97  100  98  0.98 
1994-95  198  192  0.97  115  137  1.19 
1995-96  215  231  1.07  227  181  0.80 
1996-97  315  296  0.94  161  164  1.02 
1997-98  355  297  0.84  176  205  1.17 
1998-99  395  362  0.92  195  234  1.20 
1999-00  481  361  0.75  184  203  1.10 
2000-01  477  300  0.63  175  180  1.03 
2001-02  512  379  0.74  202  206  1.02 
2002-03  509  495  0.97  198  218  1.10 
2003-04  515  500  0.97  245  257  1.05 
2004-05  565  543  0.96  293  338  1.15 
2005-06  615  537  0.87  297  290  0.98 
2006-07  671  594  0.89  325  310  0.95 
2007-08  947  900  0.95  561  525  0.94 
Average: 91-00       0.93      1.01 
Average: 01-08      0.87      1.03 
Average: 91-08      0.90      1.02 
Note: Export parity prices estimated from export prices of rice reported in Pakistan Economic Survey 
(Statistical  Supplement)  2007-08.  Incidentals  and  related  costs  of exporting  rice used  in  these 
estimations  adapted  from  various  annual  Rice  Price  Policy  reports  of  Agricultural  Prices 
Commission.  Export  parity  prices  of  basmati  calculated  at  rice  mills  located  in  the  basmati 
growing regions of the Punjab, while those of coarse paddy calculated at rice mills located in rice 
farming regions of Sindh. Domestic paddy prices are the averages of producer area markets located 
in the main basmati and IRRI growing areas of the Punjab and Sindh, respectively. 
 
4.2.1. Basmati Rice (Paddy) 
As shown in Table 2, with the exception of 1992-93 and 1995-96, the wholesale domestic 
market  prices  of  basmati  paddy  were  less  than  the  corresponding  export  parity  prices Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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throughout the reference period. Thus, the NPCs were less than one for all but those two 
years. The implicit taxation indicated by these coefficients ranges form 3 to 37 percent and 
averages 10 percent per year over the study period. From 1997-98 to 2001-02, the implicit 
taxation of basmati production was generally quite high, but has since declined following the 
economic liberalization. In the wake of international food shortages, of rice in particular, the 
domestic market has quite closely tracked the developments in world markets during 2007-
08. 
 
4.2.2. Coarse Rice (Paddy) 
Export parity prices of coarse paddy since 1990-91, along with domestic prices, are also 
reported in Table 2. These data provide a mixed picture regarding the protection of IRRI 
production. The NPCs during the reference period have ranged from 0.57 to 1.20, with a 
mean value of 1.02. The mean value of 1.02 reflects a  low level of protection for IRRI 
production. The NPC estimates indicate that the production of coarse rice enjoyed protection 
in twelve years of the reference period but faced implicit taxation in six years of the reference 
period. In recent years, as international rice prices have experienced a sharply rising trend and 
the share of rice exports in total production has  increased, its domestic prices have been 
aligned quite closely with export markets. 
There is a large domestic market in Pakistan for coarse rice, which, along with wheat, is a 
staple food for a large section of  the country‘s population. This has helped fuel domestic 
demand and support high domestic prices for the commodity. In addition, the bulk of coarse 
rice exports are destined for low income countries. Exports of coarse rice to low income 
countries  often  have  a  higher  proportion  of  brokens  to  cater  to  the  demand  from  these 
importers.  This  may  be  one  of  the reasons for  the resultant  lower  unit  export  prices  of 
Pakistani coarse rice and may also partly explain why domestic prices have often been higher 
than the export parity estimates. 
 
 
5. COTTON: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE, GOVERNMENT POLICIES, AND 
ESTIMATES OF DISTORTIONS 
 
Pakistan is the world‘s 4
th largest producer of cotton. Cotton is Pakistan‘s largest cash 
crop. It is second only to wheat in terms of area planted, hovering around 3 million hectares 
and  accounting  for  15  percent  of  the  total  cropped  area.  Annual  cotton  production  has 
averaged 2 million tons in recent years and its share in the value added  by major crops is 24 
percent (Government of Pakistan 2008). Textiles, the country‘s largest industry and the major 
source of employment in manufacturing, depends on cotton farming for raw material.
6 Cotton 
and cotton products contribute 65 percent of the foreign exchange earned from the export of 
merchandise goods. A valuable by-product of cotton farming is cottonseed, a raw material for 
the vegetable oil industry and feed for livestock and dairy farming. Cotton picking, a highly -
labor  intensive  activity  performed  by  female  workers  from  both  farm  and  non -farm 
households, is an important source of supplemental income for families in the countryside. 
                                                 
6
 Intersectoral linkages between the raw cotton, cotton lint and yarn and textile industries are modeled by Cororaton 
and Orden (2008). Abdul Salam 
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According to the  Agricultural Census (Government of Pakistan 2003), in 2000, 1.63 
million of the 6.62 million total farms in the country were cotton growers. A great majority of 
cotton growing farms operated less than 12.5 acres, but these small farms account for 50 
percent of the area under cotton. Among farm households that produce cotton, about 40 
percent of their total income comes from cotton production. The 20 percent decline in world 
prices during the late 1990s adversely affected these households.
 7 With its many forward and 
backward linkages, cotton production occupies a unique position in Pakistan‘s economy. Its 
performance holds the key to not only the growth and development of agriculture, but also to 
the robust health of the overall economy. A good cotton crop is essential for the sustainable 
development of agriculture, food security, and the success of poverty alleviation efforts. 
 
 
5.1. Government Policies and Interventions 
 
The Cotton Export Corporation  CEC), established in 1974, had a monopoly in cotton 
exports until 1986-87, when its role started to decline while the role of the private sector rose. 
Exports of cotton during the 1990s were subject to a MEP and a system of benchmark prices. 
The MEP for cotton was fixed daily by an inter-agency committee and announced by the 
State Bank of Pakistan. The benchmark price, determined on the basis of the ex-gin price of 
cotton lint, and export incidentals, provided the upper ceiling on the exporters‘ return, since 
the difference between the MEP and the benchmark price formed the basis for calculating the 
export tax. The MEP  and system of benchmark prices were introduced to prevent under 
invoicing of exports and ensure a definite amount of revenue collection from export duties. 
But it suppressed the domestic prices of cotton relative to international prices, distorting the 
incentives to its production. 
The  system  also  insulated  domestic  markets  from  the  developments  in  international 
cotton markets. Although the pricing system failed to provide any incentives to growers and 
exporters, the domestic processing industry benefited from the supply of cheap raw material. 
On the one hand, low cotton prices in the domestic market encouraged its wasteful uses, 
while on the other hand it discouraged its domestic production. The export duty on cotton was 
abolished in 1994. Both exports and imports are now in the private sector and government 
intervention is limited to an annual review of the support prices of seed cotton and limited 
public sector procurements  Salam 2008). 
 
 
5.2. Prices and Distortions in the Cotton Market 
 
Domestic market prices of seed cotton along with its export and import parity prices are 
presented in Table 3.
8 
 
                                                 
7
 Household-level simulations suggest that if cotton prices had increased rather than declined 20 percent during the 
late 1990s, the percentage of cotton-producing households living  below the poverty line in 2001 would have 
been reduced from 40 to 28 percent (Cororaton et al 2008). 
8
 Because Pakistan has been importing as well as exporting cotton during the period covered in this study, both 
import and export parity prices were estimated to reflect the opport unity cost of domestic production. Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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Table 3. Domestic Market and International Prices of Seed Cotton in Pakistan:  
1991-2008 
 
Year  Domestic price 
Rs/40 kg 
Export parity price  
Rs/40 kg 
NPC 1  Import parity price  
Rs/40 kg 
NPC 2 
1990-91  327  464  0.70  669  0.49 
1991-92  334  387  0.86  581  0.58 
1992-93  384  383  1.00  560  0.69 
1993-94  497  447  1.11  877  0.57 
1994-95  785  918  0.86  1185  0.66 
1995-96  754  816  0.92  1119  0.67 
1996-97  793  879  0.90  1204  0.66 
1997-98  843  821  1.03  1178  0.72 
1998-99  914  918  1.00  1046  0.87 
1999-2000  641  640  1.00  1060  0.60 
2000-01  900  858  1.05  1302  0.69 
2001-02  761  648  1.17  1017  0.75 
2002-03  914  816  1.12  1297  0.70 
2003-04  1219  1136  1.07  1583  0.77 
2004-05  885  899  0.98  1246  0.71 
2005-06  1017  995  1.02  1318  0.77 
2006-07  1110  1089  1.02  1389  0.80 
2007-08  1468  1268  1.16  1519  0.97 
Average: 91-00      0.94    0.65 
Average: 01-08      1.08    0.77 
Average: 91-08      1.00    0.70 
Note: Export and import parity prices estimated from the export and import prices reported in Pakistan 
Economic Survey (Statistical Supplement) 2007-08. Incidentals and related costs of exporting and 
importing cotton adapted from  annual price policy reports of Agricultural Prices Commission on 
seed cotton. NPC 1 and NPC 2 are nominal protection coefficients estimated in relation to export 
and import parity prices, respectively. Export / import parity prices estimated at ginneries located 
in  main  cotton  producing  regions,  while  domestic  prices are  the  average  of  wholesale prices 
prevailing in the main producer area markets during the harvest season. 
 
The prices of seed cotton in both domestic and international markets were characterized 
by marked fluctuations during the 1990-91 to 2007-08 period. The nominal prices of seed 
cotton in the domestic market trended steadily upward through 1998-99, notwithstanding 
wide fluctuations in the international prices of cotton. This upward movement in domestic 
market prices seems to have been triggered by the 140 percent depreciation in the value of the 
Pak Rupee between 1990-91 and 1998-99, which outlasted the impact that fluctuations in 
international cotton prices had on domestic prices (Orden et. al 2005). 
 
5.2.1. NPCs Based on Export Parity Prices 
A comparison of export parity prices with the corresponding domestic market prices of 
seed cotton (see Table 3) provides a mixed picture. The NPC (NPC 1) averaged 0.94 during 
the 1990s and 1.08 from 2001 to 2008, while its average value for the entire period is 1.0. In 7 
of the 18 crop years under study, export parity prices were higher than the domestic market 
prices, but in 11 of the years, domestic prices were higher than the export parity prices. In 
three of the years, domestic and export parity prices were so similar that the NPC was equal 
to 1. Thus, the NPC was less than 1.0 in 6 years but greater than 1.0 in 9 years. With the Abdul Salam 
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exception of 2004-05, all the years when cotton production was subjected to implicit taxation 
(i.e., NPC<1) were in the 1990s, when domestic production was substantially greater than 
domestic demand and the country exported large quantities of raw cotton. With the increasing 
requirements of the expanding textile industry and the rising share of imports in the last ten 
years or so, farmers have benefited from domestic prices that have fairly consistently been 
higher than the corresponding export parity prices. 
 
5.2.2. NPCs Based on Import Parity Prices 
Generally  speaking,  years  when  significant  quantities  of  cotton  were  exported  were 
characterized by higher export parity prices, while those years when there were considerable 
imports featured lower export parity prices. These data on export parity prices suggest that the 
implicit taxation of cotton has been arrested since 1997-98. In contrast, the data on import 
parity  prices  do  not  support  this  claim,  as  import  parity  prices  have  consistently  been 
significantly  higher  than  the  domestic  prices  received  by  cotton  farmers  throughout  the 
period. Accordingly, the NPCs based on the import parity prices (NPC 2) have been less than 
1.0 every year, ranging from 0.49 to 0.97, with an average value of 0.70. This underscores the 
importance of increasing domestic production of cotton, which is cheaper than importing 
cotton,  through  various  incentives  and  other  measures  to  meet  the  ever-increasing 
requirements of the industry. During 2003-04 cotton imports were approximately 393,000 
tons and comprised 19.4 percent of domestic cotton consumption. Cotton imports increased to 
898,818 tons in 2007-08  Government of Pakistan 2008). 
 
 
6. SUGARCANE: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE, GOVERNMENT POLICIES, 
AND ESTIMATES OF DISTORTIONS 
 
Sugarcane, which is cultivated under irrigated conditions on an area of about one million 
hectares, accounts for 4-5 percent of Pakistan‘s total cropped area. Farms operating less than 
5 hectares account for about half of the area cultivated for sugarcane. Pakistan ranks 5th in 
the world in terms of area cultivated for sugar, but 15th in terms of sugarcane production 
(Pakistan Sugar Mills Association 2005). Pakistan‘s sugar industry, which is comprised of 79 
sugar mills and is the country‘s second largest agro-based industry, depends on sugarcane 
cultivation for its supply of raw material. All of the sugar mills are in the private sector. The 
installed capacity in the industry is sufficient to produce about 5 million tons of sugar in a 
given crushing season provided that an adequate supply of raw material is available. As the 
number of sugar mills has increased over time, from 32 in 1980 to 79 in 2005, so too has the 
area under sugarcane. The sugar industry is located mostly in the countryside in and around 
small  and medium-sized towns, and has played a catalytic role  in the promotion of rural 
development. With its many forward and backward linkages, sugarcane farming has opened 
vast regular and seasonal employment opportunities for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
labor. However, the production, marketing, and processing of sugarcane are confronted with a 
host of problems. First, the sector has been characterized by unstable production, of both 
sugarcane and sugar. Total production of sugar in Pakistan has ranged from 1.93 million tons 
(1990-91) to 4.75 million tons (2007-08), averaging over 3 million tons per year during the 
period of this study. The coefficients of variation of sugarcane production for Punjab and Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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Sindh,  the  major  sugarcane  producing  provinces,  are  estimated  at  19  and  17  percent, 
respectively. Second, relations between the farmers and sugar mills remain tenuous at best, 
which has adversely affected the development of sugarcane and its related sub-sectors. The 
growers, facing ever increasing input prices and energy costs and recurring water shortages, 
have been wary of the uncooperative and often exploitative attitude of the mills‘ management. 
The mills, facing increasing competition from cheap imports and troubled by an irregular 
cane supply, complain about the poor quality of the raw material and overcrowding in the 




6.1. Government Policies and Interventions 
 
The large variation  in sugar production has often resulted in both large surpluses and 
shortages of the commodity, which has led to price instability and recourse to international 
trade and world markets.
9 This has also required frequent government policy measures and 
interventions. The pr incipal interventions in the sugarcane sector have been rationing of 
sugar, licensing of sugar mills, zoning for sugar mills, regulating sugar exports and imports 
through tariff and non tariff measures, imposition of a central excise duty on manufacturing 
of sugar and a general sales tax on sugar, and fixation of support prices of sugarcane. These 
policies  have  caused  distortions  in  incentives  for  both  the  producers  and  millers.  The 
distortions in incentives for sugarcane production resulting from government policy measures 
and interventions are discussed below. 
 
 
6.2. Prices and Distortions in the Sugar Market 
 
Pakistan has been an active participant in the international sugar market, often importing 
and exporting large quantities of sugar simultaneously (see Appendix Table 2). As shown in 
Appendix Table 2, during nine of the 18 years in the study period, Pakistan was a net exporter 
of sugar, with net exports ranging from 24,481 to 896,950 metric tons. During the other nine 
years, net imports of sugar ranged from 35,638 to 1,456,786 metric tons.
10 In view of this 
import-export  situation,  determining  the  economic  prices  (i.e., the  opportunity  costs  of 
domestic production) of sugarcane in Pakistan is rather complex, requiring estimation of both 
import and export parity prices. Moreover, because the processing of sugarcane into sugar 
also  entails  considerable  costs,  estimating  the  economic  price  of  sugarcane  requires 
representative data on the costs of processing, sucrose recoveries, etc., which are not readily 
available and are often unreliable. The data on processing costs used in the analysis here are 
from the reports and files of the Agricultural Prices Commission, while the data on average 
annual sucrose recoveries are from reports prepared by the sugar indust ry. Similarly, data 
regarding various costs involved in sugar imports were compiled and adapted from policy 
                                                 
9
 Sugarcane and sugar production, prices, and trade are also often at the center of press reports, controversy, and 
acrimonious debate in various forums, including the national press and other media. 
10
  Another notable feature of the sugar market has been the wide fluctuations in the unit value of imports and 
exports over this period, in both rupee and dollar terms (see Appendix Table 2 ). Abdul Salam 
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reports of the Agricultural Prices Commission and used to  estimate import parity prices. 
Assuming symmetry of domestic costs in imports and exports, data on import costs were also 
used to calculate export parity prices for sugarcane. 
The import and export parity prices, along with the domestic market prices of sugarcane, 
are reported in Table 4. Although the government announces support prices for sugarcane, the 
prices received by farmers have often differed from these, depending upon the crop situation and 
the prices of sugar in the market. Therefore, the average market price of sugarcane in Punjab and 
Sindh, the two provinces producing 90 percent of the country‘s sugarcane crop, has been used to 
represent the domestic market price and to estimate the NPCs presented in Table 4. Although in 
some years, the fob export cost of sugar was higher than the c and f costs of imported sugar, 
export parity prices have generally been much lower than import parity prices. 
 
Table 4. Domestic Market, Export and Import   Parity Prices of Sugarcane in Pakistan 
 




NPC 1  Import parity 
Rs/40 kg 
NPC 2 
1991-92  NA  16.88  NA  21.76  0.78 
1992-93  NA  18.63  NA  19.75  0.94 
1993-94  18.48  19.70  1.07  25.72  0.77 
1994-95  23.48  21.20  0.90  35.58  0.60 
1995-96  24.58  25.00  1.02  39.98  0.63 
1996-97  0.00  39.00  NA  37.17  1.05 
1997-98  28.05  37.00  1.32  42.76  0.87 
1998-99  23.62  34.00  1.44  35.79  0.95 
1999-00  31.32  38.50  1.23  30.57  1.26 
2000-01  NA  47.50  NA  41.36  1.15 
2001-02  42.07  42.00  1.00  44.76  0.94 
2002-03  27.22  35.50  1.30  48.08  0.74 
2003-04  28.00  34.50  1.23  45.26  0.76 
2004-05  40.08  40.50  1.01  54.08  0.75 
2005-06  55.56  60.00  1.08  64.57  0.93 
2006-07  NA  60.00  NA  69.98  0.86 
2007-08  46.50  57.50  1.24  66.56  0.86 
Average: 92-00      1.16    0.87 
Average: 01-08      1.14    0.87 
Average: 92-08      1.15    0.87 
Notes: Sugar prices, which formed the basis of calculating export parity prices, were compiled from the 
Pakistan  Sugar  Mills  Association‘s Annual  Report  2007  and  from  data  on sugar  exports  and 
imports along with their prices from the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) . Import parity prices 
were calculated from the data on sugar imports obtained from the FBS and the Agricultural Price 
Policy Institute's (formerly the Agricultural Prices Commission) annual reports on sugarcane. NPC 
1 and NPC 2 are the estimated nominal protection coefficients, based on export and import parity 
prices, respectively. Domestic prices represent the average of the ex-mill prices paid by sugar mills 
for the purchase of sugarcane in the Punjab and Sindh. Export / import parity prices were also 
worked back to the sugar mill level to represent the average situation in these two provinces. 
N/A: negligible quantities of import/exports or data not available. 
 
6.2.1. NPCs Based on Export Parity Prices 
As shown in Table 4, domestic market prices are generally higher than export parity 
prices.  Thus,  the  NPCs  calculated  by  using  the  export  parity  prices  (NPC  1)  suggest 
considerable protection of sugarcane farmers. The NPC averaged 1.16 during the 1992-2000 Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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period  but  declined  to  1.14  during  the  2001-08  period,  reflecting  the  fall  in  marginal 
protection to sugarcane in the recent past. 
 
6.2.2. NPCs Based on Import Parity Prices 
As shown in Table 4, in most years, domestic prices of sugarcane were below import 
parity prices and the NPCs based on import parity prices (NPC 2) are generally considerably 
below one, suggesting implicit taxation of domestic sugarcane production. There were, of 
course, a few years when these NPCs were greater than one, implying protection to domestic 
production. However, the average value of NPC 2 throughout the entire period is 0.87.
11 
 
6.2.3. Conclusions about Distortions in the Sugarcane Market 
In summary, the domestic prices of sugarcane have generally been higher than export 
parity  prices,  but  somewhat  lower  than  import  parity  prices.  Thus,  domestic  prices  of 
sugarcane fall between these two measures of its opportunity cost. While annual trade  in 
sugar (exports as well imports) may appear to be large in absolute terms, it represents only a 
small fraction of total domestic production, with imports averaging 10 percent and exports 
only one percent of domestic production during the last eight years. Thus, both the domestic 
demand-supply situation and government interventions in the market play important roles in 
determining the sugarcane prices paid to farmers by the mills. If we use the average of the 
import and export parity prices to indicate the opportunity cost of producing sugarcane, then 
the value of NPC is on average close to one, which to a large extent eliminates the evidence 
of distortions in domestic sugarcane prices. The picture that emerges from the foregoing 
analysis  is  quite  interesting,  but  continuous  monitoring  of  developments  in  world  sugar 
markets, the domestic sugar sector, and its related sub-sectors in the economy is required in 
order to keep track of the developments in these markets and address the emerging issues and 
challenges to sugarcane farming and processing. 
 
 
7. COMPARISON OF NPC ESTIMATES WITH RESULTS FROM 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
For comparison purposes, Table 5 summarizes the NPC estimates from this study and 
some previous studies by the World  Bank and the  United Nations Food and  Agriculture 
Organization (FAO).
12  
An  examination  of  these  NPCs  suggests  that,  notwithstanding  the  trend  towards 
liberalization, implicit taxation of wheat continues, with the average taxation remaining at 
about 25 percent of the border price. 
The implicit taxation of basmati rice, an important export and food crop, has sharply 
declined over time. It is worth mentioning that  in the past basmati rice was subject to 
numerous  interventions  at  the  marketing  stage,  including   monopsony  procurements, 
restrictions on its movements, and monopoly exports by the Rice Export Corporation of 
Pakistan (RECP) during the 1970s, which continued into the 1980s . Economic liberalization, 
                                                 
11
 It should be noted, however, that in the 1992-2000 period, there was greater variation in the annual NPC values 
than in the 2001-08 period. Abdul Salam 
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the phasing out of trade restrictions, and the dismantling of the RECP have worked to greatly 
reduce the wedge between domestic and border prices and hence the implicit taxation of 
basmati. The coarse rice, which was subject to some of the same restrictions and interventions 
as basmati rice, as well as implicit taxation, has also benefited from the economic reforms. As 
shown in Table 5, coarse rice received a small amount of protection during the 1991-2008 
period, while it was implicitly taxed during the 1970s and 1980s. Cotton was also heavily 
taxed  in the 1970s and 1980s. However, starting  in the  late 1990s, incentives for cotton 
production seem to have improved significantly. With an average NPC of 1.00 during the 
1991-2008 period, domestic prices appear to have tracked international prices rather well. 
Economic liberalization and the program of policy reforms also seem to have benefited 
the country‘s sugarcane production. Between 1972 and 1977, the NPC for sugarcane averaged 
0.58, reflecting a high level of implicit taxation of domestic production. However, during the 
1976-84 period, with an average NPC of approximately 0.93, the situation for the domestic 
sugarcane industry had improved considerably. The situation for the 1991-2008 period  is 
mixed. During this period, Pakistan both exported and imported sugar. Using export parity 
prices, the average NPC was 1.15, reflecting protection for domestic sugarcane production, 
while the average NPC based on import parity prices was 0.87, suggesting implicit taxation of 
domestic sugarcane farmers. 
The results of the present study generally agree with the results reported in the World 
Bank  study  (Dorosh  and Salam  2009)  concerning  the  direction  of  support  (i.e.,  implicit 
taxation or protection) for the four commodities, but are different in terms of the magnitude of 
that support. The differences in the magnitude or size of the coefficients of support arise for 
various reasons, for example due to the different time periods of the two analyses; variations 
in the reference prices used to calculate import or export parity prices; and variations in the 
costs used to calculate import or export parity prices. In addition, for commodities falling into 
both export and import categories, the use of the import versus the export parity price could 
significantly  affect  the  resulting  estimates  of  economic  prices.  The  reference  point  of 
comparison can also affect the size of the protection coefficient. For example, one of the main 
reasons for the differences in the magnitude of support for wheat in the two studies is the 
point of comparison. That is, in the case of the World Bank study (Dorosh and Salam 2009), 
the point of comparison is the port city of Karachi, while in the present study the protection 
coefficient has been calculated at Lahore, which increases the costs for imports, as the wheat 
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 For additional studies see Hussain, Anwar and Hussain (2006).  
Table 5. Summary of Nominal Protection Coefficients from Different Studies 
 
Period of analysis  Study by  Wheat  Basmati  IRRI  Cotton  Sugarcane 
Avg. 1972 – 77  Gotsch and Brown (1980)  0.75  0.5  0.54  0.63  0.55 
Avg. 1976 – 80  Appleyard (1987)  0.76  0.5  0.68  0.8  1 
Avg. 1976 – 84  Appleyard (1987)  0.72  0.48  0.71  0.8  0.93 
Avg. 1991-2000  Present study  0.78  0.93  1.01  0.94  1.16 (0.87) 
Avg. 2001-08  Present study  0.65  0.87  1.03  1.08  1.14 (0.87) 
Avg. 1991- 2008  Present study  0.72  0.90  1.02  1  1.15 (0.87) 
Avg.1990-1994 [ NRAs] %  Dorosh and Salam (2009)  -27.1  -17.9  -0.5  -19.9  52.1 
Avg. 1995-994 [NRAs] %  Dorosh and Salam (2009)  -20.2  -1.7  8.1  -7.9  54.3 
Avg. 2000-05 [NRA] %  Dorosh and Salam (2009)  -13.9  -25.3  12.5  7.0  86.5 
Note: NRA refers to nominal rate of assistance and  is calculated by subtracting 1.0 from the NPCs. Negative signs indicate cases where NPCs are less than one. 
The figures showing NRAs indicate the percentage divergence between domestic and international prices. 
NPCs given in parentheses in sugarcane column are based on import parity prices while those without parentheses are based on export parity prices. 
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8. LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
The estimation and analysis of NPCs require data on both the domestic and international 
prices of the commodities. In the current analysis, the domestic prices of wheat, basmati and 
IRRI paddy, seed cotton and sugarcane relate to the harvest and post harvest seasons of the 
respective  commodities.  Data  from  the  price  policy  reports  of  the  Agricultural  Prices 
Commission (now the Agriculture Policy Institute), which report commodity prices as being 
those received by the farmers in the main producing area markets, were adopted for the 
analysis in this paper. Actual import / export prices of wheat, rice and cotton, as published in 
the Pakistan Economic Survey, were used to work back the import/export parity prices for 
wheat, rice (paddy) and seed cotton. In the case of sugar, import / export prices as reported by 
the  Pakistan  Sugar  Mills  Association  in  its  annual  reports  for  2005  and  2007  were 
supplemented with data obtained from the Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
The estimation of import/export parity prices of commodities like paddy, seed cotton and 
sugarcane from the international prices of their respective imported /exported products (i.e. 
rice, cotton and sugar) requires data not only on the various commodities‘ marketing costs, 
but also on their processing costs, technical coefficients, product recoveries and prices. The 
Agricultural Prices Commission has invested significant resources and time to collect, refine, 
and update such data for use in its policy related analysis. Because this data set has been 
scrutinized by many and was the best available, it was adapted for use in the current analysis. 
The comparison of domestic and  international prices has been done using data from 
comparable locations for the various commodities. For wheat, the producer prices used in the 
analysis represented the average of the producer area markets during the harvest season. The 
price of wheat imported at Lahore, a large consumer centre located in the heart of the wheat 
producing region, inclusive of transportation and other related costs, was adopted to represent 
the average situation. For basmati paddy, producer prices used in the analysis are harvest/post 
harvest  season  prices  prevailing  in  producer  area  markets  of  the  Punjab,  where  basmati 
production is concentrated. Export parity prices for paddy, based on the export prices of 
basmati rice, were estimated for rice mills located in the main basmati producing areas. For 
coarse  varieties  of  rice,  the  domestic  price  was  the  average  of  prices  prevailing  in  the 
producer area markets of Sindh, where the bulk of coarse rice is produced. Export parity 
prices of coarse rice were estimated for rice mills located in the producer areas of Sindh. 
In the case of cotton, crop farmers produce and sell seed cotton. The domestic price used 
was the average of the wholesale prices of seed cotton prevailing in the main producing area 
markets during the harvesting and post harvesting season, normally extending from October 
to January. Ex-gin export prices of seed cotton were worked back from the actual export 
prices of cotton for ginneries located in the major cotton growing regions. For sugarcane, 
domestic prices represent the average of prices received by farmers in the major sugarcane 
growing areas of the Punjab and Sindh. The parity prices of sugarcane at the mill level were 
worked  back  from  the  export/import  prices  to  represent  a  typical  sugar  mill  using  the 
weighted average of the transport and market costs for Punjab and Sindh. Given the wide 
dispersion of rice mills, cotton gins, and sugar mills across various areas, there is bound to be 
some variation that is not captured in the estimated export/import parity prices. However, this 
is also the case with domestic producer prices, which reflect the average situation in the main 
producing area markets for the respective commodities. Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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The actual export and import prices that were used to calculate the export or import parity 
prices of the commodities are annual averages and thus mask whatever variation occurred 
during the course of the year. But such variation is inescapable in this type of analysis and a 
precise calibration of the timing of import and export prices with domestic prices is well nigh 
impossible. Another point worth mentioning in this context is the impact of transportation, 
marketing, handling and other costs related to international trade. The structure of markets 
and the efficiency of the operations involved also affect the resulting import/ export parity 
prices of the commodities. Furthermore, the efficiencies and inefficiencies of the processing 
sub-sectors for commodities like paddy, seed cotton and sugarcane affect their parity prices 
since  they  are  worked  back  from  the  prices  of  the  final  products. Thus,  in  addition  to 
government policies, the kind of market infrastructure, the prevailing market structures, and 
the  efficiency  of  the  processing  sector  affect  the  degree  of  integration  or  the  extent  of 
insulation of domestic markets from developments in world commodity markets. Moreover, 





This article has reviewed domestic producer prices and international prices for wheat, 
rice, cotton and sugarcane during the 1991-2008 period. The data and analysis indicate that 
domestic production of wheat and basmati rice (and sugarcane when import parity is used as a 
measure of its opportunity cost) has been subject to implicit taxation. At times, these crops 
enjoyed protection, which coincided with falling prices in world markets. Clearly, the degree 
of taxation and resource transfers from producers and surplus regions has varied from year to 
year. Nevertheless, as a result of these transfers, farmers‘ incomes and well being have been 
adversely affected. The production of coarse varieties of rice has been somewhat protected 
during most years in the reference period. In the case of cotton, domestic production was 
heavily taxed in the 1990s, but in recent years, its domestic prices have been tracking world 
prices rather closely, thus reducing the implicit taxation. In view of the burgeoning demand 
for cotton in Pakistan, the domestic textile industry needs to enhance its support for research 
and development efforts to raise its productivity and expand domestic production. 
Given  current  levels  of  production  and  processing  efficiency,  the  data  suggest  that 
Pakistan will be hard pressed to export sugar competitively. Nevertheless, if sugar prices in 
world  markets  rise  persistently  to  the  levels  witnessed  in  the  recent  past,  it  may  be 
economically  feasible  to  expand  domestic  production  to  meet  domestic  requirements. 
However, it may still be difficult to compete in export markets. The sugar sector would be 
well  served  by  research  and  development  efforts  aimed  at  improving  the  efficiency  of 
sugarcane production and processing. 
The role of the public sector and government interventions in commodity markets has 
declined over time while that of the private sector has expanded. Nevertheless, the food crises 
experienced in 2006-07 and 2007-08 have highlighted the shortcomings of Pakistan‘s current 
production, marketing, and distribution systems. Wheat marketing witnessed the return to 
some of the old administrative measures in 2007-08: restriction of commodity movements 
and compulsory government procurements. The end result of these interventions has been a 
consistently inadequate market infrastructure and a lot of waste and malpractice in the public Abdul Salam 
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sector. Unless and until the fundamental imbalance between demand and supply is addressed, 
these interventions will only aggravate rather than solve the problem. It is imperative to arrest 
the historical resource transfers from farmers and remove other distortions to incentives if the 
crop sector is to be able to play its proper role in agricultural development and the alleviation 
of rural poverty. If the economic environment for agriculture is not improved, the requisite 
farm investments will not occur. To some extent, there has been an  improvement  in the 
economic  environment  for  agriculture  in  Pakistan,  as  evidenced  by  steps  taken  by  the 
government to increase producer incentives during the 2008-09 crop year. However, this is 
only half of the story. The other half relates to the development, dissemination, and adoption 
of productivity-enhancing techniques and technologies. These measures will assume greater 
importance as domestic markets are increasingly aligned with world markets. 
 
Appendix Table 1. Area and Production of Crops Under Study in this Paper 
 
Years  Wheat  Rice  Cotton  Sugarcane 
Area: 000 hectares 
Average: 1991-95  8,059  2,099  2,758  927 
Average: 1996-2000  8,307  2,334  3,002  1,030 
Average: 2001-05  8,169  2,339  3,004  1,020 
Average: 2006-08  8,480  2,572  3,077  1,059 
Average: 1991-2008  8,221  2,302  2,944  1,002 
Production: 000 tons 
Average: 1991-95  15,724  3,412  1,641  40,902 
Average: 1996-2000  18,238  4,487  1,673  48,371 
Average: 2001-05  19,509  4,607  1,900  48,873 
Average: 2006-08  22,107  5,516  2,127  54,443 
Average: 1991-2008  18,895  4,506  1,835  48,147 
Source:  Calculations  by  the  author  based  on  data  from  Pakistan  Economic  Survey  Statistical 
Supplement) 2007-08. 
 
Appendix Table 2. Exports and Imports of Sugar in Pakistan 
 
Year  Imports  Unit value of imports  Exports  Unit value of exports  Imports- Exports 
Metric tons  Rs / ton  $/ton  Metric tons Rs/ ton  $/ton   Metric tons 
1990-91  434,730   8,269   369  NA  NA  NA  434,730  
1991-92  116,741   7,830   315  NA  NA  NA  116,741  
1992-93  75,018   7,356   291  NA  NA  NA  75,018  
1993-94  47,754   9,320   312  125,265   9,912   329  (77,511) 
1994-95  4,998   13,149   426  462,145   11,936   387  (457,147) 
1995-96  3,299   15,519   454  29,134   12,016   358  (25,835) 
1996-97  722,273   13,651   352  NA  NA  NA  722,273  
1997-98  110,407   15,186   373  321,063   13,757   318  (210,656) 
1998-99  9,652   14,936   299  906,602   12,739   272  (896,950) 
1999-00  66,125   11,473   221  30,487   16,032   310  35,638  
2000-01  926,856   15,558   271  NA  NA  NA  926,856  
2001-02  84,049   17,185   271  3,800   20,184   329  80,249  Distortions in Incentives to Production of Major Crops in Pakistan: 1991-2008 
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2002-03  7,749   17,991   309  32,230   13,750   235  (24,481) 
2003-04  9,818   16,196   281  116,160   13,679   238   (106,342) 
2004-05  265,784   19,615   330  54,410   18,782   316  211,374  
2005-06  1,517,743   24,469   408  60,957   26,055   435  1,456,786  
2006-07  585,754   26,817   444  NA  NA  NA  585,754  
2007-08  23,617   23,415   386   239,130    22,067   347  (215,513) 
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics and Pakistan Sugar Mills Association Annual Report  2007). 
Note: Values in parentheses indicate net exports, while values without parentheses are net imports. 
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This  article  analyzes  the  impacts  on  agricultural  markets  of  Sudan‘s  proposal  to 
accede to the WTO. We find that Sudan has inflated its customs schedule in its offer for 
agricultural  products,  which  provides  room  to  maneuver  during  negotiation.  Applied 
tariffs for commodities such as cottonseed, cotton meal, other oilseed meal, and beef and 
veal are actually higher in Sudan‘s offer than they are at present. Sudan has also proposed 
TRQs for some tariff lines. Using the Partial  Equilibrium Agricultural  Trade Simulator 
(PEATSim)  model,  we  assess  the  impacts  of  Sudan‘s  market  access  proposal  on 
agricultural  markets.  A  free  trade  case  (zero  tariffs)  is  simulated  as  well  in  order  to 
determine which agricultural commodities are most sensitive to the elimination of border 
protection. 
Model  results  indicate  that  the  agricultural  commodities  most  sensitive  to  trade 
liberalization in Sudan are oilseed products: peanut oil and  meal, and other oilseed oil 
and  meal.  We  suggest  that  in  order  to  benefit  from  its  accession  to  the  WTO  and 
overcome  the  negative  impacts,  Sudan  should  reorient  its  agricultural  trade  policy 
towards  increasing  the  competitiveness  of  its  exported  agricultural  commodities  by 
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Sudan is a low-income, least developed country. Its economy is based largely on the 
production and export of primary commodities. The main agricultural commodity exports are 
cotton, gum Arabic, sesame, peanuts, sorghum, livestock, and sugar. Although Sudan has 
recently become an oil exporting country, agricultural trade remains an  important part of 
overall  economic  activity  and  continues  to  play  a  major  role  in  domestic  agricultural 
production and employment. 
In addition to depending on agriculture as a source of non-petroleum foreign exchange 
earnings, raw materials, and food, Sudan relies on the agriculture sector as a source of inputs 
used in other sectors and as a source of employment for more than two-thirds of the country‘s 
labor force (Abdel Karim 2002). While the agricultural sector contributed, on average, about 
45 percent of gross domestic product  (GDP) during the 1994-2006 period (see Appendix 
Table 1), Sudan has not been able to attain self-sufficiency in food.
1 This is due to many 
factors, including a  lack of realistic policy priorities to exploit the country‘s comparative 
advantage in agriculture, a shortage of capital for investment, a lack of essential technical 
research, and, most importantly, political instability. 
 
Agricultural exports were Sudan‘s main source of foreign exchange before the discovery 
of oil. During 1994-1998, agricultural products represented, on average, about 89 percent of 
the  country‘s  total  exports,  but  this  share  declined  to  less  than  8  percent  in  2006  (see 
Appendix  Table  2).  Sudan  is  not  currently  a  member  of  the  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO), but it has been in the process of accession since 1994. 
 
This article has two objectives. First, we examine whether the tariff reductions in Sudan‘s 
WTO accession proposal fall under acceptable levels of WTO Agreements. Second, we assess 
the impacts on Sudan‘s agricultural markets of implementing the country‘s market access 
proposal.  The  analysis  is  based  on  the  Partial  Equilibrium  Agricultural  Trade  Simulator 
(PEATSim) model developed by the Economic Research Service of the US Department of 
Agriculture in collaboration with Pennsylvania State University. 
In the next section, we provide background on Sudan's agricultural trade policy. This is 
followed by a description of Sudan's accession process to the WTO. We then present the 
methodological approach used in our analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the results. 
The final section summarizes our findings and offers some policy recommendations to help 
Sudan benefit from its accession to the WTO. 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY IN SUDAN 
 
Over the last 15 years, the Sudanese government has undertaken economic liberalization, 
particularly in its foreign trade regime. The availability of domestic petroleum, together with 
trade liberalization, has allowed Sudan to begin integrating  into the world economy more 
rapidly (Shafaeddin 2007).  During the  last two decades, Sudan has implemented different 
                                                 
1
 The main imported agricultural commodities are wheat and wheat flour, rice, and beverages.  Sudan's Proposal to Accede to the WTO 
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development strategies and various policy reform programs. The major policies have targeted 
the agricultural sector, due to its major role in the economy. Generally, policies have been 
aimed at reducing total taxation on the agricultural sector and maintaining the stability of 
Sudan‘s  exchange  rate,  especially  against  the  dollar  (State  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Forestry 2004). 
In the past, direct and indirect taxation of the agricultural sector was a major source of 
government revenue. However, efforts have been made by the Sudanese government in recent 
years to reduce this taxation. In 1998, total taxation (production tax, state development tax, 
Farmer‘s Union levy, etc.) of agricultural products was limited to 20 percent in the rainfed 
sector and 15 percent in the irrigated sector. From 1998 to 2004, the tax on agricultural profits 
(net  returns) was  reduced  from  35  percent  to  10  percent.  Applied  tariffs  on  imports  of 





Export taxes on agricultural commodities were reduced in the 1990s and then eliminated 
entirely in 2000 (Sudanese Custom Union 2002). Exports from Sudan are exempted from the 
country‘s 15 percent value added tax (VAT) and exporters are eligible for refunds of the VAT 
paid on  imported inputs used to produce exports. However, in practice, VAT refunds are 
being delayed in most cases and are therefore acting as an indirect tax on exports. Many fees 
are  still  imposed  on  agricultural  production  and  exports,  such  as  administrative  fees, 
transportation fees, production fees (only on sugar production), state support fees (0.5%), and 
port fees (1%); there is also zakat (10%).
2 
Few  of  Sudan‘s  exports  currently  face  high  tariffs  in  foreign  markets,  but  this  may 
change if Sudan exports more processed foods and manufactured goods. Sudanese exports 
generally face low tariffs for two reasons. First, most favored nation (MFN) tariffs for its 
products are generally low because few of the countries to which Sudan exports impose high 
tariffs  on  oil  or  raw  agricultural  commodities.  Second,  Sudan  is  a  member  of  several 
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), including the Common  Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), and the Economic 






On the import side, Sudan does not apply any quantitative import restrictions. All goods 
may  be  imported  into  Sudan  except  those  that are  prohibited  by  government  regulations, 
Islamic values, or security considerations, e.g. imports of pork meat, wine and spirits are 
prohibited due to Islamic considerations. Sudan applies an 8-digit tariff nomenclature based 
on the Harmonized Commodity and Coding System (HS 96) as of July 1992. Sudan‘s tariff 
                                                 
2
 Zakat is an alms tax levied on five categories of property: food grains; fruit; camels, cattle, sheep and goats; gold 
and silver; and movable goods. 
3
 The EPA is a relatively new agreement that replaces the old Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Imad Eldin Elfadil Abdel Karim and David Abler 
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structure has two components: (1) the general rate of duty, and (2) preferential rates of duty. 
A certificate of origin for imports is required when tariff preferences are claimed. 
Customs duty rates are ad-valorem duty rates applied to the cost, insurance, and freight 
(CIF) import value. There are five different rates of customs duty: zero percent, 3 percent, 10 
percent, 25 percent and 45 percent. The zero percent rate is imposed mostly on agricultural 
and  industrial  inputs.  The  3  percent rate  applies  to  imports  such  as  products  of  milling 
industries, wheat, plastic, and metal raw materials. The 10 percent rate is charged on fresh, 
chilled, or frozen meat and fish, wood and wood articles, and edible vegetable and animal oil. 
The 25 percent rate is levied on products such as oilseeds, plastic and rubber articles, raw 
hides and skins, leather, and domestic household electrical equipment and appliances. The 45 
percent rate is imposed on textiles and textile articles, carpets and other floor coverings, 
edible  fruits  and  nuts,  sugar  and  sugar  confectionary,  perfumery,  cosmetics  and  toilet 
preparations, footwear, furniture, and tobacco. Sudan‘s 15 percent value added tax (CIF plus 
other charges) is collected on most imported goods, with human and veterinary medicines 
exempted from the VAT. Other charges include 2 percent quay (dock) dues collected by the 
Seaport Corporation and 1.2 percent civil aviation charges. 
Although current tariffs in Sudan are much less protectionist than those in place before 
the reforms of the 1990s, the import tariff regime in Sudan is still protectionist in comparison 
to most African and other developing countries (DTIS 2008).
4 In addition to high average 
tariffs, there is a considerable variation across industries and stages of production. For 
example, tariffs on final products are higher than those on intermediate inputs, which raise the 
prices of competing goods above world levels, encouraging local producers  to supply the 
local market rather than selling internationally. 
 
 
SUDAN‟S ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
 
Sudan is currently in the process of negotiating its accession to the WTO. As described in 
Article XII of the Marrakesh agreement, the accession process might be conceived as an easy 
and innocuous process whereby an agreement on the terms of accession is approved by the 
Ministerial  Conference  through  a  two-thirds  majority  vote  by  members  of  the  WTO. 
However, because Article XII does not lay out any membership criteria, the accession process 
can be very problematic (Lanoszka 2001). The terms of accession are left to negotiations 
between WTO members and the candidate country. Moreover, Article XII does not provide 
any guidance on the procedures to be used for negotiating the terms of accession (Lanoszka 
2001). 
In order to facilitate accession to the WTO by less developed countries (LDCs), the Doha 
declaration (paragraph 42) states that negotiations for the accession of LDCs to the WTO be 
―facilitated and accelerated through simplified and streamlined accession procedures,‖ with a 
view to concluding these negotiations as quickly as possible. All LDCs acceding to the WTO 
are subject to Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). In addition, a 2002 decision of the 
General  Council on streamlining accession of LDCs stipulates that ―WTO Members shall 
exercise restraint in seeking concessions and commitments on trade in goods and services 
                                                 
4
 Liberalization and privatization policies were adopted under the Economic Salvation Program. Sudan's Proposal to Accede to the WTO 
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from  acceding  LDCs,  taking  into  account  the  levels  of  concessions  and  commitments 
undertaken  by  existing  WTO  LDCs‘  Members.‖  However,  the  degree  to  which  this 
stipulation is followed in practice is subject to debate (Adhikari and Dahal 2004). 
 
 
Benefits of WTO Membership 
 
There are three key benefits that an acceding country can obtain from WTO membership. 
The  first  benefit  is  a  result  of  the  accession  process  itself,  namely,  the  systematic 
examination, streamlining, strengthening, and eventual lock-in of national trade-related laws 
and policies. This generally increases the availability and reduces the prices paid by domestic 
consumers for imported goods and services, enhancing consumer welfare. The second benefit 
is that, as a WTO member, a country will benefit from MFN access opportunities in other 
members‘ markets. The third benefit is access to a binding, rules-based multilateral dispute 
settlement process that is available by right to all WTO members. An important caveat is that, 
as  currently  set  up,  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  is  expensive  and  complex  and 
therefore may be of little practical use to poor economies (Mosoti 2004). 
 
 
Sudan‟s Accession Process 
 
The  working  party  on  the  accession  of  Sudan  was  established  in  1994.  Sudan‘s 
―Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime‖ was circulated in January 1999. The second 
meeting  of  the  working  party  was  held  in  March  2004.  A  ―Factual  Summary  of  Points 
Raised‖ (summarizing the discussions of the working party) was circulated  informally  in 
September 2004. Bilateral market access negotiations are underway on the basis of Sudan‘s 
revised  offers  on  goods  and  services.   The  third  meeting  of  the  working  party  has  been 
postponed, but as yet no date has been set. 
Sudan has taken several steps to revive the accession process. In September 2006, it 
submitted  updated  versions  of  its  ―checklist‖  reports  on  the  Trade  Related  Intellectual 
Property Aspects (TRIPS), Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS), and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) agreements. The latest versions of Sudan‘s market access proposals for goods and 
services  were  submitted  in  October  2006,  and  in  November  2006  it  initiated  bilateral 
negotiations on market access with ten members of its accession working party.
5 Since 2004 
the government has also maintained some momentum on trade reforms through significant 
liberalization in banking and telecommun ications services as well as modest reductions in 
customs duty rates. 
 
 
Sudan‟s Accession Proposal 
 
Sudan has followed a tariff binding approach, and different ranges of tariffs have been 
proposed for agricultural products, including special rates for sensitive and seasonal products. 
The  government‘s  initial  offer  on  agricultural  commodities  reflected  its  views  on  the Imad Eldin Elfadil Abdel Karim and David Abler 
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country‘s  current  level  of  economic  development  and  future  development  prospects,  its 
poverty reduction and food security requirements, and the need to protect small farmers and 
public health.
6 
The final offer on agricultural goods that Sudan submitted to the WTO includes 740 tariff 
lines (100 percent coverage) with bindings for nine tariff bands ranging from 25 percent to 
300 percent. This com pares to the current five tariff bands for agricultural products, with 
applied rates ranging from 0 percent to 45 percent. Table 1 presents the proposed bound and 
applied rates under Sudan‘s market access proposal, along with applied rates in 2004 (the 
base  year  for  the  analysis  below).  The  bound  tariff  rates  for  74  percent  of  the  products 
covered in Sudan‘s offer are above their current applied rates; 18 percent are below their 
current applied rates; and the rest (8 percent) are equal to their current applied rates. The 
simple average bound tariff in the offer is 53 percent, compared to 35 percent for current 
applied  rates.  This  average  bound  tariff  rate  is  considerably  less  than  the  rates  in  other 
developing  countries.  For  example,  in  19  African  countries  the  simple  average  bound 
agricultural tariff rate is 100 percent or more. In India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh the simple 
average bound rates are 122 percent, 101 percent and 200 percent, respectively (Basha 2004). 
In addition to normal tariff bindings, other measures are included in the final offer for 
agricultural products, such as imposing peak tariffs for sensitive products, phasing in tariffs 
for a limited number of sensitive products, and proposing tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for five 
strategic food products (sorghum, broad beans (faba beans), millet, wheat flour and sugar) for 
food security reasons. Special safeguard measures are designated for 22 tariff lines, including 
frozen meat and dairy products. Sudan has also selected 17 agricultural products (mainly 
perishable agricultural products) on which seasonal tariffs will be applied. 
It seems clear that Sudan has inflated its customs schedule in its offer for agricultural 
products, which is a good basis for negotiation. Using TRQs on some tariff lines (sensitive 
products) may not be acceptable under the Uruguay Round because TRQs typically replace 
non-tariff measures (e.g., quotas), and currently such measures do not exist for the selected 
products in Sudan. However, under the various Doha Round proposals, developing countries 
are allowed to protect special and sensitive products with TRQs. 
 
Table 1. Sudan‟s Current Applied Tariff Rates and Proposed WTO Bound and Applied 
Rates 
 
Commodity  Current Applied Rate (%) 
Proposed Rates Under WTO Accession (%) 
Bound Rate  Applied Rate 
Rice  0  60  0 
Wheat  3  60  3 
Maize  25  60  3 
Other Coarse Grains  10  80  10 
Sunflower Seed  45  40  45 
Cottonseed  25  40  45 
Cottonseed Oil  45  80  45 
Cottonseed Meal  19  25  25 
                                                                                                                                     
5
 These are China, South Korea, Japan, India, Brazil, and some EU countries. 
6
 Tariff binding refers to a commitment not to increase a rate  of duty beyond an agreed-upon level. Once a rate of 
duty is bound, it may not be raised without compensating the affected parties. Sudan's Proposal to Accede to the WTO 
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Peanuts  25  50  25 
Peanut Oil  45  80  45 
Peanut Meal  31  25  10 
Other Oilseeds  25  40  25 
Other Oilseed Oil  45  80  45 
Other Oilseed Meal  17  28  25 
Cotton  25  40  25 
Sugar  45  150  45 
Beef and Veal  25  80  45 
Poultry  45  70  45 
Fluid Milk  45  60  45 





The appraisal of the impact of Sudan‘s market access proposal on agricultural markets in 
Sudan can be carried out at various levels and with different methodological approaches, for 
example general equilibrium (CGE) or partial equilibrium approaches. CGE models excel at 
capturing  economy-wide  linkages  among  producers  and  consumers.  Changes  in  the 
agricultural sector could potentially have significant effects on national income and in turn 
demands for goods and services, including food. This is most likely to occur in developing 
countries such as Sudan where agriculture is a large percentage of national income. Changes 
in the agricultural sector could also have a significant impact on a country‘s real exchange 
rate, and in turn on prices of all goods and services (Abler 2007). However, CGE models 
require extensive data  in order to construct a social  accounting matrix, data that are not 
available or not reliable  in Sudan. Partial equilibrium models  also have  an advantage  in 
representing finely detailed sectors and policy details that are typically not captured in CGE 
models (Abler 2007). For these reasons, a partial equilibrium approach  is a suitable and 
practical tool for country like Sudan. 
The  methodological  framework  adopted  in  this  study  is  the  Partial  Equilibrium 
Agricultural Trade Simulator (PEATSim) model, which is a multi-country, multi-commodity, 
non-spatial, applied partial equilibrium model of global agricultural trade. The PEATSim 
model is non-spatial, meaning that it does not distinguish a region‘s imports by their source or 
a region‘s exports by their destination. It is a gross trade model that accounts for total exports 
and total imports of each commodity in every region. This is accomplished in most cases by 
having the smaller of the two (exports or imports) in a region governed by an Armington-like 
equation  that  is  consistent with  historical  trade,  while  the  larger  of  the  two (exports  or 
imports) adjusts as needed to help clear global agricultural markets. The nature of PEATSim 
as a non-spatial, gross trade model means that it cannot incorporate PTAs such as COMESA 
or GAFTA. This is a limitation of our modeling approach because Sudan‘s joining the WTO 
would likely alter the trade creation and trade diversion effects of these PTAs. 
The  PEATSim  model  was  developed  through  a  collaborative  project  involving 
Pennsylvania  State  University  and  the  Economic  Research  Service  (ERS)  of  the  US 
Department of Agriculture. Researchers have previously used the model to analyze a number 
of  agricultural  trade  and  policy  reform  scenarios,  including  global  agricultural  trade Imad Eldin Elfadil Abdel Karim and David Abler 
 
216 
liberalization  in  all  commodities,  trade  liberalization  in  global  dairy  markets,  and  trade 
liberalization in coarse grain markets (e.g. see Abler and Blandford 2007). 
 
 
Countries and Commodities Included in the Analysis 
 
The PEATSim model applied in this study covers 13 countries or regions: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union (EU-25), Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Korea, the United States, Sudan, and an aggregate for the rest of the world (ROW). 
Sudan is not classified as a separate region in the core version of the PEATSim model, but it 
was included separately in this study in order to depict the potential impacts of its market 
access proposal. 
The model includes 35 commodities: 13 crops (rice, wheat, maize, other coarse grains,
7 
soybeans, sunflower seed, rapeseed, peanuts, cotton [fiber and oilseed], other oilseeds,
8 
tropical oils,
9 and sugar); 12 oilseed products (soybean oil and meals, sunflower seed oil and 
meal, rapeseed oil and meal, cottonseed oil and meal, peanut oil and meal, and other oilseed 
oil and meal); 3 meat products (beef and veal, pork, and poultry); raw milk and 6 processed 
dairy products (fluid milk, butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, whole dry milk, and other dairy 
products
10).  Raw  milk,  fluid  milk,  and  other  dairy  products  are  treated  as  non -traded 
commodities in the core version of the PEATSim model. The other 32 commodities are 
traded internationally. 
Sudan  produces  and consumes  negligible  quantities  of  15  of  the  3 5  commodities: 
soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, sunflower seed oil, sunflower seed meal, rapeseed, 
rapeseed oil, rapeseed meal, tropical oils, pork, butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, whole dry 
milk, and other dairy products. Thus, these products are exc luded from the results for Sudan. 
Furthermore, because Sudan‘s production of dairy products other than fluid milk is negligible, 
and raw milk is almost entirely used as fluid (drinking) milk, the results presented for milk 





The PEATSim model  is a synthetic policy simulation model in which the behavior of 
producers, consumers, and other economic agents is represented by elasticities and other 
model parameters. The behavioral equations in the model are largely constant-elasticity in 
nature.  Constant-elasticity  functions  are  used  because  of  their  ease  of  interpretation  and 
consistent properties (provided the elasticities are chosen appropriately). The structure of the 
behavioral equations is the same for all countries in the model, but the parameters of the 
equations and the values of the variables vary by country. 
The PEATSim model is different from other partial equilibrium trade models in that it 
explicitly incorporates a wide range of domestic and trade policies related to agriculture. The 
                                                 
7
 The ―other coarse grains‖ aggregate is primarily barley, sorghum, millet and oats. 
8
 The ―other oilseeds‖ aggregate includes canola, flaxseed and others. 
9
 ―Tropical oils‖ include olive oil, palm oil, coconut oil, and others. 
10
 The ―other dairy products‖ aggregate includes ice cream, yogurt, whey, and other miscellaneous dairy products. Sudan's Proposal to Accede to the WTO 
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core set of policies  included for all countries are specific and  ad valorem  import tariffs, 
TRQs, and producer and consumer subsidies. Export subsidies are not explicitly included in 
the model. However, they are included implicitly because products that have intervention or 
other  support  prices  requiring  government  purchases  must  have  some  mechanism  for 
disposing of government stocks through subsidized sales abroad. The model uses applied 
tariff rates rather than WTO bound rates, recognizing that bound rates significantly exceed 
applied rates in many cases. 
Within-quota and over-quota tariffs for TRQ commodities are treated explicitly in the 
model  with  a  discontinuity  in  the  tariff  rate  at  the  threshold where  the  quota  amount  is 
reached. There are three possible regimes for a TRQ commodity in PEATSim: imports are 
less than the quota, so that the relevant tariff is the in-quota tariff; imports are greater than the 
quota, so that the relevant tariff is the over-quota tariff; and imports are exactly equal to the 
quota, in which case there is a difference between the domestic price and the world price plus 
the over-quota tariff that is commonly referred to as ―water‖ in the over-quota tariff. The 
model endogenously determines the amount of water in the tariff in the third case. The model 
also endogenously determines the regime in which a TRQ commodity lies, so that the regime 
can switch depending on the scenario being analyzed. 
The basic version of the PEATSim model used here is not a projections model. Changes 
over time in population, per capita income, crop and livestock yields, and other factors that 
shift  supply  and  demand  are  not  included.  However,  the  model  does  incorporate  future 
changes in agricultural policy in key regions, such as the US and EU, that have already been 
announced. 
The model‘s base year is 2004. The analysis period over which the model runs is 2005-
2014, with Sudan‘s accession to the WTO assumed to occur in 2009. The results reported 
below are for the year 2014. 
Baseline data on area, yields, production, consumption, stocks, and trade are drawn from 
USDA and country sources, including USDA‘s PSD (Production, Supply and Distribution) 
database.
11 Base-period data on Sudan‘s production, consumption, exports, and imports are 
shown in Table 2. World prices are drawn from the ERS baseline projections database.
12 
Tariffs and TRQs are drawn from the Agricultural Market  Access Database (AMAD).
13 
World prices are in US dollars and all domestic prices and policies are expressed in US 
dollars. Exchange rates are treated as exogenous. Sudan‘s baseline data are taken from the 
State Ministry of Agriculture and annual reports of the Bank of Sudan (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Base-Period (2004) Data for Sudan (1000 MT) 
 
Commodity  Production  Consumption  Exports  Imports 
Rice  9  45  0  36 
Wheat  398  1464  0  1066 
Maize  46  46  0  0 
Other Coarse Grains  5458  5441  17  0 
Sunflower Seed  7  0  7  0 
                                                 
11
 See http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/. 
12
 See http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Baseline/. 
13
 See http://www.amad.org/. Imad Eldin Elfadil Abdel Karim and David Abler 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Commodity  Production  Consumption  Exports  Imports 
Cottonseed  155  155  0  0 
Cottonseed Oil  18  18  0  0 
Cottonseed Meal  15  15  0  0 
Peanuts  790  797  3  0 
Peanut Oil  77  77  0  0 
Peanut Meal  87  87  0  0 
Other Oilseeds  401  183  218  0 
Other Oilseed Oil  92  92  0  0 
Other Oilseed Meal  81  81  0  0 
Cotton  88  9  79  0 
Sugar  755  748  24  17 
Beef and Veal  1672  1666  6  0 
Poultry  22  239  0  217 
Fluid Milk  7406  7406  0  0 
Source: PEATSim model database. 
Note: There is one case (peanuts) where production plus imports does not equal consumption plus 
exports because of changes in stocks. 
 
In the PEATSim model, the domestic price of a commodity is a weighted average of the 
commodity‘s import and export prices. The export price is the world price plus (or minus) any 
export  subsidies  (or  taxes),  while  the  import  price  is  the  world  price  plus  tariffs  and 
transportation costs. The weights in the model are endogenous and depend on a commodity‘s 
current-year exports relative to imports. If exports are large relative to imports, most of the 
weight will be on the export price; if imports are large relative to exports, most of the weight 
will be on the import price. 
The model includes five types of consumption activities: food/consumer demand, feed 
demand, crush demand, dairy processing demand, and other use demand (which includes 
biofuels,  seed  use,  and  waste).  The  model  in  this  respect  follows  the  logic  of  the  PSD 
database.  The  parameter  values  for  the  model  come from  various  sources,  including  the 
European  Simulation  Model  (ESIM),  the  ERS  baseline  projections  model,  the  Food  and 
Agricultural  Policy  Simulator  (FAPSIM),  OECD‘s  AGLINK  model,  FAO‘s  World  Food 
Model,  the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute‘s  IMPACT  model,  the  Policy 
Analysis System-Economic Research Service (POLYSYS-ERS) model, and the Static World 
Policy  Simulation  Model  (SWOPSIM).  A  number  of  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the 
model‘s elasticities to ensure that the requirements of economic theory were satisfied at the 
baseline values for the data. These requirements include symmetry and homogeneity in the 
output supply equations, land demand equations (crop production), feed demand equations 
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liberalization, three scenarios were simulated. The first is a market access scenario in which 
the  applied  rates  are  set  equal  to  those  in  Sudan‘s  accession  proposal.  The  second  is  a 
modified market access scenario in which the applied tariff rate for each commodity is set 
equal to either the rate in Sudan‘s proposal or the current applied rate, whichever is lower. 
The rationale for including this scenario is the instability in global agricultural prices that has 
existed since Sudan submitted its most recent market access offer in October 2006. Many 
developing countries moved to partially insulate domestic consumers from higher prices by 
lowering  applied  tariffs  on  agricultural  products.  One  could  argue  that  in  the  current 
environment it is hard to envision applied rates being increased. The third scenario is a zero 
tariff scenario, which serves as a point of reference and helps identify the products most 
sensitive to trade liberalization. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section presents and discusses the results of the analysis under the three scenarios 
described above. In particular, we examine the impacts of the three scenarios on domestic 
prices, production, consumption, and the export-import situation. 
 
 
Impacts on Prices 
 
Table  3  indicates  percentage  changes  in  Sudan‘s  domestic  prices  of  agricultural 
commodities (from the baseline) under the three scenarios. 
 
Table 3. Domestic Agricultural Prices in Sudan (Percentage Change from Baseline) 
 






Rice  0  0  0 
Wheat  0  0  -3 
Maize  -16  -16  -18 
Other Coarse Grains  0  0  -1 
Sunflower Seed  0  0  0 
Cottonseed  2  0  -27 
Cottonseed Oil  0  0  -30 
Cottonseed Meal  5  0  -15 
Peanuts  0  0  -4 
Peanut Oil  0  0  -27 
Peanut Meal  -1  -2  -7 
Other Oilseeds  0  0  -1 
Other Oilseed Oil  0  0  -23 
Other Oilseed Meal  0  0  12 
Cotton  0  0  0 
Sugar  0  0  -9 
Beef and Veal  0  0  -8 
Poultry  0  0  -30 
Fluid Milk  0  0  -17 
Source: PEATSim model results. Imad Eldin Elfadil Abdel Karim and David Abler 
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Both  producer  and  consumer  prices  are  equal  to  domestic  prices  because  the  model 
contains no specific policies for Sudan (e.g., producer or consumer subsidies) that would 
drive a wedge between producer and consumer prices. 
The only two commodities whose prices decline under the two market access scenarios 
are maize and peanut meal. These are also the only two commodities whose import tariffs are 
reduced under these scenarios. Tariffs for some commodities (cottonseed, cottonseed meal, 
other oilseed meal, and beef and veal) actually increase in the market access scenario, and 
these tariff increases translate into increases in domestic prices for cottonseed and cottonseed 
meal.
14 The modified market access scenario is constructed in such a way that no applied 
tariffs are increased, and the results in Table 3 show that no domestic p rices increase in this 
scenario. 
With the exception of rice, sunflower seed, and cotton, domestic prices of commodities 
decline in the zero tariff scenario. The result for rice is due to the fact that its applied tariff is 
already zero. Sunflower seed and  cotton are commodities that Sudan exports but does not 
import, either currently or under this scenario. Thus, the elimination of import tariffs has no 
impact on domestic prices. The largest percentage declines in prices in this scenario occur for 
cottonseed, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, other oilseed oil, and poultry. 
 
Impacts on Production and Consumption 
 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate the percentage changes in Sudan‘s production and consumption 
from the baseline. The decline in the price of maize in the two market access scenarios leads 
to a drop in maize production and a rise in maize consumption. The decline in the production 
of cottonseed oil and cottonseed meal under the market access proposal appears to be due to 
the rise in the price of cottonseed in that scenario, which drives up cottonseed crushing costs 
and hence reduces the amount of cottonseed crushed. As shown in Table 5, the decline in 
cottonseed  crushing  is  also  manifested  in  a  decline  in  cottonseed  consumption  in  this 
scenario. Consumption of other coarse grains declines slightly in percentage terms in the two 
market access scenarios, as consumers switch from other coarse grains to maize. 
Large percentage declines in production occur in the zero tariff scenario for peanut oil, 
peanut meal, other oilseed oil, other oilseed meal, and poultry. These declines are a response 
to the declines in domestic prices for peanut oil, other oilseed oil, and poultry. It should be 
noted that in the PEATSim model, oil and meal from each oilseed are joint products that are 
produced in fixed proportions. Prices of cottonseed oil and cottonseed meal also decline 
significantly  in the zero tariff scenario, but output of these two products does not decline 
much because output price declines are offset by lower production costs in the form of lower 
cottonseed prices. A significant percentage decline in other oilseed consumption occurs in the 
zero tariff scenario. This occurs in spite of a small percentage decline in the other oilseed 
price because the percentage declines in prices for cottonseed and peanuts are larger, which 




                                                 
14
 Prices of other oilseed meal and  beef & veal  also rise  but the percentage increases are very small and, after 
rounding to a whole number, are zero in Table 3. Sudan's Proposal to Accede to the WTO 
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Table 4. Agricultural Production in Sudan (Percentage Change from Baseline) 
 






Rice  0  0  1 
Wheat  0  0  0 
Maize  -6  -6  -6 
Other Coarse Grains  0  0  1 
Sunflower Seed  0  0  0 
Cottonseed  0  0  1 
Cottonseed Oil  -3  0  -2 
Cottonseed Meal  -3  0  -2 
Peanuts  0  0  -1 
Peanut Oil  0  0  -31 
Peanut Meal  0  0  -31 
Other Oilseeds  0  0  1 
Other Oilseed Oil  0  0  -31 
Other Oilseed Meal  0  0  -31 
Cotton  0  0  1 
Sugar  0  0  -4 
Beef and Veal  0  0  -6 
Poultry  0  0  -22 
Fluid Milk  0  0  0 
Source: PEATSim model results. 
 
Table 5. Consumption of Agricultural Products in Sudan  
(Percentage Change from Baseline) 
 






Rice  0  0  -1 
Wheat  0  0  0 
Maize  4  4  4 
Other Coarse Grains  -1  -1  -3 
Sunflower Seed  0  0  0 
Cottonseed  -3  0  -2 
Cottonseed Oil  0  0  11 
Cottonseed Meal  0  0  -2 
Peanuts  0  0  -10 
Peanut Oil  0  0  10 
Peanut Meal  0  0  -3 
Other Oilseeds  0  0  -31 
Other Oilseed Oil  0  0  7 
Other Oilseed Meal  0  0  -5 
Cotton  0  0  0 
Sugar  0  0  0 
Beef and Veal  0  0  -6 
Poultry  0  0  5 
Fluid Milk  0  0  0 
Source: PEATSim model results. 
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Impacts on Exports and Imports 
 
Table 6 presents the percentage change (from the model‘s baseline in 2014) in Sudan‘s 
exports and imports of key traded commodities under the three scenarios. The results indicate 
an increase in other coarse grain exports relative to the baseline in the two market access 
scenarios,  and  an  even  larger  increase  in  exports  in  the  zero  tariff scenario.  In  all  three 
scenarios, domestic consumers shift some grain consumption from other coarse grains to 
maize, while in the zero tariff scenario producers shift some land from maize to other coarse 
grains. The result in all three scenarios is an increase in other coarse grain production relative 
to  consumption,  leading  to  an  increase  in  exports.  Maize  imports  increase  in  all  three 
scenarios,  and  while  the  absolute  increase  is  small  (4,000  metric  tons)  the  increase  in 
percentage terms is quite large (200%). The increase in maize imports is approximately the 
same in all three scenarios because the applied tariff for maize is the same or about the same 
in all three cases (3% in the two market access scenarios and 0% in the zero-tariff scenario). 
Table 6 also shows an increase in exports of peanuts and other oilseeds relative to the 
baseline in the zero tariff scenario. In both cases there are significant percentage decreases in 
domestic  consumption,  leading  to  an  increase  in  exports.  The  decline  in  domestic 
consumption of other oilseeds is due to a decline in domestic crushing demand. When Sudan 
liberalizes its trade regime it is profitable to source some oilseed oil and meal from lower-cost 
foreign crushing facilities, a result reflected in the increase in imports of other oilseed oil and 
meal in Table 6. 
 
 
Most Sensitive Commodities 
 
If we  examine  the  results  across  all  three  scenarios,  it  appears  that  the  agricultural 
commodities most sensitive to trade liberalization in Sudan are oilseed products: peanut oil 
and meal, and other oilseed oil and meal. Significant percentage declines in domestic prices 
and production occur for all of these products in the zero tariff scenario, except for the price 
of other oilseed meal (its production drops anyway in response to the decline in the price of 
other oilseed oil). Significant percentage declines  in domestic prices and production also 
occur for maize and poultry in the zero tariff scenario, but only small quantities of these 
commodities are produced in Sudan. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has analyzed the  impacts on agricultural markets of Sudan‘s proposal to 
accede to the WTO. We find that Sudan has inflated its customs schedule in  its offer for 
agricultural products, which provides room to maneuver during negotiation. Applied tariffs 
for commodities such as cottonseed, cotton meal, other oilseed meal, and beef and veal are 
actually higher in Sudan‘s offer than they are at present. Sudan has also proposed TRQs for 
some tariff lines. 
  




Model Baseline (2014)  Market Access Proposal  Modified Market Access Proposal  Zero Tariff Scenario 
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
Rice  0  36  0  36  0  36  0  35 
Wheat  0  1068  0  1063  0  1063  0  1062 
Maize  0  2  0  6  0  6  0  6 
Other Coarse Grains  60  0  114  0  115  0  252  0 
Sunflower Seed  6  0  6  0  6  0  6  0 
Cottonseed  0  4  0  0  0  4  0  0 
Peanuts  5  0  6  0  6  0  78  0 
Other Oilseeds  272  0  273  0  273  0  334  0 
Other Oilseed Oil  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  36 
Other Oilseed Meal  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  21 
Cotton  76  0  76  0  76  0  77  0 
Sugar  49  17  50  17  50  17  23  17 
Beef and Veal  4  0  7  0  4  0  2  0 
Poultry  0  218  0  218  0  217  0  234 
Source: PEATSim model results. 
Note: Exports and imports of all commodities not listed are zero. 
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The  results  of  the  three  scenarios  indicate  that  the  agricultural  commodities  most 
sensitive to trade liberalization in Sudan are oilseed products: peanut oil and meal, and other 
oilseed oil and meal. Significant percentage declines in domestic prices and production occur 
for all of these products in the zero tariff scenario, except for the price of other oilseed meal 
(its production drops anyway in response to the decline  in the price of other oilseed oil). 
Significant percentage declines in domestic prices and production also occur for maize and 
poultry  in  the  zero  tariff  scenario,  but  only  small  quantities  of  these  commodities  are 
produced in Sudan. We suggest that in order to benefit from its accession to the WTO and 
overcome the negative impacts, Sudan should reorient its agricultural trade policy towards 
increasing  the  competitiveness  of  its  exported  agricultural  commodities  by  raising 
productivity, reducing trade costs, and rationalizing the incentive regime for the agricultural 
sector. 
One limitation of this study is the use of a partial equilibrium model that does not capture 
general equilibrium effects of changes in the agricultural sector on national income and in 
turn  demands  for  goods  and  services,  or  effects  on  Sudan‘s real  exchange  rate.  As  we 
indicated earlier the necessary data to implement a CGE model for Sudan are lacking, but 
should the data become available in the future it would be useful to readdress this study‘s 
questions using a CGE model. 
 
Appendix Table 1. Sudan‟s Gross Domestic Product and Contribution of Agriculture,  
1990 – 2006, at 1981/82 constant prices 
 
Year 













1990  661.4    200.3    30.3 
1991  669.1  1.2  191.8  -4.2  28.7 
1992  744.7  11.3  252.2  31.5  33.9 
1993  836.4  13.1  318.8  26.4  38.1 
1994  900.2  5.6  360.5  13.1  40.0 
1995  985.0  12.7  424.5  17.7  43.1 
1996  1043.7  4.7  469.4  9.6  45.0 
1997  1107.1  6.1  527.4  12.3  47.6 
1998  1173.0  6.0  571.2  8.3  48.7 
1999  1243.4  6.0  619.7  8.5  49.8 
2000  1346.2  8.3  624.4  0.8  46.4 
2001  1432.2  6.4  658.7  4.7  45.6 
2002  1524.6  6.5  701.6  7.3  46.0 
2003  1617.3  6.1  738.1  5.2  45.6 
2004  1801.1  9.1  706.4  3.5  39.2 
2005  1904.7  8.1  754.2  7.2  39.6 
2006  2221.7  9.3  816.9  8.3  39.9 
2007  2455.3  10.5  867.0  6.0  35.3 
Source: Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, various issues. 
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Appendix Table 2. Sudan‟s Agricultural Exports, 1990 – 2006 
 
Year  Agricultural exports (m US$)  Share in total exports (%) 
1990  368.0  98.0 
1991  299.0  98.0 
1992  310.0  97.0 
1993  390.0  93.0 
1994  471.0  90.0 
1995  488.0  87.0 
1996  536.0  86.0 
1997  518.0  87.0 
1998  532.0  89.0 
1999  428.0  55.0 
2000  378.7  21.0 
2001  248.3  14.0 
2002  363.4  18.6 
2003  401.0  15.8 
2004  470.7  12.5 
2005  482.6  10.0 
2006  437.4  7.7 
2007  357.5  4.0 
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The unprecedented rise and fall  in global food prices from  late 2006 to 2009 has 
raised concerns about food security in poor countries and the appropriate policy response 
to price shocks. As a short term response to higher commodity prices many major food 
exporting countries imposed export restrictions to protect their consumers from soaring 
food  prices.  Using  the  Global  Trade  Analysis  Project  (GTAP)  model,  this  study 
investigates  the  economic  and  welfare  impacts  of  the  imposition  of  export  taxes  on 
agricultural commodities by India and all South Asian countries. In general, export taxes 
imposed  by  India  on  food  and  agricultural  products  have  adverse  effects  on  food 
importing  countries.  However,  the  export  taxes  offset  the  effects of  existing  domestic 
distortions in the paddy and rice sectors of India and hence lead to welfare improvements 
in India. It is recommended that actions be taken to mitigate the effects of such restrictive 
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South Asia is characterized by unique inter- and intra-regional trade relationships. The 
South Asian nations
1 account for less than two percent of total world trade and the region is 
believed to be the least integrated in the world, with intra -regional trade accounting for less 
than five percent of its total t rade (World Bank, 2008a). India is the largest country in the 
South Asia region, not only in terms of physical size (total land area of 3,287,590
 km²) and 
population (1.15 billion), but also  in terms of economic size. India accounts for US$1.2 
                                                 
1
  Eight  countries  comprise  the  South  Asian  Association  for  Regional  Cooperation  (SAARC):  Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Jeevika Weerahewa and Karl Meilke 
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trillion of the region‘s total GDP of $1.4 trillion (World Bank, 2008a). The other countries in 
South  Asia  are  either  geographically  and/or  economically  linked  to  India.  Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Nepal, and Pakistan have common borders with India, and Sri Lanka is becoming 
increasingly dependent on India for international trade. As a result, any trade policy actions 
taken by India have significant implications for the rest of South Asia. 
Over the past two decades, South Asia has made several attempts to liberalize regional 
trade. The South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was ratified in 1995 and 
was followed in 2004 by the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which had the objective 
of creating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that  includes all eight South  Asian countries. 
However, SAFTA contains a negative list of trade restrictions
2 and is not expected to attain 
complete  free  trade  area status  until  2013.  Moreover,  many South  Asian  countries  are 
pessimistic about the prospects for SAFTA and have instead negotiated, or are in the process 
of  negotiating,  various  bilateral  and  regional  trading  agreements.  In  particular,  many 
countries, both within and outside the region, have entered into agreements with India, which 
has shown a willingness to strengthen its trade re lationships. For example, India has signed 
bilateral arrangements with three South Asian countries: Sri Lanka (a FTA in 1998 and the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) to be formed in the near future), 
Bangladesh (a FTA in 2006), and Nep al (a FTA in 1991). In addition, the Bay of Bengal 
Initiative  for  Multi -Sectoral  Technical  and  Economic  Cooperation  (BIMSTEC),  which 
consists of both South Asian (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) and other 
Asian (Myanmar and Thailand) partners, links these countries economically. India has also 
signed a number of bilateral trade agreements with non -South Asian countries, including 
Thailand (a FTA in 2003 and a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in 
2005), Chile (a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in 2006), Afghanistan (a PTA in 2003), 
and Mercosur
3 (a PTA in 2004). India is currently negotiating trade agreements with Japan, 
China, the European Union (EU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The  escalation  of  world  food  prices  during  2007 -2008  caused  many  South  Asian 
countries to reverse their previous trade policies, which had been intended to liberalize trade. 
For example, many net food exporting countries imposed export bans, export taxes, and 
export embargos. India has been no exception, and the imposition of export restrictions, 
particularly on rice and wheat, has adversely affected food security in countries that rely on 
India to meet their food needs. World food prices have declined since mid -2008 and some 
food exporting countries, including India, have rescinded the embargoes introduced on food 
exports.  Although  there  are  a  number  of  studies  evaluating  the  implications  of  trade 
integration in South Asia, few have evaluated the extent to which South Asi an countries are 
economically dependent on India. The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent to 
which the economies of South Asian countries are affected by trade with India and its trade 
                                                 
2
 A ―negative list‖ approach to trade liberalization is common in South Asia.  Under this approach, certain items are 
not subject to liberalization (i.e., they are included in the negative list of the trading agreement) for health, 
moral, environmental, or national security reasons or due to concerns about protecting vulnerable parts of the 
farming community. 
3
 Mercosur is a South American common market created in 1991.  Its member countries are Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. South Asian Trade Integration 
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policy  actions.  More  specifically,  we  use  the  Global  Trade  Analysis  Project  (GTAP)
4 
database and model (version 7) to: (i) document the pattern of food and agricultural trade 
within South Asia and the extent to which trade is restricted; and (ii) investigate the economic 
and welfare effects of hypothetical export restrictions (modeled as export taxes) imposed by a 
large country like India and by the South Asian region as a whole on India, smaller trade -
dependent nations in the region, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and the rest of the world. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents trade data 
for South Asia and highlights India‘s relative position in the region. Section 3 presents the 
nature and extent of the food crisis and the policy responses of food exporting and importing 
countries, both globally and in the South Asia region. The GTAP model, the data, and the 
results of the analysis of export taxes are presented in sections 4 and 5. The final section 
presents our conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL TRADE AND INDIA‟S DOMINANCE 
 
India  is  the  world‘s  second  largest  rice  producer,  third  largest  wheat  producer,  and 
seventh largest corn producer. As shown in Table 1 India trades more with countries outside 
the region than with countries inside the region. As far as total trade is concerned India‘s 
largest trading partners are the major industrial nations in the EU. The United States and the 
United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  the  second  and  third  largest  export  destinations  and  the 
European  Union and China are the second and third largest import sources. A substantial 
portion of India‘s trade also takes place with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  high-income  East  Asian  countries  (Hong  Kong,  Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan). None of the South Asian countries are included among the 
top ten import sources and export destinations of India (Table 1). 
Table 1 also shows India‘s major trading partners according to the value of exports and 
imports of food and agricultural commodities. Compared to many developed countries, 
India‘s trade is not highly concentrated by source or destination. Indonesia (18.99 percent), 
Argentina (10.88 percent) and Canada (8.28 percent) are the major suppliers of India‘s food 
and agricultural imports. The EU (18.32 percent), the United States (9.44 percent), and the 
UAE (5.77 percent) are the major destinations for India‘s agricultural and food exports. 
Among South Asian countries, Sri Lanka is the tenth largest import source and Bangladesh 
and Pakistan are the fifth and sixth largest export destinations as far as food and agricultural 
trade is concerned.
                                                 
4
 The GTAP is a global  data base that contains complete bilateral trade information and transport and protection 
linkages among regions for 57 sectors for the year 2004. The standard GTAP model is a computable general 
equilibrium model  (Hertel,1997)   
Table 1. India‟s top ten trading partners by value of total trade and food and agricultural trade, 2006 („000 US dollars) 
 
Imports  Exports 
Import Source  Value of total 
imports 
Import Source  Value of Imports of Food 
and Agricultural Items 
Export 
Destination 




Value of Exports of 
Food and Agricultural 
Items 




Indonesia  1,175,446 
(18.99) 
European 







China  17,427,948 
(9.40) 










Saudi Arabia  13,358,831 
(7.21) 














Myanmar  496,146 
(8.02) 
China  8,278,968 
(6.56) 
Japan  627,993 
(5.46) 






Singapore  6,057,952 
(4.80) 




















Australia  346,366 
(5.60) 
Japan  2,857,529 
(2.27) 
Saudi Arabia  539,447 
(4.69) 






Saudi Arabia  2,583,497 
(2.05) 
Viet Nam  378,039 
(3.28) 
Australia  6,994,988 
(3.77) 






Malaysia  364,126 
(3.16) 
Kuwait  5,980,923 
(3.23) 
Sri Lanka  146,758 
(2.37) 
South Africa  2,242,426 
(1.78) 
Indonesia  346,949 
(3.01) 
World  185,384,928 
(100) 
World  6,190,203 
(100) 
World  126,125,504 
(100) 
World  11,510,070 
(100) 
Source: Trade Map (downloaded in February, 2009). 





Table 2. South Asian intra-regional trade of food and agricultural commodities (in 000‟ US Dollars), 2005 
Import 
Export 
Afghanistan  Bangladesh  Bhutan  India  Maldives  Nepal  Pakistan  Sri Lanka  South Asia 


































































































































Source: Trade Map (Downloaded in April, 2009). 
Note: The figures in parentheses indicate the value of exports as a percentage of aggregate exports to all South Asian countries.Jeevika Weerahewa and Karl Meilke  232 
Within the region, India is the largest food and agricultural commodities trading partner for 
most countries, with the exception of the Maldives and Pakistan as shown in Table 2. As far 
as exports of food and agricultural commodities from Bhutan are concerned, India is almost 
its sole South Asian partner. Out of total exports of food and agricultural commodities from 
Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan to South Asia, 82 percent, 68.85 percent, 
62.56 percent and 22.93 percent respectively is shipped to India. Out of total imports into 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 3.87  
percent, 96.62 percent, 93.18 percent, 52.91 percent, 99.24 percent, 72.07 percent and 83.47 
percent respectively originate  in India (not shown in the table). Despite the presence of a 
variety of regional and multilateral trade agreements, there are still a number of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in the region. 
Table  3  shows  the  most  favored  nation  (MFN)  tariff  rates  for  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural products applied by South Asian (i.e., SAARC) countries. In general, the applied 
tariffs on agricultural products are higher than on non-agricultural products, implying a higher 
level of protection for agriculture than for manufactured goods. This is particularly true for 
Sri Lanka. The import tariffs charged by Bhutan and India on agricultural  items imported 
from  the  SAARC  countries  are  significantly  lower  than  for  imports  from  non- SAARC 
countries. 
Non-tariff barriers to trade between South Asian countries (e.g., quantitative restrictions, 
trade  facilitation  and  customs  procedures,  technical  barriers  to  trade,  sanitary  and 
phytosanitary measures, financial measures, para-tariff measures) are still a major obstacle to 
regional trade integration, although these barriers vary among countries. The likelihood of the 
agricultural sector as a whole being restricted through these non-tariff trade restrictions is 
much higher than for other sectors because of the legitimate concerns surrounding the health 
and safety of plant and animal products as well as the opportunity to use these measures as 
disguised trade barriers (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
Table 3. Applied MFN -tTariffs for -fFood and -aAgriculture -pProducts in 2007 
 
Country  Product  SAARC countries (%)  Non-SAARC Countries (%) 
Afghanistan 
Agriculture  6.48  6.48 
Non Agriculture  5.05  5.08 
Bangladesh 
Agriculture  12.66  12.84 
Non Agriculture  13.02  13.16 
Bhutan 
Agriculture  33.86  50.14 
Non Agriculture  13.91  17.10 
India 
Agriculture  47.47  62.83 
Non Agriculture  12.04  15.67 
Nepal 
Agriculture  15.48  15.94 
Non Agriculture  12.11  12.61 
Maldives 
Agriculture  26.98  27.17 
Non Agriculture  24.19  24.32 
Pakistan 
Agriculture  16.20  18.76 
Non Agriculture  11.34  12.89 
Sri Lanka 
Agriculture  25.82  27.02 
Non Agriculture  5.47  6.31 
Source:  
Market Access Map (downloaded in October 2007). 
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3. THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND POLICY RESPONSES  
 
The  unprecedented  increase  in  commodity  prices  that  peaked  in  early  2008  raised 
concerns  about the  future  level  of  food  prices  and  food  security  in  poor  countries.  The 
International Monetary Fund‘s (IMF) index of internationally traded food commodity prices 
increased by 130 percent from January 2002 to June 2008 and by 56 percent from January 
2007 to June 2008. World rice prices almost tripled from January to April 2008 and wheat 
prices nearly tripled between late 2006 and early 2008.  There are several reasons for this 
dramatic rise in commodity prices: 1) crop shortfalls in a number of major producing regions; 
2)  continued  strong  demand  from  developing  countries,  particularly  India  and  China;  3) 
increased demand for grain to be processed into bio-fuels (see Yang et al., 2008 for global 
impacts due to bio-fuel); and 4) the depreciation of the United States dollar (ADB, 2008). 
Grain and most other commodity prices dropped sharply beginning in the fall of 2008 as a 
result of generally good harvests  and a serious global financial crisis that appears to have 
pushed the world into a major recession. Still, agriculture remains highly energy dependent 
and the impact of the rapid rise in the cost of imported foodstuffs around the world - 21 
percent higher in 2007 than in 2006 - will continue to be felt (FAO, 2008). 
 
 
Price Trends in South Asia 
 
During  2007  and  early  2008  the  rise  in  domestic  prices  in  South  Asia  was  not  as 
pronounced  as  in  world  markets.  The  sharply  higher  international  prices  were  not fully 
transmitted to domestic prices in these countries because of the strong role played by political 
and economic factors in the setting of food policy and prices (ADB, 2008). According to the 
ADB (2008), between March 2007 and March 2008, domestic rice and wheat prices increased 
by 70 percent and 16 percent, respectively,  in  Afghanistan; 100 percent and 74 percent, 
respectively, in  Bangladesh; 60 percent and 38 percent, respectively,  in Pakistan; and 55 
percent and 36 percent, respectively, in Sri Lanka. However, in India, rice prices increased by 
only 9.3 percent and wheat prices actually decreased by 2.5 percent. The wide variation in 
domestic price increases across countries is due to the specific food policy and price measures 
adopted in each country. Still, these increases in commodity prices led to significant inflation 
in  food  and  general  prices  in  the  South  Asian  region.  Between  2005  and  2008,  overall 
inflation and food price inflation were 16 percent and 22 percent, respectively, for India; 17 
percent  and  21  percent,  respectively,  for  Bangladesh;  and  33  percent  and  42  percent, 
respectively, for Pakistan (World Bank, 2008b). 
 
 
Global Policy Responses 
 
The immediate policy responses of food importing and exporting countries around the 
world exacerbated the problem of high international prices. A number of countries, including 
Argentina, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and 
Vietnam,  imposed export restrictions or bans on grain exports to help constrain domestic 
price increases (Oxfam, 2008 and World Bank, 2008c). The spike in the world prices of 
cereals, particularly rice and wheat, elicited policy responses that exaggerated rather than 
reduced  international  price  volatility  as  governments  rushed  to  restrict  exports,  control Jeevika Weerahewa and Karl Meilke 
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domestic prices, and attempted to rebuild stocks in the face of price increases (ADB, 2008; 
Zwart  and  Meilke,  1979).  According  to  the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute 
(IFPRI, 2008a), these export restrictions played a major role in the high price of rice and to a 
lesser degree, wheat. According to Heady  and Fan (2008), export restrictions by countries 
accounting for 40 percent of global rice exports proceeded price rises. The goal of the export 
restrictions was to lower domestic food prices, maintain consumption by net food buyers, and 
increase government revenue if export taxes were used. However, these policies also resulted 
in lower incomes for net food sellers, reduced incentives for food production, and decreased 
availability  of  food  on  world  markets.  To  a  large  degree,  the  ability  to  enforce  export 
restrictions  and  the  difficulty  of  applying  export  taxes  for  countries  with  limited 
administrative capacity determined the choice of policy instrument (IFPRI, 2008b). 
 
 
The Policy Response in South Asia 
 
When large countries like India impose trade restrictions, there are implications for other 
countries, specifically countries in South Asia. India‘s immediate policy response to the rise 
in commodity prices was to impose export bans on non-Basmati rice (on September 10, 
2007). India is the world‘s second largest rice producer. Thus world rice prices started to 
escalate (World Bank, 2008c). India exempted Bangladesh from its rice export ban, but India 
still faces the prospects of a neighbor with a humanitarian food crisis on its hands. Virtually 
all of Nepal‘s imports, including energy, come through India. Pakistan banned wheat exports, 
and Afghanistan was particularly hard hit by this export ban because Pakistan is its major 
wheat supplier. The restrictions imposed by other South Asian countries included export bans 
on edible oil in Bangladesh, an export ban on paddy rice, wheat, maize and flour in Nepal, 
and an export ban on rice and coconuts in Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2008d). 
The empirical model presented  in the next section  illustrates the extent to which the 
policy actions taken by India and other South Asian countries in response to the food crisis 
influence their own economies as well as the economies of other countries throughout the 
region and the rest of the world. 
 
 
4. THE GTAP MODEL, DATA, AND POLICY SCENARIOS 
 
This study uses a general equilibrium approach to assess the impacts of export taxes. 
Given the objective of the study, i.e., an assessment of the implications of export taxes, this 
approach was chosen as it allows us to calculate welfare changes at a regional level taking 
into  consideration  changes  in  price  levels  and  resource  reallocations  in  the  total 
economy/world.  The  general  equilibrium  model  results  illustrate  long-run  equilibrium 
outcomes – it suffers from not being able to track the short-run dynamics of adjustment. 
This section describes our specification of the GTAP model, the data set used in our 
analysis, and the hypothetical policy scenarios used to assess the economic impacts of export 
restrictions. 
 





The GTAP model  is a neo-classical multi-region, multi-sector, static, applied general 
equilibrium model that assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale (Hertel, 
1997). The GTAP database and model has become a standard tool for trade policy analysis. 
The most recent (which relates to policies in 2004) and by far the most comprehensive release 
is version 7 (Narayanan, 2008). 
Economic welfare is represented in the GTAP model as being derived from the allocation 
of  national  income  between  private  consumption,  government  consumption,  and  savings 
(Hertel,  1997). This  approach  recognizes  that  households  benefit  from  their  own current 
consumption  expenditure,  net  national  savings  (which  increases  future  household 
consumption), and government provision of public goods and services. How much a policy 
change actually benefits a region depends on how the change affects regional income. It also 
depends on the effect of the policy change on prices and hence the purchasing power of that 
income. 
The welfare decomposition in the GTAP model shows welfare changes in relation to: 
 
(i)  Allocative efficiency: Due to changes in the allocation of resources relative to pre-
existing distortions. 
(ii)  Terms of trade:  Arising from changes in relative prices (export prices relative to 
import prices) as producers and consumers adjust their purchasing and sales patterns 
in response to a policy change. 





The GTAP database (pre-release of version 7) is used to run the policy scenarios, with 
2004 as the base year. GTAP allows for the inclusion of 57 sectors and 110 regions. As far as 
small Asian countries are concerned, the current version is a clear improvement over previous 
GTAP versions, as it includes data for Pakistan and the data for Sri Lanka have been updated 
to 2000. 
Our specification of the GTAP model includes: 
 
1.  Eight individual countries: Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Brazil
1; 
2.  Seven  regions:  South  East  Asia,  Rest  of  South  Asia,  Oceana,  North  America, 
EU(25), and the Rest of the World;  
3.  Fourteen sectors: ten for agriculture and food (paddy rice,
2 wheat, other cereals,
3 
other crops,
4 milk, dairy products, cattle, meat,
5 rice, processed food), and four non-
agricultural sectors (textiles and apparel, oil, manufacturing, and services); and  
                                                 
1
Brazil  was included  because it is a sizeable  developing country that exports agricultural items and is a potential 
competitor for India. 
2
 Paddy rice is unmilled rice. 
3
 Other cereals includes maize, barley, rye, oats, and those cereals that are not included elsewhere.  
4
 Other crops includes vegetables, fruits, nuts, oilseeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, and plant -based fibres. Jeevika Weerahewa and Karl Meilke 
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4.  Five factors of production (land, unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital, and natural 
resources). 
 
The GTAP data for 2004 indicate that India  is the largest country in the South  Asia 
region accounting for 78 percent of the region‘s factor endowment (the sum of the value of 
land,  skilled  labor,  unskilled  labor,  capital,  and  natural  resources).  India  is  followed  by 
Pakistan, accounting for 11.6 percent of the region‘s factor endowment, and Bangladesh, 
accounting for 6.4 percent. Sri Lanka is the smallest South Asian economy, with only 2.4 
percent of the region‘s endowment. The rest of South Asia is aggregated into one region and 
accounts for 1.6 percent of the region‘s endowment. 
Imports of agriculture and food products represent 8.36 percent of total imports for the 
South Asia region, ranging from a high of 19.48 percent for Bangladesh to a low of 5.92 
percent for India (see Appendix Table 1). 
Processed food represents 4.62 percent of total agriculture and food imports. Other crops 
and  rice  are  generally  the  most  important  agricultural  imports  across  all  South  Asian 
countries, especially in Bangladesh, where other crops and rice represent 8.10 percent and 
1.80 percent, respectively, of the country‘s total imports. South Asian imports account for 
1.91 percent of total imports and 2.15 percent of agricultural and food imports. 
Exports of agriculture  and food products represent 9.44 percent of the region‘s total 
exports, ranging from a high of 16.38 percent  in Sri Lanka to a  low of 5.57 percent in 
Bangladesh (see Appendix Table 2). 
Processed food represents 4.05 percent of the region‘s total agriculture and food exports, 
with other crops and rice generally being the most important agricultural exports across all of 
the countries. South Asian exports account for 1.39 percent of total exports and 1.92 percent 
of agricultural and food exports. Interestingly, the value of the region‘s textile and apparel 
exports ($37.49 billion) is 2.84 times the value of the region‘s agricultural and food exports 
($13.19 billion). 
The GTAP data also show that South Asia is a rather small player in the world market. 
The main items exported from South Asia are paddy rice (raw product) and rice (processed 
product), comprising 11.92 percent and 23.62 percent, respectively, of the world‘s total paddy 
rice and rice exports. The main imports into South Asia are rice and other crops, comprising 
3.74 percent and 3.01 percent, respectively, of global rice and other crops imports. The intra-
regional trade of agricultural goods is quite small. According to the bilateral trade statistics in 
the GTAP database, of the total exports of rice from India, Sri Lanka is the destination for 5 
percent, Bangladesh for 16 percent and rest of South Asia one percent. Of the total imports of 
rice by Sri Lanka, 70 percent comes from India and 27 percent is from Pakistan (Appendix 
Table 3). Of the total imports of rice by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and rest of South Asia 76 
percent,  98  percent  and  30  percent respectively  come  from  India.  India  accounts  for  14 
percent  of  the  world‘s  rice  exports  (Not  shown  in  Appendix  Table  3).  No  export 
taxes/subsidies are present for food and agricultural commodities exported by South Asian 
countries, except for milk  in Pakistan, which receives an export subsidy of two percent. 
Import tariffs on rice from India are 35 percent in Sri Lanka, 9 percent in Pakistan, 22.5 
                                                                                                                                     
5
 Meat includes wool, silk-worm cocoons, and meat of cattle, sheep, goat, and horse. South Asian Trade Integration 
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percent in Bangladesh and 3.96 percent in the rest of South Asia (GTAP database)
 6. Output 
subsidies  and  output  taxes  on food  and  agricultural  items  are  prevalent.  In India,  output 
subsidies are provided at the rates of 6.38%, 10.42%, 3.52%, 3.38% and 6.38% for paddy, 
wheat, other crops, grain crops and rice respectively. Output taxes are charged at the rates of 
0.63%, 0.64%, 0.33%, 0.24% and 1.91% from milk, dairy, cattle, meat and livestock, and 





The following hypothetical policy scenarios are used to compare and contrast the impacts 
of  various  export  restrictions  imposed  by  South  Asian  countries,  particularly  India,  on 
welfare, price levels, and bilateral trade flows in the region. Export restrictions are modeled 
as export taxes so that the exporting country reaps the welfare gains accruing from the export 
tax revenue. 
In  the  preliminary  analysis  we  experimented  with  export  tax  rates  of  5  percent,  25 
percent, and 50 percent and with a complete removal of output subsidies on rice and paddy in 
India. However, to illustrate one potential outcome here, we present only the results for the 25 
percent export tax and hold output subsides on rice and paddy constant. The three policy 
scenarios are: 
 
(i)  A  25  percent  export  tax  on rice  and  paddy  by  India.  This  is  one  policy  option 
selected by India during the food crisis.
7 
(ii)  A 25 percent export tax on all agriculture and food products by India. This scenario 
is designed to highlight the regional importance and impacts of India‘s trade policy.
8  
(iii) A 25 percent export tax on agriculture and food products by all South Asian nations. 
This scenario illustrates the effects of all South Asian nations (Bangladesh, India, 





5. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
As stated earlier, the baseline equilibrium is characterized by the presence of import 
tariffs charged by almost all the regions on all the products except for services. There are no 
export subsidies or export taxes in South Asia except for milk in Pakistan. There are output 
subsidies  on    paddy,  wheat,  other  crops,  grains  and  rice  in  India.  Consequently,  the 
counterfactual equilibrium resulting from the imposition of export taxes could lead to either 
welfare improvements or welfare reductions, as the baseline equilibrium is distorted. 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that GTAP database uses tariff equivalents that capture tariff as well as non-tariff barriers rather 
than applied or MFN rates as presented in figure 5. 
7
 The restriction was only on rice—not on paddy. 
8
  During the crisis period,  India imposed export restrictions on wheat as well —so  this  scenario  is  not  entirely 
hypothetical. 
9
 During the crisis period, not only India, but also Pakistan imposed export restrictions.  Countries like Sri Lanka 
have tightened their more  liberal policies and the country is becoming more protectionist.  Jeevika Weerahewa and Karl Meilke 
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In a world free of distortions, the imposition of an export tax will reduce the incentive to 
export and to produce domestically. Therefore, with the  introduction of an export tax, a 
reduction in exports and a reduction in local production is expected. A reduction in exports 
will  lead  to  higher  international  prices  but  lower  domestic  prices  in  the  sector  under 
consideration. Lower domestic prices will attract resources away from the sector and will 
increase the production in other sectors leading  to an  increase in exports in other sectors 
despite the potential for lower exports in aggregate. A decline in total imports is expected so 
as to fulfill the balance of trade condition. Such a change could depress the prices of these 
other imports if the country under consideration is relatively large. This potential increase in 
international export prices and a reduction  in  international  import prices, for the country 
imposing the export tax, leads to an  increase the terms of trade facing the country. It is 
possible that such an increase could lead to welfare improvements if they are large enough to 
offset allocative efficiency losses. 
The magnitude of above changes is determined mainly by the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic goods and imported goods. If domestic goods and imported goods are 
highly substitutable, an export tax can lead to significant changes both within the economy 
and in the rest of the world. 
It is clear from the above discussion that as far as welfare changes are concerned, an 
export tax will lead to a reduction in global welfare, however, it has the potential to improve 
the welfare in the country imposing the export tax, depending upon its ability to influence 
international price levels. To sum, if export taxes are imposed in a perfect world there are 
allocative efficiency losses, however, it  is still possible that the country will  improve  its 
welfare due to favourable terms of trade effects. However, when export taxes are imposed on 
a distorted economy the consequences are less  clear. For example,  if there are domestic 
output subsidies, it is possible for an export tax to offset its distortionary effects. An output 
subsidy draws resources from other sectors and expands the sector under consideration. This 
leads to allocative efficiency losses and there will be a reduction in export prices due to the 
expansions  in  exports.  When  an  export  tax  is  imposed  on  this  sector,  which  is  already 
distorted by an output subsidy, exports are reduced and production is curtailed. The extent to 
which such effects offset each other is mainly determined by the relative magnitude of policy 
levels, the elasticities of demand and supply and the degree of substitutability between the 
domestic  good  and  the  import  good.  When  an  export  tax  is  imposed  on  a sector which 
receives output based production subsidies government spending/earnings are also influenced 
and welfare improvements are possible. 
The  following  sections  presents  the modeling  results  for  each  of  the three  scenarios 
described in section 4. They show the percentage changes in prices and quantities produced, 
exported, and imported, in various regions by sectors, due to imposition of export taxes. It 
should be noted that even though the percentage changes are large, the absolute changes 
could be very small in certain cases (like paddy exports) as the baseline values are very small. 




Table 4. Percentage change in market prices due to the imposition of a 25 percent export tax, by product 
 
  Export Taxes on Paddy and Rice by India  Export Taxes on all Agri Food by India  Export Taxes on Agri Food by South Asia 
































Paddy  1.94  -1.15  1.20  1.11  0.20  2.26  -5.59  1.29  1.49  0.62  -8.78  -5.5  -6.73  0.00  -2.83 
Wheat  -0.04  -0.27  0.19  0.36  0.08  3.17  -3.9  0.34  1.71  0.8  -3.25  -3.86  -2.17  0.12  -2.16 
Other cereals  0.30  -0.33  0.20  0.60  0.12  3.43  -4.63  0.42  3.88  0.86  -5.27  -4.58  -2.04  2.51  -3.15 
Other crops  0.38  -0.33  0.21  0.60  0.11  1.03  -4.92  0.41  1.22  0.81  -13.11  -4.85  -2.48  -0.51  -3.26 
Milk  0.48  -0.34  0.24  0.70  0.12  1  -4.63  0.38  1.17  0.87  -9.71  -4.52  -2.31  -0.07  -1.77 
Dairy products  0.13  -0.16  0.11  0.11  0.05  0.61  -1.44  0.15  0.43  0.55  -3.68  -1.42  -0.97  -0.04  -0.18 
Cattle  0.55  -0.27  0.23  0.74  0.13  1.06  -3.88  0.35  1.21  0.77  -11.33  -3.83  -2.15  -0.04  -1.43 
Other livestock 
and meat  0.20  -0.30  0.19  0.56  0.10  0.51  -4.31  0.31  1.99  0.62  -5.84  -4.26  -1.94  0.83  -2.62 
Rice  1.67  -0.32  0.58  0.72  0.14  1.98  -1.78  0.62  0.85  0.35  -7.7  -1.76  -3.38  -0.23  -2.14 
Processed food  0.10  -0.18  0.12  0.17  0.04  0.79  -2.05  0.18  0.71  0.59  -3.75  -2.02  -1.13  0.03  -0.37 
Textile and 
apparel  0.01  -0.15  0.09  0.09  0.03  -0.05  -1.45  0.14  0.18  0.05  -1.32  -1.43  -0.86  -0.23  -1.05 
Oil  -0.01  0.03  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.04  0.3  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.63  0.31  0.30  0.09  0.03 
Manufacturing  0.01  -0.08  0.06  0.05  0.02  -0.03  -0.6  0.05  -0.18  -0.09  -1.35  -0.59  -0.52  -0.52  -0.77 
Services  0.02  -0.12  0.08  0.05  0.03  -0.01  -0.85  0.04  -0.24  -0.08  -2.20  -0.85  -0.76  -0.63  -1.02 











Table 5. Percentage change in output in South Asian countries due to imposition of a 25 percent export tax, by product 
 
Policy Scenario  Export Taxes on Rice by India  Export Taxes on all Agri Food by India  Export Taxes on Agri Food by South Asia 
Region 
Sri  




















Product                               
Paddy  4.21  -2.17  4.03  1.4  0.35  3.7  -1.89  3.88  1.17  0.16  9.89  -1.84  -19.31  1.2  0.24 
Wheat  0.41  0.1  -0.09  -1.04  -0.15 
-
10.75  -2.15  0.08  6.51  2.7  -87.5  -2.17  -0.58  1.79  -0.62 
Other cereals  -0.45  0.08  -0.04  -0.94  -0.09  10.11  -1.12  0.42  10.22  1.35  17.07  -1.15  0.23  11.35  -1.62 
Other crops  -0.52  0.13  -0.11  -0.63  -0.15  -0.17  -1.67  0.11  0.29  0.85  -8.02  -1.62  -0.43  -1.06  -3.24 
Milk  -0.14  0.06  0.01  0.1  -0.02  -0.22  0.34  -0.04  0.18  0.2  4.58  0.32  0.07  -0.02  -0.16 
Dairy products  -0.32  0.04  0.01  -0.22  -0.1  -0.94  -0.43  0.04  0.14  3.21  4.36  -0.44  -0.21  0.44  6.94 
Cattle  -0.02  -0.46  0  0.1  0.04  -0.11  -1.77  -0.02  0.19  0.21  0.02  -1.73  -0.01  -0.01  -0.53 
Other livestock and 
meat  -0.16  0.13  -0.04  -0.32  -0.15  -0.31  -1.98  -0.08  -1.04  -0.34  -0.27  -2  -1.03  -1.14  -8.74 
Rice  4.61  -2.98  4.52  1.55  0.37  4.08  -2.82  4.43  1.29  0.16  10.66  -2.73  -21.85  1.37  0.32 
Processed food  -0.16  0.12  -0.03  -0.24  -0.06  -0.39  -4.4  0.23  0  0.86 
-
10.28  -4.32  -3.26  -7.31  -4.42 
Textile and apparel  -0.07  0.47  -0.45  -0.61  -0.19  0.06  4.48  -0.82  -1.39  -1.18  7.54  4.32  3.99  0.87  3.32 
Oil  -0.01  0.08  -0.05  -0.03  -0.01  0.01  0.58  0  0.13  0.09  0.72  0.58  0.52  0.29  0.55 
Manufacturing  -0.09  0.19  -0.16  -0.13  -0.08  -0.09  1.57  -0.14  0.14  -0.12  3.68  1.55  1.46  0.41  1.28 
Services  -0.05  0.06  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  -0.09  0.38  -0.01  -0.05  -0.05  0.84  0.37  0.12  -0.07  0.06 









Table 6. Percentage change in exports from South Asian countries due to the imposition of a 25 percent export tax, by product 
 
Policy Scenario  Export Taxes on Rice by India  Export Taxes on all Agri Food by India  Export Taxes on Agri Food by South Asia 
Region 
Sri  




















Product                               
Paddy  -3.67  -89.92  17.6  11.92  13.26  -6.02  -84.75  16.03  8.04  5.08  -81.14  -82.99  -81.07  -90.42  -90.58 
Wheat  0.42  2.33  -1.44  -2.36  -1.7  -11.05  -85.84  16.91  -10.51  -19.57  -90  -86.3  -87.91  -90.55  -89.8 
Other cereals  -0.71  0.74  -0.57  -1.45  -0.4  -6.25  -37.35  12.96  -8.54  -3.73  -43.5  -37.77  -40.49  -54.48  -47.11 
Other crops  -1.51  1.51  -0.74  -2.06  -0.57  -2.9  -62.08  1.21  -2.79  -5.33  -45  -62.33  -64.06  -64.72  -67.13 
Milk  -3.33  2.6  -1.66  -4.88  -0.79  -5.29  -82.51  -0.83  -6.35  -4.36  -73.51  -82.48  -85.06  -87.19  -85.7 
Dairy products  -0.88  1.18  -0.62  -0.7  -0.59  7.68  -85.32  14.05  10.12  -5.88  -78.06  -85.09  -78.04  -82.75  -86.82 
Cattle  -2.12  1.05  -0.67  -2.83  -0.61  -3.32  -33.47  14.09  -4.06  -4.01  -48.17  -27.72  -55.4  -67.7  -64.57 
Other livestock and 
meat  -1.34  2.17  -1.24  -3.8  -0.65  0.61  -81.51  -0.38  -12.32  -4.03  -79.05  -81.54  -84.22  -87.26  -84.62 
Rice  -1.76  -62.27  11.56  3.53  5.08  -3.06  -60.04  11.37  3.05  4.13  -59.73  -58.16  -57.27  -72.53  -72.69 
Processed food  -0.35  0.73  -0.37  -0.62  -0.21  -2.02  -62.97  1.88  -1.87  -1.77  -59.3  -62.87  -59.39  -66.37  -63.97 
Textile and apparel  -0.07  1.08  -0.66  -0.65  -0.28  0.13  10.54  -1.19  -1.42  -1.34  9.24  10.18  5.82  1.19  6.4 
Oil  0.13  -0.33  0.24  0.2  -0.01  0.14  -2.41  0.3  -0.03  0.09  -5.06  0.34  -2.32  -0.25  0.54 
Manufacturing  -0.06  0.58  -0.4  -0.35  -0.19  0.17  4.41  -0.33  1.32  0.18  9.93  4.39  3.61  3.78  4.99 
Services  -0.07  0.4  -0.3  -0.19  -0.1  0.06  2.97  -0.1  1  0.33  8.51  2.96  2.93  2.51  3.87 











Table 7. Percentage change in imports from South Asian countries due to imposition a 25 percent export tax, by product 
 
Policy Scenario  Export Taxes on Rice by India  Export Taxes on all Agri Food by India  Export Taxes on Agri Food by South Asia 
Region 
Sri  




















Product                               
Paddy  -15.07  -6.27  -0.7  4.95  -10.99  -13.04  -25.8  -0.43  6.09  -9.41  -49.2  -27.65  -38.4  -2.16  -23.55 
Wheat  -0.17  -1.25  0.46  0.97  0.51  -0.38  -16.68  0.08  -9.77  -10.31  -9.61  -18.1  -6.76  -19.78  -25.96 
Other cereals  0.18  -0.42  0.23  0.14  0.25  -8.55  -5.98  -1.79  -7.01  -13.48  -12.47  -8.26  -5.18  -7.98  -18.04 
Other crops  0.72  -0.73  0.23  0.65  0.21  -8.49  -10.29  -1.71  -3.19  -6.9  -34.2  -13.08  -8.33  -6.32  -20.29 
Milk  1.53  -1.24  0.85  2.63  0.44  1.97  -15.74  -0.08  3.03  1.16  -29.89  -16.13  -9.74  -2.73  -10.78 
Dairy products  0.15  -0.56  0.39  0.19  0.11  0.52  -5.16  -0.64  -1.04  -4.65  -7.66  -6.56  -4.69  -2.34  -13 
Cattle  0.8  -0.84  0.42  1.99  0.35  -0.07  -8.85  -0.06  -27.31  -13.46  -20.02  -16.67  -5.21  -29.35  -30.42 
Other livestock and 
meat  0.92  -0.77  0.51  1.24  0.15  0.66  -11.28  0.42  4.29  -1.83  -13.89  -11.41  -6.46  1.15  -9.77 
Rice  -23.19  -1.15  -28.58  -42.3  -11.45  -21.84  -4.91  -27.46  -40.46  -10.83  -46.32  -6.81  -43.89  -42.19  -43.21 
Processed food  0.08  -0.3  0.21  0.14  0.01  -1.87  -3.67  -1.65  -2.48  -1.3  -11.97  -5.16  -4.16  -4.56  -10.68 
Textile and apparel  -0.06  -0.42  0.05  -0.19  0.05  0.06  -3.83  -0.04  -0.34  0.13  6.19  -3.55  -0.57  0.34  -0.93 
Oil  -0.09  0.22  -0.19  -0.13  -0.08  -0.09  1.85  -0.18  0.14  -0.16  3.69  1.83  1.76  0.41  1.01 
Manufacturing  0  -0.14  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.01  -0.87  0.02  -0.34  -0.02  -0.11  -0.86  -0.72  -1.17  -0.94 
Services  -0.05  -0.15  0.15  -0.01  0.04  -0.27  -1.12  0.03  -0.67  -0.27  -4.42  -1.12  -1.38  -1.43  -2.27 
Source: Results of simulations performed using GTAP version 7. 
 South Asian Trade Integration  243 
Scenario 1 
 
As shown in Table 4, when India imposes a 25 percent export tax on rice and paddy, the 
domestic price of rice is lowered (the primary objective of the policy), but by only 0.32 
percent, and the price of rice increases elsewhere (e.g., 1.67 percent in Sri Lanka and 0.72 
percent in Bangladesh). In this and the other scenarios we assume that other countries do not 
retaliate by changing their own import/export or domestic policies. India‘s export tax on rice 
leads to a 2.98 percent reduction in domestic rice production
1 and a 62.27 percent reduction in 
Indian rice exports (see Tables 4 and 5). 
The lower level of exports from India results in a significant drop in rice imports by 
countries such as Sri Lanka (23.19 percent) and Bangladesh (42.3 perc ent), and a 4.61 and 
1.55 percent increase in domestic rice production in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (Tables 5 and 
7). The summary welfare results  are presented in Table 8 and the welfare decomposition 
results are presented in Appendix Tabl e 4, which indicates the losses and gains associated 
with changes in allocative efficiency (A1), terms of trade (E1: relative prices for exports and 
imports), and relative prices of savings and investment (F1). The imposition of a 25 percent 
rice export tax results in an increase in Indian welfare of $74.17 million dollars. The result for 
the 25 percent tax is clearly dependent on the elasticities of substitution included in the GATP 
model.
2 The welfare decomposition results indicate that India incurs alloc ative efficiency 
losses. However, favorable terms of trade turn the total welfare effects positive. The terms of 
trade effect is quite prominent for rice in India. 
 
Table 8. The change in equivalent variation (EV) associated with the imposition of a 25 
percent export tax (US$ million), by region 
 
Policy Scenario 
Export Taxes on Rice 
by India 
Export Taxes on all Agri 
Food by India 
Export Taxes on Agri Food 
by South Asia 
       
Sri Lanka  -16.73  -45.38  -124.72 
India  74.17  252.45  210.77 
Pakistan  21.61  -4.56  -64.94 
Bangladesh  -54.85  -142.21  -183.96 
Rest of South Asia  -0.17  -32.84  -112.91 
China  -3.28  -98.95  -137.24 
Vietnam  10.08  6.81  11.72 
Thailand  16.15  -10.67  -24.98 
South East Asia  -34.17  -363.21  -444.22 
Oceana  0.48  52.51  56.08 
                                                 
1
 As a reviewer indicated, the supply elasticity is quite high and it is due to the default elasticitiy parameters used. 
2
 The Armington elasticities for domestic imports were set for paddy rice (5.05), wheat (4.45), other cereals (1.30), 
other crops (2.32), milk (3.65), dairy (3.65),   cattle (2.00), other livestock and meat (3.18), rice (2.60) and 
processed food (1.88). The Armington elasticity shows the degree of substitution between domestic and 
imported goods (Armington,1969). The standard GTAP model uses the above elasticities as t he default. Jeevika Weerahewa and Karl Meilke 
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Table 8. (Continued) 
 
Policy Scenario 
Export Taxes on Rice 
by India 
Export Taxes on all Agri 
Food by India 
Export Taxes on Agri Food 
by South Asia 
North America  9.78  -88.64  0.83 
EU_25  -44.61  -508.4  -620.98 
Brazil  1.86  39.41  53.54 
Rest of World  -197.93  -186.49  -410.94 
Total  -217.6  -1130.18  -1791.94 
Source: Results of simulation performed using GTAP version 7. 
 
When India imposes export taxes on rice, the terms of trade improve for all rice exporting 
countries and it decreases for rice importing countries. Furthermore, India loses terms of trade 
in  all  other  sectors,  except  for  oil  (not  shown  in  the  tables).  Of  course,  rice-importing 
countries in South Asia suffer welfare losses as a result of India‘s export tax on rice. For 
example, Sri Lanka loses $16.73 million, Bangladesh loses $54.85 million, and Other South 
Asia loses $0.17 million. Pakistan, a net rice exporting country, gains $21.61 million. The 
―rest  of  the  world‖  region  has  the  greatest  welfare  loss  ($197.93  million),  while  total 






As shown in Tables 4-6, when India imposes a 25 percent export tax on all agriculture 
and food products, there are reductions in its domestic market prices and production and 
exports of agricultural and food commodities. The decline in domestic prices in India ranges 
from 1.44 percent for dairy products to 4.92 percent for other crops (Table 4). However, 
prices of all agricultural and food products rise in Sri Lanka (ranging from 0.51 percent for 
other livestock and meat to 3.43 percent for other cereal products), Pakistan (ranging from 
0.15 percent for dairy products to 1.29 percent for paddy rice), and Bangladesh (ranging from 
0.43 percent for dairy products to 3.88 percent for other cereal crops). The export tax leads to 
reductions in the production of almost all food and agriculture products in India (ranging from 
-0.43 percent for dairy products to -4.4 percent for processed products) and increases in the 
production of most food and agricultural products in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the 
rest of South Asia. With an export tax of 25 percent, India‘s exports of all agricultural and 
food products decline significantly, ranging from a 33.47 percent decrease for cattle to a 
84.75 percent decrease for paddy rice (Table 6). The reductions in rice imports by Sri Lanka 
and  Bangladesh are high, 21.84 percent and 40.46 percent, respectively (Table 7). Other 
cereal  imports  decline  by  8.55  percent  and  7.01  percent,  respectively,  in  Sri  Lanka  and 
Bangladesh, while imports of other crops show reductions of 8.49 percent and 3.19 percent. 
As shown in Table 8, with an export tax of 25 percent on all agricultural and food products, 
India still enjoys welfare gains ($252.45 million), but losses are heavy in Sri Lanka ($45.38 
                                                 
3
 Our  analysis  shows that large export tax rates decrease  welfare in India.   For example, if India imposes a 50 
percent export tax on rice, holding other policies constant, India‘s welfare decreases by $43.31 million, with 
allocative inefficiencies amounting to $241.78 million.  When India imposes a 60 percent export tax on rice, 
welfare in India decreases by $168.79 million, of which allocative inefficiencies account for $384.62 million. South Asian Trade Integration 
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million),  Bangladesh  ($142.21  million),  South  East  Asia  ($363.20  million),  and  the  EU 





When all of South Asia  imposes a 25 percent export tax on all agricultural and food 
products there is a welfare loss of $1,791.95 million (see Table 8), but this hides the fact that 
India gains welfare ($210.77 million) while all other countries in the region  lose welfare: 
$124.72 million in Sri Lanka, $64.94 million in Pakistan, $183.96 million in Bangladesh, and 
$112.91 million in the Other South Asia region. This export tax on all food and agricultural 
products results in significant reductions in domestic price and production levels for most 
food and agricultural items in all South Asian countries (see Tables 4 and 5). As shown in 
Table  6,  with  a  25  percent  export  tax,  exports  of  food  and  agricultural  products  fall 
precipitously across the region. Although the largest reductions in exports are in the paddy 
rice, wheat, milk and dairy product sectors, these sectors‘ contributions to total exports are 
relatively small in most cases. The reduction in rice imports into Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
are as high as 46.32 percent and 42.19 percent, respectively. Wheat imports decline by 9.61 
percent and 19.78 percent, other cereals show reductions of 12.47 percent and 7.98 percent, 
and other crops show reductions of 34.20 percent and 6.32, for Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 
respectively  (Table  7).  Overall,  the  impacts  of  export  restrictions  imposed  by  exporting 
countries on the welfare of their non-South Asian trading partners are mixed. As shown in 
Table 8, when one or more countries in South Asia imposes export taxes, a welfare gain can 
be observed for a few of their competitors (Vietnam and Brazil) and a welfare loss for their 
close  trading  partners  (South  East  Asia,  European  Union  and  the  Rest  of  the  World). 
Thailand, the key rice exporting country in the world, incurs a welfare gain when India 
imposes an export tax on rice. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The results presented above show the importance of India and its trade policies for the 
South Asian economy. Although our results depend on the base parameters and assumptions 
contained in the GTAP model, particularly the  Armington  elasticities, which significantly 
influence the terms of trade effects, they illustrate that while India‘s implementation of trade 
restrictions  through  export  taxes  may  improve  India‘s  welfare,  these  policies  harm  other 
countries in South Asia and elsewhere. Even though the primary objective of these restrictive 
policies was to reduce domestic price levels in the country imposing them, the reductions in 
the country‘s food and agricultural output and export levels can be larger than the reductions 
in  domestic  price  levels  as  evident  in  India.  Thus,  although  such consequences  may  be 
unintended, export taxes could allow a country to achieve welfare gains through the effects of 
the taxes on their terms of trade. Given the fact that the WTO currently has no rules to restrict 
these ―beggar-thy-neighbor‖ trade-restricting policies, and that the latest draft text from the 
Doha Development Round proposes scant improvements, there appears to be little hope that 
countries will limit the use of such policies during periods of high prices (Meilke, 2008). In 
our view, improving the WTO rules dealing with trade restrictions and ensuring that export 
restrictions are prominently addressed in regional trade agreements should be a high priority.  
Appendix Table 1. South Asian imports valued at market prices („000 US dollars), 2004* 
 
Product  Sri Lanka  India  Pakistan  Bangladesh  Rest SA  All South Asia   World 
1 Paddy  3.90  0.37  0.14  14.56  0.39  19.40  2,387.54 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.01)  ( 0.02) 
2 Wheat  184.69  0.96  247.14  197.44  13.33  643.56  25,411.30 
(1.70)  (0.00)  (0.80)  (1.30)  (0.20)  (0.31)  ( 0.24) 
3 Other cereals  20.82  3.17  19.66  45.23  2.24  91.12  22,744.73 
(0.20)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0 .04)  (0.21) 
4 Other crops  300.62  2,128.85  1,467.33  1,283.85  245.80  5,426.45  180,226.20 
(2.80)  (1.50)  (4.70)  (8.10)  (3.80)  (2.64)  (1.68 ) 
5 Milk  0.13  1.55  0.54  0.08  0.12  2.42  252.85 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00 ) 
6 Dairy products  188.58  48.75  44.33  96.75  52.96  431.37  48,751.35 
(1.80)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.60)  (0.80)  (0.21)  (0.45) 
7 Cattle  0.11  2.34  1.10  0.76  9.11  13.42  7,360.11 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.01)  (0.07) 
8 Meat and livestock  18.27  341.67  98.55  43.86  59.20  561.55  107,230.53 
(0.20)  (0.20)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.90)  (0.27)  (1.00) 
9 Rice  134.98  4.46  4.31  290.75  55.28  489.78  13,090.48 
(1.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (1.80)  (0.90)  (0.24)  (0.12) 
10 Processed food  590.45  5,856.97  1,319.84  1,100.57  635.03  9,502.86  390,313.25 
(5.50)  (4.10)  (4.30)  (7.00)  (9.90)  (4.62)  (3.64) 
Sub Total Ag and Food  1,442.59  8,389.09  3,202.94  3,073.85  1,073.46  17,181.93  797,768.34 
( 13.45)  (5.92)  (10.36)  (19.48)  (16.79)  (8.36)  (7.43) 
  
 
Product  Sri Lanka  India  Pakistan  Bangladesh  Rest SA  All South Asia   World 
11 Textiles and apparel  1,969.01  3,081.94  1,062.25  3,354.40  596.12  10,063.72  520,497.09 
(18.40)  (2.20)  (3.40)  (21.30)  (9.30)  (4.89)  ( 4.85) 
12 Oil  615.51  27,099.94  2,265.76  424.32  0.01  30,405.54  531,846.63 
(5.70)  (19.10)  (7.30)  (2.70)  (0.00)  (14.79)  (4.95) 
13 Manufactured   5,524.73  83,998.85  18,454.32  8,041.15  4,016.19  120,035.24  7,081,379.00 
(51.50)  (59.20)  (59.70)  (51.00)  (62.80)  (58.38)  (65.96) 
14 Services  1,175.16  19,252.21  5,916.22  882.29  709.39  27,935.27  1,805,029.38 
(11.00)  (13.60)  (19.10)  (5.60)  (11.10)  (13.59)  ( 16.81) 
Total  10,727.00  141,822.03  30,901.50  15,776.00  6,395.16  205,621.69  10,736,520.00 
(100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00) 

















Appendix Table 2. South Asian exports valued at market prices („000 US dollars), 2004* 
 
Product   Sri Lanka  India  Pakistan  Bangladesh  Rest SA  All South Asia  World 
1 Paddy   0.85  127.10  47.22  2.00  0.04  177.21  1,486.76 
(0.00)  (0.10)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.13)  (0.01) 
2 Wheat   1.60  460.91  0.61  0.05  0.03  463.20  21,443.79 
(0.00)  (0.50)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.33)  ( 0.21) 
3 Other Cereals   0.07  220.13  0.26  0.00  0.47  220.93  18,404.88 
(0.00)  (0.20)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  ( 0.16)  (0.18) 
4 Other Crops   690.00  2,726.54  314.81  149.44  116.82  3,997.61  146,015.64 
(9.40)  (2.70)  (1.90)  (1.40)  (4.20)  (2.86)  ( 1.45) 
5 Milk   0.02  4.71  3.48  0.01  0.56  8.78  251.95 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
6 Dairy products  2.97  110.15  7.92  0.29  1.59  122.92  45,816.03 
(0.00)  (0.10)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.09)  ( 0.46) 
7 Cattle   0.07  3.61  3.57  0.28  2.22  9.75  6,535.69 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.10)  ( 0.01)  ( 0.07) 
8 Other Livestock and meat  4.45  627.83  54.25  2.68  24.84  714.05  91,919.31 
(0.10)  (0.60)  (0.30)  (0.00)  (0.90)  (0.51)  ( 0.91) 
9 Rice   3.61  1,195.75  607.97  2.09  12.06  1,821.48  7,713.07 
(0.00)  (1.20)  (3.60)  (0.00)  (0.40)  (1.30)  ( 0.08) 
10 Processed Food   504.25  4,023.35  539.02  445.02  149.71  5,661.35  344,897.41 
(6.80)  (3.90)  (3.20)  (4.10)  (5.40)  ( 4.05)  (3.43) 
Subtotal Ag and Food  1,207.89  9,500.08  1,579.11  601.86  308.34  13,197.28  684,484.53 
(16.38)  (9.29)  (9.47)  (5.57)  (11.15)  (9.44)  ( 6.81) 
  
 
Product   Sri Lanka  India  Pakistan  Bangladesh  Rest SA  All South Asia  World 
11 Textile and apparel   3,019.39  15,981.99  9,778.08  8,193.01  522.64  37,495.11  451,486.19 
(40.90)  (15.60)  (58.70)  (75.90)  (18.90)  ( 26.81)  (4.49) 
12 Oil   0.00  0.27  2.93  0.00  330.51  333.71  485,114.66 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (11.90)  ( 0.24)  ( 4.83) 
13 Other Manufacturing   1,813.12  58,438.08  2,489.79  821.40  417.60  63,979.99  6,624,134.50 
(24.60)  (57.20)  (14.90)  (7.60)  (15.10)  (45.75)  (65.91) 
14 Services   1,335.01  18,331.38  2,821.37  1,180.12  1,187.44  24,855.32  1,804,984.50 
(18.10)  (17.90)  (16.90)  (10.90)  (42.90)  (17.77)  (17.96) 
Total   7,375.42  102,251.81  16,671.28  10,796.41  2,766.53  139,861.45  10,050,204.00 
(100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00)  (100.00) 

















Appendix Table 3. Bilateral imports of rice 
 
Country  1 Sri Lanka  2 India  3 Pakistan  4 Bangladesh  5 Rest SA  Total 
1 SriLanka    -  0.02  0.01   -   0.11  6.91 
   -   0  0   -   0.02  (100) 
2 India   94.24   -   3.26  286.24  16.32  1812.68 
  (0.05)   -   0  (0.16)  (0.01)  (100) 
3 Pakistan   36.61  0.03   -   0.6  37.01  888.1 
  (0.04)   -    -   0  (0.04)  (100) 
4 Bangladesh   0.02  0.01   -    -    -   3.1 
  (0.01)  0  0   -   0  (100) 
5 RestSA   0.01  0.1  0.03  0.01   -   12.06 
   -   (0.01)  0   -    -   (100) 
6 China   0.11  0.87  0.31  0.04  0.08  1013.67 
   -   0   -    -    -   (100) 
7 Vietnam   0.01  0.18  0.06  0.01  0.02  878.71 
   -   -    -    -    -   (100) 
8 Thailand   0.83  0.54  0.12  1.86  0.59  4494.89 
   -   -    -    -    -   (100) 
9 SEAsia   1.14  1.07  0.3  1.89  0.13  297.55 
  0  0  0  (0.01)   -   (100) 
10 Oceana   0.05   -    -   0.01  0.01  292.2 
   -   -    -    -    -   (100) 
11 NAmerica   0.58  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.83  1679.37 
   -   -    -    -    -   (100) 
12 EU_25   1.36  0.59  0.04   -   0.04  814.11 
   0   0   -    -    -   (100) 
  
 
Country  1 Sri Lanka  2 India  3 Pakistan  4 Bangladesh  5 Rest SA  Total 
13 Brazil    -  0.02  0.01   -    -   16.16 
   -  0   -    -    -   (100) 
14 Rest of World   0.03  0.94  0.15  0.01  0.14  880.97 
   -  0   -    -    -   (100) 
Total   134.98  4.46  4.31  290.75  55.28  13090.48 
  (0.01)   -    -   (0.02)  0  (100) 
* Numbers in parentheses are percentages of total value of imports.   






















Appendix Table 4. The change in the equivalent variation (EV) associated with the imposition of a 25 percent export tax (US$ million), 
by region 
 
































(F1)  Total EV 
Sri Lanka  -8.96  -7.94   0.18  -16.72  -14.74  -29  -1.64  -45.38  -114.38  31.63  -41.97  -124.72 
India  -53.43  140.37  -18.73  68.21  -457.94  849.47  -139.08  252.45  -476.86  826.14  -138.51  210.77 
Pakistan  1.23  18.37  4.92  24.53  -1.49  -2.4  -0.67  -4.56  -147.58  138.17  -55.53  -64.94 
Bangladesh  -21.31  -33.89  1.05  -54.14  -39.95  -95.68  -6.58  -142.21  -141.33  -26.9  -15.73  -183.96 
Rest of SA  0.76  -1.12  0.3  -0.05  -8.14  -21.14  -3.57  -32.84  -55.3  -35.34  -22.27  -112.91 
China  -7.64  0.28  2.53  -4.83  -58.01  -74.1  33.16  -98.95  -90.31  -101.22  54.28  -137.24 
Vietnam  -0.46  10.57  0.44  10.55  7.45  -1.26  0.61  6.81  5.98  4.99  0.75  11.72 
Thailand  -16.2  30.3  2.23  16.33  -11.44  -7.31  8.08  -10.67  -29.21  -7.92  12.15  -24.98 
South East Asia  -20.8  -32.03  10.84  -41.98  68.6  -519.47  87.66  -363.21  44.13  -617.88  129.52  -444.22 
Oceana  0.3  0.6  -0.11  0.79  4.64  44.89  2.97  52.51  6.1  44.73  5.25  56.08 
North America   -12.15  31.43  -8.38  10.9  -125.59  77.81  -40.86  -88.64  -119.1  157.43  -37.49  0.83 
EU_25  -73.67  -16.67  0.23  -90.11  -315.84  -217.24  24.68  -508.4  -403.08  -268.47  50.56  -620.98 
Brazil  -0.62  2.26  0.32  1.97  -9.29  52.02  -3.32  39.41  -11.25  68.11  -3.32  53.54 
Rest of World  -58.37  -142.4  4.14  -196.63  -173.73  -50.33  37.57  -186.49  -264.66  -206.6  60.32  -410.94 
Total  -271.31  0.14  -0.02  -271.19  -1135.46  6.27  -0.98  -1130.18  -1796.83  6.87  -1.98  -1791.94 
Source: Results of simulations performed using GTAP version 7. 
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This  paper  proposes  a  methodology  for  evaluating  the  impacts  of  non-tariff  trade 
barriers  on  Brazilian  beef  exports.  The  hypothesis  is  that  sanitary  issues  influence 
Brazilian beef exports. Intervention  models are applied to price and quantity series to 
obtain direct impact estimates and to establish the influence pattern of the intervention 
variables.  The  analysis  considers  the  European  Union  market  for  Brazilian  exports  of 
fresh and chilled beef cuts, and covers the period from January 1992 through December 
2000. In the intervention analysis, the March 1995 point was significant and indicates a 
reduction effect on export prices for three  months, which was related to the European 
embargo  against  Brazilian  exports.  In  general,  the  results  suggest  that  most  of  the 
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As indicated by Miranda (2001), the beef market is heavily protected all around the world 
by tariffs and tariff-rate quotas (TRQ), import licensing mechanisms, domestic support prices, 
domestic production subsidies, and export subsidies, particularly in the developed countries. 
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Trade in bovine meat products is strongly affected by technical and sanitary regulations and 
quality standards. During the 1990s, sanitary issues became more relevant in determining the 
nature and extent of global trade  in beef. It is  important to note that sanitary  issues, for 
instance, those raised by disease outbreaks, can cause significant changes in the behavior of 
consumers, policymakers, producers, exporters and importers. 
The United States (US), Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, and the European  Union 
(EU)  are  the  world‘s  main  beef  exporters.  According  to  Gordon  (2000), there  are  great 
differences in production costs between the southern and northern hemispheres in this sector. 
While this could encourage trade, the international meat market is also highly regulated and 
protected. 
Since 2004,  Brazil has been the major world beef exporter. Meat exports ranked 6
th 
among Brazil‘s exports in 2005. In that year, Brazil exported about 2.4 million tons of beef in 
carcass-weight equivalent, which generated US$3.15 billion in income (ABIEC, 2006). Brazil 
competes with Argentina in the European and Chilean markets for fresh and chilled beef, and 
in the US market for processed products. 
Suppliers are differentiated  according to quality and consumer preferences. Countries 
such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, US, Japan, and South Korea, which are considered 
to be part of the Pacific Rim region, face better prices in the international beef market because 
of the high quality of their product, which is also closely related to their successful image 
concerning their sanitary status. Moreover, these countries do not buy meat products from 
countries that have not completely eradicated foot and mouth disease (FMD). Unlike Brazil, 
Argentina and Uruguay have access to the Pacific Rim markets, even though in recent years 
they have faced temporary bans because of FMD outbreaks. 
Given the direct effects of sanitary and technical trade barriers on exports, as well as their 
direct and indirect income and employment consequences, measuring the impacts of these 
barriers on trade in goods and services is a challenge. This is particularly true for developing 
countries, where there is a scarcity of financial resources and human capital to deal with the 
diversity and complexity of sanitary and technical  issues. Although economists have used 
several methodologies to  measure the  impacts of sanitary and technical trade barriers on 
exports, there is still potential for further developments  in this specific area of research, 
including its public policy applications. 
The main objective of this article is to present a new application of the Box and Tiao 
(1975) methodology, which employs intervention variables to evaluate the trade impact of 
non-tariff trade barriers, particularly sanitary measures, and use it to analyze the case of 
Brazilian beef exports. The first challenge of such an analysis is to propose a methodology 
that  is  capable  of  capturing  the  impacts  of such sanitary  and  technical  requirements  or 
barriers, which are not always very clear or well identified. A second challenge is to gather 
enough  information  and  data  to  provide  the  necessary  input  to  the  quantitative  models, 
without sacrificing the qualitative features that are so relevant to an analysis of these kinds of 
non-tariff barriers. 
With these challenges and requirements in mind, the analysis here uses the results of 
Miranda (2001) to select the variables for the transfer functions in time-series models. Then, 
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using monthly data, an intervention model
2 is applied to verify the influence of selected non-
tariff barriers on Brazilian beef exports to the Europe an Union (EU) for the period from 
January 1992 through December 2000. The hypothesis is that sanitary events and related 
regulations affect the prices or the quantities (or both) of beef exported by Brazil. It is 
important to note that applying these models requires a detailed knowledge about the problem 
being analyzed, in particular details about the general and specific determinants of trade for 
the product or group of products considered, the nature and structure of protectionism 
concerning these products, the sanitary and other regulations imposed on them, and any other 
events that could affect the time-series being studied. 
This article proposes using intervention variables rather than econometric models with 
dummies to analyze the impacts of non -tariff barriers to trade. The greatest advantage of 
intervention  models  over  the  traditional  dummy  variables  approach  is  that  intervention 
models can represent the dynamic effects of shocks. Such intervention models have been 
applied  in  particular  to  environment al  issues.  However,  they  have  not  been  used  for 
evaluating  the  effects  of  the  sanitary  or  technical  barriers  on  trade  flows.  The  major 
motivation for this article‘s focus on identifying and measuring the impacts of sanitary and 
technical  barriers  are  the complaints  from  Brazilian  exporters  that sanitary  and  technical 
requirements have damaged trade, particularly trade in livestock. Thus, the use of economic 
models to analyze the empirical evidence would be very helpful in informing the debate on 
this issue. 
The  remainder  of  this  article  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents 
background  on  sanitary  and  technical  barriers.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the 
methodology used in our analysis. This discussion is divided into two parts: the first describes 
the choice of the determinants of Brazilian beef exports and the second presents the analytical 
approach used in this article (i.e., the transfer function and intervention analyses). The next 
section describes the data and the interviews conducted with export-oriented slaughterhouses 
in Brazil. Following the description of the data, we present and interpret the results of the 
models  run  for  quantities  of  beef  exports  and  prices  of  beef  exports.  We  offer  some 
concluding remarks in the final section. 
 
 
BACKGROUND ON SANITARY AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS 
 
The  discussion  of  sanitary  and  technical  barriers  imposed  on  tradable  agribusiness 
products is based on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) multilateral agreements  implemented under the  World Trade Organization (WTO). 
These  two  agreements,  in  particular  the  SPS,  encourage  countries  to  harmonize  their 
regulations  with  the  international  scientific  and  technical  references  developed  by 
international  scientific  organizations,  such  as  the  Codex  Alimentarius  Commission 
(established  by  the  U.N.  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  and  the  World  Health 
Organization), the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC). 
                                                 
2
 Intervention analysis and transfer function analysis are techniques that ―generalize the univariate methodology by 
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The SPS provisions deal with some of the most important principles to protect human, 
animal, and plant health and food safety. Additionally, SPS establishes the regionalization 
and  equivalence  provisions,  which  help  facilitate  world  trade.
3  The  goal  of  the  TBT 
provisions is to prevent technical requirements from creating unnecessary barriers to trade 
and also to handle origin certification, environment protection, pesticide residues in food, 
conformity assessment procedures, traceability, and other requirements. 
Because of the complexity of the harmonization and equivalence processes, Brazilian 
exports (including beef) face a large diversity of requirements imposed by importers. Meeting 
these varied requirements is difficult, increases the costs of production, and re sults in more 
bureaucracy. This situation also contributes to a misapplication of technical and sanitary 
requirements, which goes beyond the reasonable objectives of protecting human and animal 
health and in this way becomes a kind of non-tariff barrier. 
In addition,  it is  important to note that sanitary and technical policies should focus 
primarily on protecting consumers (with respect to their health and security), animal and plant 
health, and the environment, as well as achieving other legitimate objecti ves established by 
the SPS and TBT provisions. The fact that in some cases sanitary and technical regulations 
have not been aligned with SPS and TBT provisions has raised suspicion that these policies 
are being used solely to restrict commerce. However, ev aluating the legitimacy of a sanitary 
or technical requirement is seldom a simple task, and there have been numerous debates in 
Brazil among the media and politicians about whether the country is facing  increasing 
sanitary barriers. This further illustrates the importance of analyzing the empirical evidence 
on this issue. 
According to Ferraz Filho (1997), the slaughter sector was one of the most directly 
affected by the technical requirements imposed on Brazil by importers. A sample of firms, 
which were all private and had foreign trade background, considered sanitary rules to be a 
very important obstacle to their export growth rates. Procópio Filho (1994) carried out a 
survey of the Brazilian private sector and found that sanitary and environmental requirements 
were perceived as a way to negotiate a decrease in prices. Lima, Miranda, and Galli (2005) 
found that due to its FMD status, Brazil was not part of the beef niche market, which was 
valued at  US$7.5 billion in 2004 and included the Pacific Rim countrie s. These studies 
indicate that sanitary and technical requirements may sometimes result in an import ban on a 





The economics literature has proposed some tools for evaluating the impacts of non-tariff 
barriers. These include partial equilibrium models, general equilibrium models, frequency and 
coverage indexes, as well as case studies. Laird (1996) and Beghin and Bureau (2001) review 
the literature on these methodological alternatives. 
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Econometric  models,  including  those  using  dummy  variables,  can  address  events  or 
actions whose effects are not directly quantifiable (e.g. a new sanitary regulation).  As an 
alternative, it is also possible to evaluate the effects of this kind of event by applying a time-
series method that uses intervention models and  intervention variables to explain specific 
events that are identified by observing the behavior of time-series data. 
Our discussion of the methodology for our analysis is divided into two parts, with the 
first  relying  on  the  previous  results  of  Miranda  (2001)  to  explain  how  the  explanatory 
variables  were selected,  and  the  second  describing  the  transfer function  analysis  and  the 
intervention analysis, and explaining in detail which dummies (intervention variables) were 
included in the analysis and how they were addressed in the models. 
 
 
Identifying the Determinants of Brazil‟s Beef Exports 
 
In order to identify the main determinants of  Brazilian beef  exports, Miranda (2001) 
estimated an econometric model through a reduced form. This model was generated from a 
structural model based on the domestic market surplus, which can be used to indicate Brazil‘s 
foreign  beef  sales.  The  volume  exported  in  the  equilibrium  was  determined  through  the 
balance  between  this  foreign  sales  equation  and  the  foreign  demand  for  Brazilian  beef. 
Miranda  (2001)  acknowledges  that  the  imported  good  is  not  a  perfect substitute  for  the 
domestic good and that there is not perfect substitution between Brazilian beef and beef from 
other countries in the international market. 
The analysis by Miranda (2001) assumed perfectly elastic international demand and the 
functional model forms were estimated through an ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
method. The first equation estimated by Miranda (2001) had the exported volume as the 
dependent variable. The second equation used the average price of Brazilian beef exports as 
the dependent variable. The residuals were examined  in order to  identify the presence of 
outliers, which might indicate the effects of non-tariff barriers. Miranda (2001) found that the 
following explanatory variables were significant in determining Brazil‘s beef exports to the 
EU:  the  steer  price  in  the  Brazilian  domestic  market  (which  had  a  negative  coefficient, 
indicating a negative price elasticity relative to the quantity of beef exports to the EU); the 
real exchange rate between the Brazilian currency and the U.S. dollar lagged by one period 
(which had a positive coefficient); seasonality (which indicated that in the livestock harvest 
months--February until July--exports increase); beef exports from Argentina (with a negative 
coefficient, indicating substitution between Brazilian and Argentinean beef suppliers in the 
European market); and domestic income (with a negative coefficient, indicating that income 
has a negative correlation with the quantities of beef exported). 
 
 
Approach Used in the Current Analysis 
 
In the current analysis, the same explanatory variables found to be significant by Miranda 
(2001) were introduced as transfer functions in the Box-Jenkins model.
4 These explanatory 
variables are presented in the next section. It is also important to mention that we did not 
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assume perfectly elastic demand since Miranda (2001) concluded that Brazilian beef exports 
had influenced the prices of beef exports to the EU. 
Other variables representing sanitary events, technical requirements, and other types of 
events relevant to the beef export sector, such as changes in foreign agricultural policies, were 
modeled through intervention variables, following Box and Tiao (1975), Jenkins (1979), and 
Vandaele (1983). 
Thus, we included some dummy variables (representing specific events or actions) in the 
intervention model. These dummies were selected based on interviews (see below) and the 
main events that occurred in the domestic and international markets that could affect beef 
exports. These dummy variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the intervention variables tested in the model for beef exports 
 
Year  Month  Event (Intervention variable) 
1995  January  The WTO, the SPS and the Agriculture Agreement took effect 
  March  Temporary three-month restriction by the European Community on 
importing fresh beef from São Paulo and Minas Gerais states (Brazil) 
1996  March  EU bans beef imports from United Kingdom 
  June  The government rule nº 304 (Brazil) took effect to set up the 
requirements of the bovine meat commercialization in quarters, and 
standard, classified, identified, and packaged cuts 
1998  March  FMD outbreaks in Porto Murtinho/Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) – Brazil 
  May  Rio Grande do Sul (RS) and Santa Catarina (SC) states (Brazil) 
declared free from FMD with vaccination 
  June  Partial interruption of the ban on British beef exports 
  October  FMD outbreak in Naviraí County/MS - Brazil 
1999  July  Ending of the Calf Processing Aid Scheme (CPAS) in the European 
Community 
  December  Release on the reforms of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) - 
Agenda 2000, to be implemented in July 2000 
2000  May  Argentina, RS, and SC recognized as FMD free zones without 
vaccination; and the Center-West Circuit (Brazil) recognized as FMD 
free with vaccination 
  July  Final reduction in import tariffs on beef imported by the European 
Community, according to the tariff reduction schedule under the 
Uruguay Round Agreement 
  August  FMD outbreaks in Jóia County/RS (Brazil) 
  September  Canada, US, Central America, Venezuela, and Caribbean lifted bans 
on Argentinean beef exports that had been due to FMD problems 
 
Using a time-series approach we can identify the intervention effects directly through the 
own data generating process of the time-series. Consider a stochastic process Zt,, with the 
exported volume to the EU in one case, and the average export price in the other case. Then, 
following Jenkins (1979) and Vandaele (1983): 
 
Zt = Ut + Nt                  (1) The Application of Intervention Models to Non-Tariff Trade Barriers 
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where Ut is the share of Zt explained by Xt (the explanatory variable responsible for that part 
of the change that occurred in Zt, due, for instance, to the exchange rate, income, and so on) 
and by  t (representing the intervention variables), and Nt is the error term. Thus we can also 
write: 
 
Ut = f(Xt,  t,, k)                (2) 
 
where k represents the deterministic term. 
The following transfer function is used to represent the relationship between Ut, Xt, and 
t. The lags‘ parameters comprise b and d, which are the moment the explanatory and the 
intervention variables start, respectively, to influence Ut: 
 










   (3) 
 
The transfer function V(B) comprises a moving average operator ω(B); an autoregressive 
operator  (B); and a lag parameter b, describing the total number of delays necessary for Xt to 
have an effect on Zt. Additionally V(B) must be convergent, that is, the roots of  (B) = 0 and 
ω(B) = 0 must be within the unit circle. 
The W(B) function is a specific case of a transfer function, a dynamic representation of 
the  intervention  variable  that  also  comprises  a  moving  average  operator  (B),  an 
autoregressive operator γ(B), and a lag parameter d, describing the delay necessary for  t to 
have an effect on Zt. 









                  (4) 
 
Substituting equations 2, 3 and 4 into equation 1 results in the transfer function, which 

















         (5) 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  identification  of  the  model  structure  consists  of 
determining the order of all the polynomials in equation 5. 
The first step in analyzing the impact of intervention variables is to check if the event or 
intervention being analyzed shifts the level of the time-series (for export volumes or export 
prices) smoothly or drastically, or if it shifts its trend. Afterwards, the intervention analysis is 
applied.  Shifts  in  series Zt  caused  by  an  exogenous  event  may  be  immediate  or  lagged, 
temporary  or  permanent.  So  the  representation  of  these  intervention  variables  can  be 
classified into two types: pulse (effect occurs only in a single time T) and step (continuous 
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from the time T forward). There is also an intermediate case when the intervention occurs 
during a time break, which causes changes in the level or steepness of the Zt series. Vandaele 
(1983,  p.335)  describes  the  different  types  of  responses  to  a  step  or  pulse  intervention 
function, which is important for modeling each intervention listed in Table 1. 
Miranda (2001) applied causality tests, as indicated by Granger (1969) and described in 
Gujarati (1995), in order to support the choice of variables in the models, particularly in the 
transfer functions. This paper has adopted Miranda‘s choice of variables. 
In order to evaluate whether or not the series are stationary, all the time-series data were 
also checked for unit roots using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF).
6 The procedure 
employed to verify unit roots as well as to te st for cointegration
7 between each pair of time-
series variables follows Engle and Granger (1987) and is described in Enders (1995). All the 
models and tests were run through the 4.0 Regression Analysis Time Series (RATS) program 
(Doan 1994). The Box-Jenkins estimation was done through an interactive process, which 
uses the Gauss-Newton algorithm. 
 
 
DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES OF DATA 
 
Table 2 lists the explanatory variables as they appear in the tables of results, and also 
includes brief descriptions and sources of data for each variable. 
 
Table 2. Explanatory variables used as transfer functions in the models 
 
Name of variable 
in the model 
Description  Source of data 
VDTUE 
(Dependent) 





Seasonality variables   RATS 
program 
TXREAL  Real exchange rate (R$/US$)  IPEA 
VXARG  Quantity of fresh/chilled beef exported by Argentina  SAGyP 
PBREAL  Real Brazilian steer prices   IEA 





PRDIANT  Real wholesale beef price (front quarters)  Boletim 
Intercarnes 
RBRAS  Proxy for domestic income: real average revenue of workers 




Average nominal export price for Brazilian special cuts (fresh 
and chilled beef) to the EU 
ABIEC 
(calculated) 
PNARG  Average export price for Argentinean fresh/chilled beef  SAGyP 
TREND  Trend   _ 
D_mmyy{}  Intervention results. D means dummy and the four numbers 
after this letter (see results in Table 3 and 4) correspond to the 
month (mm) and the year (yy) of the shock. The number in {} 
is the lag of the term‘s numerator (or denominator)  
Table 1  
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The study used monthly data for January 1992 through December 2000. This period was 
chosen primarily because of the availability of data provided by Miranda (2001). Moreover, 
this period was significant in terms of sanitary issues in Europe (i.e., Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy  outbreaks)  and  South  America  (i.e.,  FMD  outbreaks),  and  because  it 
coincided with the Uruguay Round results and the launch of the SPS Agreement under the 
scope of the WTO. 
 
 
Export Volumes and Prices 
 
Monthly data on quantities and average prices (calculated from the exported values and 
quantities) for fresh and chilled cuts of beef exported to the EU were obtained from the 
Associação Brasileira das Indústrias Exportadoras de Carne Bovina (Brazilian Association of 
Beef Exporting Companies) or ABIEC. Figure 1 presents quantities of exports and highlights 
some events or potential intervention variables. 
Brazil‘s domestic steer prices and beef wholesale prices were obtained from the Instituto 
de  Economia  Agrícola  (IEA)  and  the  Boletim  Intercarnes
8, and deflated by an index of 
general prices
9  based on prices in January 200 1 (IPEADATA, 2001). Monthly data for 
Argentinean prices and exported volumes  of beef  in natura, which is comprised of fresh, 





Figure 1. Brazil‘s exports of special cuts (fresh and chilled) to the EU (in tons), January 1992 - 
December 2000. Source: ABIEC. 
Figure  1  indicates  that  Brazil‘s  beef  exports  may  also  have  a  seasonal  component. 
Miranda (2001) calculated seasonality indexes (based on the geometric moving average) for 
bovine prices in Brazil and beef exports to the EU, and found that harvest and non-harvest 
                                                 
8
 INTERCARNES. Data Bulletin. Several issues (1992-2000). Published daily and released through fax. 
9
 The index is the Índice Geral de Preços – Disponibilidade Interna (IGP-DI)/Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). 
10
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periods clearly affected both steer prices in Brazil, which tend to be low from February to 
July, and exports, which are high from March to August. This suggests that seasonal variables 





The source for the nominal exchange rate series (R$/US$) was the Instituto de Pesquisas 
Avançadas  (IPEA,  2001).  The  exchange  rate was  deflated  to  real  values  by  the  IGP-DI 
(Brazilian  General  Price  Index)  and  by  the  Producer  Price  Index (U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics, available at http://stats.bls.gov/datahome.htm).
11  
Figure 2 shows the real exchange rate time series. 
 
 




The proxy for domestic income was the nominal average revenue for people who were 
both  employed  and  over  15  years  old  (Pesquisa  Mensal  de  Preços  –  IBGE,  2001),  also 
converted to real values using the IGP-DI. 
 
 
Interviews with Brazilian Beef Exporters 
 
Ten slaughterhouses involved in the beef exporting business were visited and interviews 
conducted in order to collect information on sanitary and technical issues affecting the beef 
market. This sample of slaughterhouses, which all belong to ABIEC, represented about 70.1 
percent of the total value and 66.5 percent of the total volume of beef exported in natura in 
2000. According to Miranda (2001), from 1990 to 1998, the companies belonging to ABIEC 
accounted for at least 90 percent of Brazilian beef exports, on a volume basis. Figure 3 shows 
                                                 
11
 A better choice for the exchange rate may be the real to ECU rate (the Euro-only rate started in 1999), that is, an 
effective real exchange rate based on a basket of European currencies. Thus the results presented here that are 
related to the exchange rate should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the evolution of the real to dollar 
rate was similar to the effective real rate for most of the period (www.ipeadata.gov.br). The Application of Intervention Models to Non-Tariff Trade Barriers 
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the trends in exports for all companies belonging to ABIEC,
12 which accounted for 67 percent 
of all Brazilian beef sold in 2005. 
 
 
Figure 3. Beef exports by companies belonging to ABIEC, by type (in thousand tons of carcass-weight 
equivalent (CWE)), 1990 to 2005. Source: ABIEC. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In order to better understand the impacts of sanitary and technical events on Brazil‗s 
export performance, the results presented here focus on those models estimated with variables 
in logarithms and in level form. A similar procedure was adopted in Marsh (2003), which 
estimated the structural equations for the domestic beef market in the US with variables in 
level form, based upon the findings of DeJong et al. (1992) and Johnson and DiNardo (1997). 
Tests indicated that some variables have unit roots, suggesting the need to difference the 
time-series data. However, as pointed out by Vandaele (1983), with differenced time-series 
data it becomes more difficult to identify the exact time when an intervention or shock takes 
place. Indeed, he cites this as a caveat to his analysis. In addition, DeJong et al. (1992) shows 
that for small samples the ADF test is weak against the trend-stationary alternative. Such 
could be considered to be the case for this study. Moreover, Vandaele (1983) and DeJong et 
al. (1992) do not recommend performing cointegration tests for sample sizes with fewer than 
100 observations. With about 108 observations, the time series used in this paper is on the 
edge of what is recommended. 
Nonetheless, unit root and cointegration tests were carried out in the current analysis. 
Most of the time-series were found to be non-stationary and integrated of first order, except 
for the dependent variable vdtue (quantity of beef exported by  Brazil to the EU) and the 
explanatory  variable  pbreal  (domestic  price  of  steer  in  Brazil),  which were  found  to  be 
                                                 
12




13 Additionally, the results of the cointegration tests indicated that none of the pairs 
of variables tested were cointegrated. 
 
 
Model for Quantity of Beef Exported to the EU 
 
The first case analyzed concerns the fresh and chilled cuts exported to the EU and the 
first model was fitted for their exported volumes (vdtue). All the series were transformed to 
logarithms.  Following  the  approach  of  Miranda  (2001),  the  transfer  functions  were 
constructed using the variables presented in Table 3, which also shows the best fit when the 
Box-Jenkins  model  was  applied  to  quantities  of  in  natura  beef  (fresh  and  chilled  cuts) 
exported to the EU. 
The results of the intervention model were quite similar to those in Miranda (2001), when 
an  econometric  model  was  used  to  estimate  the  elasticities  of  the  explanatory  variables 
relative to Brazilian beef exports. The Q test (Ljung and Box, 1979, described in Gujarati, 
1995) showed goodness-of-fit of the model. The quantity exported by Argentina showed a 
significant  and  negative  coefficient  (-0.48),  which  indicates  a  substitution  effect  between 
Brazilian and Argentinean exports of fresh and chilled beef to the European market. Another 
important result is that an increase in Brazilian domestic income during the time period may 
have caused a reduction of –1.62% in Brazilian exports of beef to the EU. Although Miranda 
(2001) found the exchange rate to be a very relevant determinant of foreign sales of beef, it 
was not very significant in the transfer function and intervention model estimated here. 
The seasonality variables were also significant in explaining exports, confirming that in 
the  dry  months  (lower  pasture  availability)  for  bovine  production,  exports  tend  to  be 
positively affected. 
The intervention variables presented in Table 1 were modeled as pulse or step variables. 
In general they did not show relevant impacts over the volume traded. Although one can 
notice the outcomes for the shocks in January 1995, March 1996, and July 2000 presented in 
Table 3, only the intervention for January 1995 had statistically significant coefficients. This 
variable (shock) relative to January 1995 was defined as (m,l,d) = (0,1,0), where  m is the 
auto-regressive component, l is the moving average component and d is the lag. This profile 
determines  the  way  this  intervention  acts  on  the  dependent  variable.  This  shock  had  an 
immediate and negative  impact on Brazilian exports to the EU (vdtue), estimated at -0.76 
percent,  from  the  time  it  occurred  in  January  1995.  In  the  next  period  this  shock  was 
attenuated  by  a  positive  effect,  reducing  the  original  negative  shock  on  exports  to  0.52 
percent. This kind of intervention pattern is illustrated in Figure 4, which is based upon the 
work of Vandaele (1983).
14 It is called a ―step‖ intervention variable and acknowledges that 
since January 1995, there has been a permanent effect on exported volumes, which originated 
with the initial shock in January 1995. However, these results must be interpreted carefully 
because  even  when  the  effect  of  a shock  is  identified,  there  can  be  other  simultaneous 
                                                 
13
 As the Akaike and Schwartz tests were not conclusive for vdtue and pbreal, the unit root tests were performed 
twice. The first test considered a lag of 1 for both variables. In this case, the outcome was stationary. However, 
when the tests were performed again with a lag of 7, these two time-series became non-stationary of order 1. 
14
 This author presents several representations of simulated dynamic effects of intervention variables.  The Application of Intervention Models to Non-Tariff Trade Barriers 
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occurrences in the market that diminish or augment the previous effects and interact with 
them. 
 
Table 3. Results of Box-Jenkins model for Brazilian beef exports to the EU.  
January 1992 –December 2000 
 
Model: Q(24,1) = 24.89* 
2 R  = 0.92 Dependent variable = LVDTUE
1 
Variables  Coefficient   Test ―t‖ 
Constant  25.62*  4.41 
AR(1)  0.28**  2.16 
N
2_SAZ{0}  0.13  1.28 
N_SAZ{1}  0.008  0.05 
N_SAZ{2}  0.12  0.89 
N_SAZ{3}  0.46*  3.15 
N_SAZ{4}  0.62*  3.92 
N_SAZ{5}  0.60*  3.10 
N_SAZ{6}  0.70*  3.57 
N_SAZ{7}  0.43*  2.24 
N_SAZ{8}  0.19  1.26 
N_SAZ{9}  0.15  1.19 
N_SAZ{10}  0.08  0.73 
N_TXREAL{1}  0.59  1.27 
N_VXARG{1}  -0.48**  -2.47 
N_PBREAL{1}  -0.80  -1.46 
N_RPBRARG{0}  -0.23  -0.77 
N_PRDIANT{1}  -0.47  -1.50 
N_RBRAS{1}  -1.62**  -2.17 
N_TREND  0.002  0.12 
N_D0195{0}  -0.76*  -2.90 
N_D0195{1}  0.52**  2.13 
N_D0396{1}  -0.01  -0.06 
N_D0396{2}  -0.35  -1.27 
N_D0396{3}  0.03  0.12 
N_D07{0}  0.32***  1.75 
N_D07{1}  1.42*  4.41 
N_D07{2}  -0.44  -1.39 
* Significant to 1%; ** Significant to 5% *** Significant to 10%. 
1Data in logarithms. See Table 2 for variable definitions. The ―N‖ in front of the intervention variables 
means that the coefficient is related to a numerator term from the transfer function established to 
represent the intervention variable itself. The number that follows the name of the intervention 
variable indicates the order of this term in the numerator. So, the {0} means that the coefficient 
expresses the effect of the own intervention when it occurs. When the number 1 follows the first 
term of the numerator, the corresponding coefficient represents the intervention effect that is only 
felt in the following time, that is, the lag is equal to one. 
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The coefficients presented in Table 3 also indicate that the  intervention variable July 
2000 had a positive effect on vdtue. Three parameters in the numerator of the mathematical 
expression represent this intervention. The coefficients for the intervention at the time period 




Figure 4. Pattern showing effect of intervention variable (shock in January 1995) on exports (vdtue). 
(Adapted from Vandaele, 1983). 
The  residuals  series  from  the  model  in  Table  3  suggests  that  although  several 
interventions and explanatory variables were statistically significant, there were still some 
outliers that could not be explained, either  in the  literature or from the interviews. More 
specifically, there were outliers in May 1993, December 1994, and November 1996 (see 
Figure 5), which did not appear to be related to any relevant event in the beef market. 
 
 
Figure 5. Residuals series for the intervention model (Table 3) for Brazilian beef exported to the EU. 
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Model for Export Prices 
 
In addition to applying the Box-Jenkins model to the exported quantities, we ran a model 
for the average prices negotiated for beef exports to the EU market (pdtuen), Again, we 
employed transfer functions built  around variables identified by  Miranda (2001) as being 
determinants of Brazilian export prices for beef. 
Miranda (2001) found negative and significant coefficients for the real exchange rate 
lagged by one period, indicating that the expectation of exchange rate devaluation induces a 
reduction in the export price in dollars. This conclusion was also supported by findings from 
the  interviews  with  Brazilian  slaughterhouses  that  export  beef.  Moreover,  according  to 
Miranda (2001), the negative coefficient for the real lagged exchange rate in the model run 
for export prices and the positive coefficient found for the exchange rate variable in the model 
for export volumes imply that an exchange rate devaluation causes an increase in the quantity 
of exports and a reduction in the prices for those exports, suggesting that Brazil has some 
influence on this market. As a result, Miranda (2001) notes that it is possible to question if, in 
fact, the EU demand for Brazilian beef is perfectly elastic. 
The same procedure for estimating the  Box-Jenkins model for vdtue was adopted to 
estimate the model for the nominal average export price (pdtue)
15. In this case, the variables 
considered were: domestic cattle prices; the prices for Argentina‘s beef exports to the EU; the 
real exchange rate; and the intervention variables presented in Table 1. As with the quantity 
of exports model, the explanatory variables were transformed into logarithms and run in level 
in order to observe the impacts of shocks directly on the time-series analyzed. 
In  the  Box-Jenkins  models  with  transfer  functions  and  intervention  variables,  the 
domestic prices for cattle in Brazil and the prices for Argentina‘s beef exports to the EU both 
had significant and positive coefficients, suggesting that when these variables change, the 
prices for Brazil‘s beef exports will move in the same direction (see Table 4). 
The estimated coefficient for the shock in March 1995  indicates a reduction of 0.07 
percent in the average export price in the three following months, starting from March (Table 
4). In March 1995, the European Community suspended beef imports from Brazil‘s São Paulo 
and Minas Gerais states for sanitary reasons. This ban lasted for three months and might have 
been  responsible  for  the  statistically  significant  negative  effects  identified  by  the  model 
presented above. Viglio (1996) emphasizes that commercial sanctions due to FMD vary a lot. 
Reporting on the EU‘s temporary ban on  Brazilian beef  imports  in 1995, she notes that 
although a European inspection of sanitary conditions resulted in the removal of the ban after 
three months, it would have been impossible to change the herd sanitary conditions in such a 
short time. 
Concerning the result for May 1998, an intervention ―step‖ variable was modeled for 
subsequent months to account for the fact that an increase of Brazilian exports was expected 
to happen, because the OIE had just declared Brazil‘s South-Circuit to be a FMD free area 
with vaccination. It was expected that this declaration could favor Brazil‘s performance in 
export markets. However, only the denominator of the coefficient for the intervention variable 
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 The use of nominal prices in this context is recommended because the objective of the analysis is to capture the 
change  in  prices  as  an  effect  of  changes  in  intervention  variables.  The  use  of  real  prices  would  lead  to 
variations  in  prices  due  to  inflation,  and  not  necessarily  related  to  specific  changes  in  the  market,  being 
analyzed and thus make it more difficult to detect the effects of interest in this study.  It is important to note 




16 (see Table 4) was statistically significant, which is very difficult to interpret in 
economic terms. 
 
Table 4. Results of Box-Jenkins model for Brazilian beef exports to EU. Dependent 
variable: nominal average prices of beef exports (US$/ton).  
January 1992 – December 2000 
 
Q(26,2) = 27.74 Dependent variable = LPDTUE 
Variable  Coefficient  Test ―t‖ 
Constant  6.88*  6.39 
AR(1)  0.61*  5.91 
AR(2)  0.32*  3.08 
N_SAZON{0}  0.002  0.15 
N_TREND{0}  0.001  0.24 
N_PBREAL{1}  0.25*  2.55 
N_PNARG{1}  0.20**  2.28 
N_PNARG{2}  -0.15  -1.62 
N_TXREAL{1}  0.08  0.53 
N_D0395{0}  -0.07***  -1.71 
N_D0598{1}  0.08  1.22 
N_D0598{2}  -0.10  -1.56 
D_D0598{1}  0.94*  11.36 
* Significant to 1%; ** Significant to 5% *** Significant to 10%. 





The objective of this article has been to propose a new approach that uses intervention 
models to evaluate the impacts of non-tariff trade barriers, particularly sanitary measures, and 
to apply  it to the case of  Brazilian beef exports. The results suggest that the volume of 
Brazilian  exports  of  in  natura  beef  products  to  the  European  Union  are  influenced  by 
European demand conditions and both Brazilian supply and demand conditions, in particular 
those related to the cattle and wholesale markets. The real exchange rate and domestic income 
also help to explain changes in the quantities exported between 1992 and 2000. 
Concerning  the  sanitary  events  examined  and  their  impact  on  trade,  the  intervention 
model  showed  significant  coefficients  only  for  a  few  events  that  had  been  previously 
suggested by the literature and the interviews conducted for this study. The most remarkable 
outcome was the intervention variable estimated for March 1995, when exports of Brazilian 
beef were suspended by European countries for three months due to FMD. Export prices were 
also pushed downwards for all of that period. 
At least three reasons may explain the difficulty in measuring the impact of this type of 
intervention variable (i.e., sanitary events). First there are limitations to establishing the exact 
                                                 
16
  The transfer  function to  represent the  shock  in  May  1998  and  its  behavior  since  then  was  defined  by  the 
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time pattern of the shock in order to specify its correspondent intervention function. Second 
there is the regionalized effect of sanitary events on trade flows: impacts could be distinct 
according to the exporting zone and its specific sanitary status. Finally, other events or actions 
that occur around the same time as a specific sanitary event can jeopardize the observation of 
its distinct impact and make it very difficult to isolate its consequences. 
Even though the results of this case study were not very statistically significant, we still 
find intervention models to be a useful instrument and recommend them for evaluating the 
impacts of sanitary and other non-tariff barriers. This approach improves on the use of simple 
dummy variables  in econometric models, which miss the dynamic effects of intervention 
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This  article  analyzes  the  relative  importance  of  producers‘  attributes  and  farms‘ 
geographical characteristics in the decision to produce an exportable good (blueberries) 
in  the  southern  region  of  Chile.  Using  farm-level  data,  a  logit  model  is  estimated  to 
identify  factors  influencing  the  export-production  decision.  Results  show  that  the 
probability of producing blueberries increases with the educational level of producers (a 
proxy  for  productivity),  the  presence  of  irrigation  and  drainage  systems,  and  the 
availability  of  labor.  The  last  factor,  which  arises  from  the  proximity  to  large  and 
urbanized regions, has a stronger effect on the export-production decisions of Chilean 
farms than either farmers‘ education or farms‘ physical characteristics. 
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The integration of Chile‘s economy into international markets during the last few decades 
has led many  local firms to orient their production towards foreign markets. Agriculture, 
particularly the fruit sector, has responded very positively to this trend, taking advantage of 
selling in the northern hemisphere‘s off-season markets. In fact, Chilean fresh fruit exports 
have grown from $160 million in 1980 to more than $1.8 billion in 2006 (ODEPA, 2008). 
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The  growth  of  agricultural  production  and  exports  in  Chile  has  been  geographically 
uneven. For example, producers located in the north and central Chilean zones (the Tarapacá 
and El Maule regions) have witnessed rapid growth in agricultural production and exports. In 
fact, more than 90 percent of agricultural exports in 2007 were produced in these zones. On 
the  other  hand,  southern  farmers  are  considered  to  be  traditional  producers,  i.e.  their 
production of beef, wheat and dairy products is aimed mainly at the domestic market. The 
most common reason cited by southern farmers for not producing export-oriented products 
such as fruits is that the region‘s geographic characteristics (e.g., soil type) severely limit the 
production possibilities of their farms. 
Nevertheless, the production of blueberries  - a product that is mostly exported  - has 
expanded  considerably  in  Chile‘s  southern  regions  in  recent  years.  Moreover,  the spatial 
distribution of farms producing blueberries indicates that blueberry producers and traditional 
producers are located side by side in several micro-regions (see figure 1). 
 
 
▲ Traditional producers. 
● Blueberry producers. 
Source: Centro de Información de Recursos Naturales (2007). 
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of traditional and export-oriented producers in southern Chile. 
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This conflicts with the common perception that regional geographic characteristics are 
the major determinant of the choice between producing exportable versus traditional products. 
In particular, the finding about the spatial distribution of blueberry production raises the 
possibility  that  other  factors,  such  as  producer-specific  attributes  and  farm-specific 
geographic characteristics, may play an important role in the export-production decision. 
The firm‘s decision to produce for foreign markets and export, commonly called the 
export decision, has been studied extensively for manufacturing industries. In general, these 
studies have found that exporting firms are larger and more capital  intensive, pay higher 
wages, hire more skilled workers, and, importantly, are more productive than non-exporters 
(Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard et al., 2007; Wagner, 2007). Previous studies have placed 
special emphasis on the role of productivity in the export decision because productivity is 
related to firms‘ competitiveness and economic growth. In fact, productivity seems to be the 
main  factor  that  differentiates  exporters  from  non-exporters (Melitz,  2003),  although  the 
causality  between  productivity  and  exports  is  not clear.  Several  studies  have  focused  on 
whether productivity is a cause of exports (the self-selection hypothesis) or export activity is 
the  cause  of  higher  productivity  (the  learning-by-exporting  hypothesis)  (Aw,  Chung  and 
Roberts, 2000; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Delgado, Farinas 
and Ruano, 2002; Girma, Greenaway and Kneller, 2004). 
Some studies have focused on factors other than productivity that could be relevant to 
firms‘ export decisions. For example, in a study of spillover effects of exporters on non-
exporters due to their proximity to each other, Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997) found that 
the presence of multinational companies in a specific geographical area positively affects the 
decision to export by domestic firms that are located in that area. On the other hand, using a 
dynamic model, Roberts and Tybout (1997) found that a firm will export only if the expected 
benefits of exporting are greater than the sunk costs involved in the export process. Although 
there has been extensive research on the impact of geographic characteristics on industrial 
production decisions (e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002), 
few studies have used firm level data to consider the role of such factors in firms‘ export 
decisions. Most research has controlled for the effect of geographic characteristics using only 
categorical  variables  such  as  regional  or  provincial  indicators  (e.g.,  Aitken,  Hanson  and 
Harrison, 1997). 
While there have been advances in the study of the export behavior of manufacturing 
firms, little  is known about the export behavior of agricultural firms. Some studies have 
explored the link between productivity and agricultural exports, but only at an aggregated 
level (Arnade and Vasavada, 1995; Gopinath and Carver, 2002). And, although some studies 
have analyzed the production decisions of agricultural firms (Katchova and Miranda, 2004), 
none of them has focused on the export-orientation of production.
1 Any analysis of farms‘ 
export behavior must recognize that agriculture differs considerably from the manufacturing 
industry. In fact, in the Chilean case, most farmers do not export directly. Rather, exporting 
agribusiness firms buy farmers‘ products, make the export decision, and sell the products in 
foreign markets (Echeverria and Gopinath, 2008, Forthcoming). This implies that Chilean 
farmers only produce with an ―orientation‖ towards foreign markets. 
                                                 
1
  An  exception here  is the  study  by  Echeverria  (2006),  who found  that  farm-specific  characteristics  were  more 
relevant than regional geographic characteristics in the export-production decisions of Chilean farmers. Rodrigo Echeverría, Munisamy Gopinath, Víctor Moreira et al. 
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The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  analyze  the  export-production  decision  of  Chilean 
farmers. In particular, we evaluate the relative  impact of producers‘ attributes and farm-
specific physical and geographic characteristics on the decision to produce an exportable 
good - blueberries - in southern Chile.
2 It is important to note that this study does not examine 
the absolute effect of geographic variables on the decision to produce exportables, but rather 
the  relative  effect  of  these  variables  when  the  production  decision  is  compared  among 
neighboring  farms.  More  specifically,  using  farm  level  data,  we  evaluate  whether  farm-
specific geographical variables make a farm inherently better suited for export production 
rather  than  traditional  production.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  we  attempt  to  identify  those 
producer-specific characteristics that affect the production choice. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a simple 
logit model for analyzing the export-production decision of farms. We then describe the 
dataset. This is followed by a discussion of the analysis and the results of the modeling 





Although  existing export-decision models work well  in the context of manufacturing 
industries, they are generally not well suited for explaining the export-production behavior of 
agricultural firms (farms). 
As mentioned above, Chilean farms often do not export their products directly. Instead, 
marketing  firms  make  the  export  decision,  with  farms‘  export  participation  limited  to 
producing the commodities or goods that will subsequently be exported. Thus, because it is 
these marketing firms that actually make the export decision in Chile, we employ a simple 
model that is based on the approach of Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997), who studied the 
export behavior of manufacturing firms in a static context.
3 
We assume that farms can produce domestic-oriented products (i.e., traditional products), 
exportables, or both. The production of exportables differs from the production of traditionals 
in both prices and costs. 
The production of exportables is desirable because of their higher prices. However, 
production  is  constrained  by  the  cost  function,  which   is  determined  by  farm -specific 
geographic  characteristics (e.g.  soil  type,  availability  of  water  for  irrigation)  and  some 
producer-specific  attributes  (e.g.  productivity,  age  of  the  farmer).  We  assume  that  the 
production cost function of traditionals  is a lso constrained by geographic characteristics 
and/or producer attributes.
4 Thus, to make its production decision, a profit maximizing farm i 
will calculate the following:
5 
 
                                                 
2
  Unlike  Echeverria  (2006), the  focus  here  is  only on  blueberry  production,  more than  90  percent  of  which  is 
exported.  Clearly, farmers that produce only blueberries have more of an export orientation than other farms. 
3
 Dynamic models, such as the one proposed by Roberts and Tybout  (1997), cannot be used in this study due to the 
nature of data. 
4
 In practice, geographic characteristics seem to have less of an effect on traditionals than exportables because all 
farms produce at least a traditional product. However, for the sake of simplicity, we do not i nclude this factor 
in our model. 
5
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where  t  and  e  indicate  traditional  and  exportable  production,  respectively,  p  represents 
product prices (not necessarily specific to the farm), q represents the quantity of production, 
c(∙) are the production cost functions,  S represents the producer-specific attributes, and G 
represents the farm-specific geographic characteristics. We assume that the production cost 
functions are increasing and convex in their respective arguments. 
The optimal output choice may be zero for either kind of production. All firms produce 
positive quantities of traditional products but, in practice, firms can produce zero export-
oriented products. Using this framework, we estimate the probability that a farm will produce 









y otherwise            
(2) 
 
which indicates whether or not a farm i has positive production of exportables. Equation (2) 
assumes that the decision to produce exportables is a continuous latent variable (
i
e q ) that can 
be observed only in two stages: produce exportables (y = 1), or not (y = 0). The estimation of 
the discrete choice model in equation (2) allows us to obtain consistent estimates of factors 
underlying the optimal solution to 
i
e q . Note that the probability that y will take the value 1 is 
equal to the probability that the latent variable 
i
e q  is greater than zero (Long, 1997). So, it 
follows from equation (2) that the probability that the i-th farm will produce exportables is 
given by: 
 
Pr( 1) Pr( 0) Pr( 0)
i i i i i
e y y S G ,      (3) 
 
where 
i  is the random error; S
i is a vector of farm- or producer-specific characteristics (e.g. 
education,  size,  age)  arising  from  the  production cost  function,  and    is  the  associated 
parameter  vector  that  measures  the  relative  importance  of  these  characteristics  to  the 
probability  of  export  production;  G
i  is  the  vector  representing  farm-specific  geographic 
characteristics,  and  the  parameter  vector    measures  their  relative  importance  to  the 





The analysis of farms‘ export-production decisions requires data on both export-oriented 
and domestic-oriented producers. Export-oriented producers are relatively rare, which means 
that a completely random sample may not allow for a comparison between the two types of Rodrigo Echeverría, Munisamy Gopinath, Víctor Moreira et al. 
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producers (Bernard et al., 2007). Indeed, according to the 2007 Chilean Agricultural census 
(Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadísticas,  2007),  only  5  percent  of  farmers  export  directly  or 
indirectly. Thus, in order to include export-oriented producers in the sample, we first selected 
a random set of producers from all export-oriented producers and then randomly selected 
another set of producers from those that are domestic oriented. This two-step process is 
explained in more detail below. 
 
 
Selection of Producer Samples 
 
In the first step, export-oriented producers were selected from a database of the Natural 
Resources  Information  Center  of  Chile  (CIREN)  (Centro  de  Información  de  Recursos 
Naturales, 2007), which contains information about Chilean fruit producers, including the 
final destination of production (i.e., domestic or foreign markets). An analysis of these data 
shows  that  more  than  90  percent  of  blueberry  production  is  exported.  Thus,  blueberry 
producers were treated as export-oriented producers, despite the fact that these farmers can 
also produce some traditional products. Blueberry producers receive invoices with prices that 
are based on foreign sale prices. That is, farmers are aware that they are producing for foreign 
markets. This implies that they know the risks, costs and benefits of making the production 
decision. CIREN‘s data are reported in a geographical information system format. This means 
it is possible to know the exact location of each farm. Using this geographical information, 
for each export-oriented producer, a traditional producer (within a 5 km radius of the export-
oriented producer) was selected randomly. This method of selecting farmers guarantees that 
the comparison of export-oriented and traditional producers will be based on farm-specific 
geographic characteristics, because we have controlled for those geographic variables that are 
regional (e.g. temperature or precipitation levels) and hence not specific to individual farms. 
In this way, a random sample of 100 export-oriented producers and 100 domestic-oriented or 
traditional producers was selected. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of these producers. 
Each of the farms in our sample was visited between November 2007 and January 2008, 
and  a  brief  interview  was  conducted  with  each  producer  to  obtain  the  farm-specific 
geographic characteristics and producer attributes. Next, the data for each farmer were linked 
to the data from the 2007 agricultural census. Because of several inconsistencies in the census 
data, complete information was available for only 70 farmers. It is important to note that 
farmers were not willing to answer personal questions about producer-specific attributes such 
as their educational levels, their age, and whether there is a separate farm manager, because 
they  had  already  been  asked  these  questions  in  the  2007 census. Thus,  our  econometric 
analysis is based on two samples: one with 200 producers, which includes only farm-specific 
geographic  characteristics,  and  another with  70  producers, which  includes  both  producer 






Farm-specific geographic variables were analyzed based on the particular  location of 
each  farm.  Some  of  these  variables  had  to  be  collected  and  interpreted  directly  by  the The Export-Production Decision of Chilean Farmers 
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interviewer (with the collaboration of the farmer). In the case of blueberry producers, the 
analysis of variables was restricted to the area of the farm where blueberries were being 
produced.  For  traditional  producers,  farmers  were  asked  to  identify  an  area  that  could 
potentially be used to produce blueberries. This area was used to identify the value of some 
geographic variables, such as ―irrigation‖, ―drainage‖, ―slope‖, ―acidity of soil‖, and ―access 
to the farm.‖ 
Irrigation  is an important factor in the production of blueberries. In our analysis, this 
variable includes the availability of water as well as the water rights owned by farmers. It 
takes the value 0 if it is not possible to irrigate (i.e., no water and/or no water rights), and 1 
otherwise. ―Drainage‖ indicates the capability of soils to drain water. Soils with insufficient 
drainage are not suitable for producing blueberries. Thus, the variable takes the value 0 if the 
soil has drainage problems, and 1 otherwise. It is important to note that the irrigation and 
drainage variables are closely related because  irrigation projects must include  a drainage 
system. 
The  ―slope‖  variable  represents  the  slope  of  the  area  that  is  used  for  producing 
blueberries (or, in the case of traditional producers, the area that could potentially be used for 
producing them). It takes the value 0 if the terrain is almost flat (slope less than 30º), and 1 
otherwise. An important characteristic of blueberries is that they grow well in acidic soils, so 
the variable ―acidity of soil‖ is also included. Farm-specific soil acidity was obtained using a 
dataset from the Centro Tecnológico de Suelos y Cultivos (CTSyC). Soils with strong acidity 
received the value of 0, and 1 otherwise. The variable ―access to the farm‖ represents the 
quality  of  roads  for  accessing  the  farm.  Good  quality  roads  make  the  transportation  of 
products and labor easier. Thus, this variable takes the value of 0 if access is poor, and 1 
otherwise. 
Given  that  production  of  blueberries  is  highly  labor  intensive,  another  geographic 
variable  included  in the study was a farm-specific index of labor availability. This index 
depends not only on the labor supply that a geographical area can offer, but also the cost of 
commuting to the farm. A  labor availability  index (LAI) that considers labor supply and 
commuting is given by: 
 
11
1000 LAI PNC PNT




where DNC is the distance to the nearest city, PNC is the population of the nearest city, DNT 
is the distance to the nearest town, and PNT is the population of the nearest town. The index 
is  standardized  by  dividing  by  1000. This  index  was created  considering  that  farmers  hire 
people from either the nearest city (high labor supply) or town (low labor supply). In general, 
a city was considered as such if its population was above 50,000 people.  
It is important to note that the index captures the availability of labor  in relative terms. 
That is, it compares labor constraints between farms based on their geographical location. For 
example, a farm that is located close to a big city will have higher labor availability than a 
farm that is located far away from this city. In the same line, if a farm is located very close to 
a town, it will have lower labor availability than a farm located close to a city. 
 





Data on producers‘ characteristics were collected from the 2007 Chilean  Agricultural 
Census. Variables such as education (years of schooling of the farmer, gender (male/female), 
age of farmer, presence of a farm manager, and farm size are included. Although the trade 
literature argues that productivity is an important factor that determines the export decision 
(Wagner, 2007), it was not possible to obtain a measurement of productivity (e.g. total factor 
productivity) for this study. In particular, although technical efficiency could be used as a 
proxy for productivity, the nature of the data made such an analysis impossible. 
Farmers operate in a multi output-input context, i.e., they produce several products (e.g., 
grains, cattle) and use many inputs (e.g., fertilizers, labor), but each product requires a unique 
set and level of inputs. The techniques available to address this issue require disaggregated 
data  on  quantities  of  main  products  and  inputs.  However,  such  data  are  not  available. 
Nevertheless, several studies have found a strong and positive correlation between highly-
skilled workers and productivity (Munch and Skaksen, 2008; Turcotte and Rennison, 2004). 
Thus, we  have  used  the  educational  level  of  farmers  as  a  proxy  for  productivity.  This 
approach also has the advantage of avoiding the need to correct for endogeneity caused by 
any causality between productivity and exports (i.e., self-selection and learning-by-exporting 
hypotheses). 
Descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables  for  our  samples  of  70  and  200  producers  are 
presented in Table 1. For the sample of 70 farms, these statistics indicate that average farm 
size and years of education are considerably higher for export-oriented producers than for 
domestic-oriented producers. 
On the other hand, age, slope, drainage and the labor availability index are higher for 
domestic-oriented  producers  than  for  export-oriented  producers.  Since  all  export-oriented 
producers in this sample had irrigation facilities and none of the domestic oriented producers 
had irrigation (i.e., there is a perfect match), we dropped this variable from the econometric 
analysis of this sample. Statistics for the sample of 200 farms follow the same pattern that the 
sample of 70 farms. However, it is important to note that a 60% of traditional producers have 
irrigation, while 99% of blueberry producers have irrigation (only 1 producer of blueberries 
does not have irrigation). 
In all cases studied, farmers sold their products to marketing firms that were private 
entities.  In  most cases (about  80%) farmers  had contract sales  with  theses  firms which 
guarantee that firms will buy (and consequently export) their products. 
These contracts include an estimated price that the producer will receive. However, final 
prices paid to farmers will correspond to the actual prices paid  in the final market (after 
deducting transaction costs and earnings of marketing firms). Thus, exporting firms assume 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Export-Oriented (Blueberry Producers) and Domestic-




Domestic-oriented producers    Export-oriented producers 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max    Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                   
Sample of 70 farms  n = 48    n = 22 
Farm area (hectares)  48.1  75.5  0.5  400.0    123.5  165.5  0.8  550.0 
Gender (0: female; 1: male)  0.8  0.4  0.0  1.0    0.8  0.4  0.0  1.0 
Age of farmer (years)  63.1  13.1  37.0  90.0    58.1  17.1  32.0  88.0 
Education (years)  9.3  3.5  0.0  17.0    13.9  3.6  8.0  17.0 
Manager (0: No; 1: Yes)  0.1  0.3  0.0  1.0    0.3  0.5  0.0  1.0 
Irrigation (0: No; 1: Yes)  0.7  0.5  0.0  1.0    1.0  0.0  1.0  1.0 
Acidity of soil (0: Strong; 1: Weak)  0.4  0.5  0.0  1.0    0.6  0.5  0.0  1.0 
Drainage (0: Poor; 1: Good)  0.3  0.5  0.0  1.0    0.1  0.3  0.0  1.0 
Slope (0: Flat; 1: Steep)  0.4  0.5  0.0  1.0    0.2  0.4  0.0  1.0 
Access to farm (0: Poor; 1: Good)  0.8  0.4  0.0  1.0    0.8  0.4  0.0  1.0 
Labor availability index  5.4  6.8  0.6  39.4    5.1  6.8  0.6  31.2 
                   
Sample of 200 farms  n = 101    n = 99 
Irrigation (0: No; 1: Yes)  0.6  0.5  0.0  1.0    1.0  0.10  0.0  1.0 
Acidity of soil (0: Strong; 1: Weak)  0.5  0.5  0.0  1.0    0.6  0.5  0.0  1.0 
Drainage (0: Poor; 1: Good)  0.3  0.5  0.0  1.0    0.2  0.3  0.0  1.0 
Slope (0: Flat; 1: Steep)  0.4  0.5  0.0  1.0    0.3  0.4  0.0  1.0 
Access to farm (0: Poor; 1: Good)  0.9  0.3  0.0  1.0    0.9  0.3  0.0  1.0 
Labor availability index  4.7  5.6  0.6  39.4    7.1  10.7  0.6  31.2 
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on sample‘s data. 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The export-production decision is analyzed through logistic regression. Two logit models 
are estimated in our analysis. The first model uses the complete sample of producers (200 
farms)  and  includes  only  those  variables  that  are  related  to  farm-specific  geographic 
characteristics.  The  second  model  adds  producer-specific  attributes  to  the  geographic 
characteristics,  but  considers  only  the  sample  of  70  producers.
6  The  two  models were 
regressed using robust standard errors (Huber-White standard errors), since a plot of residuals 
showed some degree of heteroskedasticity. 
The results are presented in Table 2. A comparison of the two specifications reveals that 
model 2 has a higher likelihood value ( -27.47) and higher pseudo R
2 (0.37) than model 1 
(-106.19 and 0.25, respectively). These results suggest that the export production decision is 
better explained when both producer-specific attributes and geographic characteristics are 
included in the model. The results for each model are discussed in more detail below. 
                                                 
6
 Some interaction effects were analyzed, but no significant effect was found. Rodrigo Echeverría, Munisamy Gopinath, Víctor Moreira et al. 
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Table 2. Export-production decision of Chilean farmers analyzed through a  
Logit Model 
 
  Model 1    Model 2   
         
Producer-specific attributes         
         
Education      0.403  *** 
      (0.112)   
Sex      0.556   
      (0.744)   
Age      -0.021   
      (0.030)   
Manager      -0.361   
      (1.204)   
Area      0.004   
      (0.004)   
         
Farm-specific geographic characteristics         
         
Irrigation  4.177  ***     
  (1.035)       
Drainage  0.912  **  2.222  ** 
  (0.415)    (0.942)   
Labor Availability Index  0.042  *  0.088  * 
  (0.022)    (0.050)   
Slope  -0.203    -0.934   
  (0.347)    (0.946)   
Access  -0.382    -0.055   
  (0.519)    (0.960)   
Acidity  0.046    0.950   
  (0.359)    (0.745)   
Constant  -3.743  ***  -7.383  *** 
  (0.961)    (2.443)   
         
Number of observations  200    70   
Wald chi
1  34.51    21.59   
Log-likelihood value  -106.19617     -27.47   
Pseudo R
2  0.2339    0.3694   
Source: Authors‘ calculations. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
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Results for Model 1 
 
In  model  1,  the  ―irrigation‖  variable  has  a  positive  coefficient,  which  is  statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. As explained above, irrigation  in a commercial orchard 
depends on having both physical access to water and the property rights for using it. The 
coefficient on ―drainage‖ is also positive and significant at the 5 percent level. In practice, 
Chilean farmers treat irrigation and drainage as part of one, interconnected system, because 
irrigation projects include the drainage of water derived from irrigation. Thus, these two 
variables should be considered complementary factors. 
The ―availability of labor‖ variable deserves special attention. In a preliminary analysis, 
distance from the farm to the closest city or town and the sizes of these urban areas were 
included in the estimation. However, none of these variables was significant, despite the fact 
that in interviews both domestic-oriented and export-oriented farmers indicated that labor is 
an important factor in the decision to produce blueberries. Thus, in the subsequent analyses, 
the labor availability index was included to capture the effect of this factor. In model 1, this 
index  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  at  the  10  percent  level.  This  means  that  the 
probability of producing blueberries will be higher if farms are located near urban areas that 
have abundant labor and/or the cost of transporting labor is low (i.e., the distances between 
farms and sources of labor are short). 
 
 
Results for Model 2 
 
As indicated above, we excluded the ―irrigation‖ variable from model 2 because there 
was a perfect match between this variable  and the production of blueberries (that  is, all 
blueberry producers had irrigation, but no domestic-oriented producers had irrigation). As in 
model 1, ―drainage‖ had a positive sign and was significant at the 5 percent level and the 
―labor availability index‖ had a positive sign and was significant at the 10 percent level. None 
of  the  other  farm-specific  geographic  variables  had  a  significant  effect  on  the  export-
production decision. 
Regarding the producer-specific attributes included in model 2, ―education‖, the proxy 
for productivity, was the only variable with a positive and significant effect (at the 1 percent 
level) on the decision to produce exportables. That is, producers with an orientation toward 
foreign markets appear to be more productive than domestic-oriented producers. This result is 
consistent with previous studies on the export decision in the manufacturing sector (Bernard 
and Jensen, 2004), which find that firms with higher productivity tend to be exporters. The 
coefficients on other farm-specific attributes (i.e., age, gender, manager, and farm size) in 
model 2 were not statistically significant. 
 
 
Analysis of Marginal Effects 
 
The previous discussion of the export-production decision has focused on the signs of the 
coefficients  (i.e., whether  a  variable  has  a  positive  or  negative  effect  on  the  decision  to 
produce exports) rather than on the relative magnitude of the impacts of producer attributes 
versus farm-specific geographic characteristics. To estimate these relative impacts, marginal Rodrigo Echeverría, Munisamy Gopinath, Víctor Moreira et al. 
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effects are calculated for each of the explanatory variables. Formally, the marginal effect of 
the l










             
(5) 
 
where the partial derivative of the non-linear cumulative distribution function with respect to 
a particular variable (Xjl) will depend on the level at which the other independent variables are 
evaluated (Wooldridge, 2002). For model 2, the marginal effects for the three variables that 
were  significant  in  the  regression  analysis—education,  the  labor  availability  index,  and 
drainage--are 0.0645, 0.0142, and 0.3560, respectively (these marginal effects were evaluated 
with the other variables held at their means). Thus, drainage seems to be relatively more 
important in the export-production decision than the other two variables. However, given the 
nonlinearity of variables in discrete choice models, the marginal effects can mask the true 
magnitude of the variable of interest when it is analyzed for values other than its mean. To 
address this problem, the predicted probabilities of export participation arising from each 
significant variable are derived as: 
 
  ( 1| , ) ( ) j jl j P y X X X
           
(6) 
 
where  () P  is the predicted probability when all variables except  jl X  are evaluated at their 
respective  means.  Thus,  holding  all  other  variables  at  their  means,  the  effect  on  export 
participation of changing  jl X  can be illustrated with a plot of  (.) P  
Figures 2, 3(a) and 3(b) show the predicted probabilities of export participation due to 
changes  in  education,  drainage,  and  the  labor  availability  index.  Figure  2  indicates  that 
education has a positive relationship with the probability of producing exportables. That is, 
farmers with  more  education,  who  are  thus  more  productive,  are  more  likely  to  produce 
exportables.  In  fact,  when  farmers  have  a  college -level  education,  the  probability  of 
producing exportables can reach up to 50 percent. In the case of ―drainage‖ (see figure 3(a)), 
the probability of producing blueberries reaches up to 30 percent when there is no problem 
with soil drainage. The  labor availability  index seems to have the strongest effect on the 
decision to produce exportables. As shown in figure 3(b), when there is a high availability of 
labor (the combined effect of being close to the source of labor and having this source of 
labor be abundant) the probability of a farm deciding to produce exportables can be close to 
90 percent. 
It is important to note that when the drainage variable is close to zero, that is, when soil 
drainage is very bad, the probability that a farmer will produce exportables is very low (this is 
very similar to the case of irrigation, which is essential for producing blueberries). On the 
other hand, the analysis indicates that when the other two variables (education and the labor 
availability index) are at their minimum values, there is still some probability of participating 
in blueberry production. In the case of labor, this result can be explained by the use of family 
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Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities Due to Changes in Drainage and Labor Availability Index. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this study has been to evaluate the relative  importance of producers‘ 
attributes and farm-specific geographic characteristics on the export-production decision of 
Chilean farmers through a case study of blueberry producers in southern Chile. The spatial 
distribution of blueberry producers -who represent export-oriented producers- and traditional 
farmers suggests that the export-production decision is likely influenced more by producer-
specific attributes and farm-specific geographic characteristics than by regional geographic 
characteristics. 
Results  obtained  from  the  logistic  regression  suggest  that  education,  a  proxy  for 
productivity, is a producer-specific attribute that is key to the export-production decision. 
Thus, policies aimed at encouraging agricultural exports should include efforts to improve 
farmers‘ formal education as well as technical training. 
Irrigation and drainage appear to be the main physical geographic variables that affect the 
export-production decision. The positive effects of these factors on agricultural production are 
well known in Chile. In fact, since 1985 there has been a national program that encourages 
irrigation and drainage projects by subsidizing up to 75 percent of the costs of such projects 
(Law 18,450). Although this policy has been successful in helping many farmers increase 
their production possibilities, it appears that traditional farmers have not benefited from it. 
Thus, another way to encourage export production would be to improve the availability of The Export-Production Decision of Chilean Farmers 
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and access to water, which expands farmers‘ production choices. It is necessary to note that 
although  the  blueberry  production  requires  irrigation,  the  presence  of  irrigation  does  not 
necessarily imply production of blueberries. This is evident when the sample of 200 farms is 
analyzed and 60% of traditional producers have irrigation. 
Finally,  the  results  of  the  analysis  suggest  that  distance  from  metropolitan  areas 
influences the export-production decision through its effects on labor costs, which arise from 
variations in both wages and commuting costs. Since fruit production is labor intensive, farms 
with lower labor costs have a higher probability of engaging in exportable production. This 
geographic effect, arising from proximity to larger and more urbanized regions, is particularly 
strong in our sample of blueberry producers, who export 90 percent of their production.  
In summary, this research has provided new insights into the factors that determine the 
export-production decision of Chilean farmers. By focusing on export-oriented and domestic-
oriented farms that are located near each other, we control for regional climatic factors and 
are  thus  able  to  assess  the  relative  impact  of  producers‘  attributes  and  farm-specific 
geographic  characteristics  on  the  decision  to  produce  exportables.  We  find  that farmers‘ 
educational levels, their access to water, and the availability of labor are key to expanding 
farmer‘s production choices to include export products. In the short run, farmers who have 
high levels of education, good labor availability and irrigation should be targeted to promote 
export-oriented  production.  However,  in  the  long-run,  policies  should  be  directed  at 
eliminating education and irrigation as a barrier facing farmers. However, as labor availability 
is associated with the geographical  location of farms and  is determined by many factors 
influencing the economy at large and so is difficult to address.  
Although  the  present  study  was conducted  based  on  the  blueberry  production,  their 
results can be easily extended to any other similar product (e.g., most berries). Indeed, this 
research methodology can be adapted to investigate the factors that are related to the export-
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